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Trade Policy Review Body

OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING ENVIRONMENT

ANNUAL REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL[1]

(up to 30 June 2026)

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[1] This Report covers trade and trade-related measures implemented up to 30 June 2026. The Report is presented pursuant to Paragraph G of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism mandate in Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement and aims to assist the Trade Policy Review Body in undertaking its annual overview of developments in the international trading environment that are having an impact on the multilateral trading system. The Report is issued under the responsibility of the Director General. It has no legal effect on the rights and obligations of Members, nor any legal implications with respect to the conformity of any measure noted in the Report with any WTO Agreements or any provisions thereof.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This WTO Trade Monitoring Report[2] covers trade policy measures implemented until 30 June 2026. The Report shows that trade policy activity intensified in 2025 and remained elevated in the first six months of 2026, with the number of trade and trade-related measures rising to its highest level since the 2009 Global Financial Crisis. The global trading environment continued to be shaped by tensions among major trading partners, ongoing armed conflicts, and heightened geopolitical uncertainty. The reporting period was characterized by a range of new measures as well as adjustments to existing trade measures across major economies, including changes to tariffs, export controls, and sector-specific measures. Bilateral trade relations also evolved, with some tensions easing through agreements and negotiated arrangements, while others intensified with the introduction of new tariffs and other trade restrictions.

2. The pace of new trade-facilitating measures accelerated sharply in the first half of 2026, with 466 measures recorded, exceeding the 391 measures introduced during all of 2025, largely reflecting temporary measures introduced in response to disruptions associated with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. In the first half of 2026, newly introduced import-facilitating measures covered USD 1.3 trillion (5.2% of world imports) (USD 360 billion, i.e. 1.4% of world imports of which were associated with measures related to the Hormuz situation), down from USD 1.6 trillion (6.7%), in 2025. Export-facilitating measures reached a record USD 570 billion (2.3% of world exports) more than five times the USD 102 billion (0.5%) recorded in 2025. Out of this amount, USD 239 billion (1.0% of world exports) was associated with measures related to the Hormuz situation.

3. The pace of other (restrictive and other non-facilitating measures, excluding trade remedies) newly introduced trade and trade-related measures also increased, with 333 measures recorded in the first half of 2026, compared with 300 new measures in all of 2025, with a notable increase in export-related measures. Import-related other measures covered USD 2.0 trillion (8.0% of world imports) in the first half of 2026, compared with USD 2.8 trillion (12.0%) in all of 2025, while export-related coverage surged from USD 163 billion (0.7% of world exports) in 2025 to USD 794 billion (3.2%) in the first half of 2026.

4. As a consequence, the stockpile[3] of import-related other trade measures (restrictive and other non-facilitating measures, excluding trade remedies) introduced since 2009 and still in force continued to increase steadily, affecting 21.3% of world imports (or USD 5.4 trillion) as of 30 June 2026, compared with 20.4% at the end of 2025 and 12.1% at the end of 2024. The stockpile of export-related such measures also reached its highest level since 2009, covering 6.3% of world exports (or USD 1.5 trillion) on 30 June 2026, up from 4.0% at the end of 2025 and 3.7% at the end of 2024.

5. World trade performed more strongly than expected in the first half of 2026, despite disruptions from the Middle East conflict, thanks to surging demand for AI-enabling goods. The WTO forecast for merchandise trade volume growth in 2026 was revised up to 3.9%, 2 percentage points higher than the previous baseline forecast of 1.9% issued in March. Commercial services trade growth was revised down to 3.3% from 4.8% in the March baseline forecast, reflecting the impact of the conflict on transport and travel. In value terms, merchandise and commercial services trade increased by around 15% and 14% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, respectively.

6. The multilateral trading system has remained resilient despite significant trade policy changes, with around 72% of global goods trade continuing to take place on Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) terms. This resilience underscores the continued importance of the WTO as an anchor of predictability and stability in global trade, while recent developments reinforce the need to adapt and reform the organization to remain fit-for-purpose in a rapidly changing global trading environment.

[2] This Report reflects the transition to a revised reporting cycle and covers developments from 1 July 2025 to 30 June 2026, while presenting annual and semi-annual statistics where appropriate.

[3] The stockpile refers to the value of trade covered by measures introduced since 2009 that remained in force as of the reporting date.

SPECIFIC FINDINGS

7. This Report arrives against a backdrop of stronger-than-projected merchandise trade growth in the first half of 2026, with surging demand for AI-enabling goods offsetting the effects of the Middle East conflict. While the conflict has disrupted shipments of fuels and fertilizers to the rest of the world, demand for semiconductors and electronic components has remained exceptionally strong. Consequently, the WTO's **forecast for world merchandise trade volume growth in 2026** from the October Global Trade Outlook and Statistics (GTOS) report has been revised to 3.9%, up from 1.9% from last March, more than double the baseline forecast from the March GTOS. Merchandise trade in current US dollar terms was up 15% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, with the value of traded electronic components recording growth of 51%, underscoring the role of AI investment as a driver of trade.

8. Commercial services trade has also been affected by the Middle East conflict, particularly in the transport and travel sectors. As a result, the forecast for commercial services trade volume growth in 2026 has been revised to 3.3%, down from 4.8% in the March baseline forecast. However, trade in digitally delivered services is expected to remain resilient. In value terms (USD), commercial services trade was up around 14% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, although growth is estimated to have slowed to around 11% in the second quarter.

9. **Trade policy activity remained high in 2025 and the first half of 2026**, with the number of newly introduced measures reaching levels among the highest observed since the Trade Monitoring Exercise began in 2009. The rise in trade policy activity was not driven by the largest economies alone; rather, it was broad-based across the membership. The number of trade-facilitating measures increased significantly in the first six months of 2026. At the same time, the number of other (restrictive and other non-facilitating, excluding trade remedies) trade and trade-related measures also increased. This development partly reflects a series of bilateral and global trade actions taken by major trading partners, since early 2025. At the same time, WTO Members continued to pursue constructive dialogues, including to address underlying imbalances, and stepped-up efforts to reach negotiated solutions.

10. In 2025, 1,229 new trade and trade-related measures were introduced by 105 WTO Members and Observers, comprising 391 trade-facilitating measures, 538 trade remedy actions (391 initiations and 147 terminations), and 300 other trade and trade-related measures. In the first six months of 2026 alone, another 1,048 new measures were recorded by 109 WTO Members and Observers, comprising 466 trade-facilitating measures, 249 trade remedy actions (218 initiations and 31 terminations), and 333 other trade and trade-related measures, reflecting a substantially higher monthly pace than in 2025.

11. The surge in **trade-facilitating measures** during the first half of 2026 largely reflected temporary actions introduced in response to disruptions associated with the situation in the Strait of Hormuz. Overall, new import-facilitating measures in the first six months of 2026 covered USD 1.3 trillion, or 5.2% of world merchandise imports, compared with USD 1.6 trillion, or 6.7%, in all of 2025, with tariff reductions or removals remaining the most common form of facilitation. The trade coverage of export-facilitating measures rose sharply in the first half of 2026 to a record USD 570 billion (2.3% of world merchandise exports), more than five times the USD 102 billion (0.5%) recorded in 2025.

12. In 2025, 300 new **other (restrictive and other non-facilitating, excluding trade remedies) trade and trade-related measures** were recorded, while 333 measures were recorded in the first half of 2026 alone, the highest annual number since 2009 (and bound to increase further over the rest of the year), raising the monthly average of new measures taken from 25.0 last year to 55.5 over the first half of 2026 – more than double. The composition also shifted towards export-related measures, which rose from 24.3% of the total in 2025 to 30.6% in the first half of 2026, with 102 measures already exceeding the 73 recorded in all of 2025. Trade coverage remained substantial: import-related measures covered USD 2.0 trillion (8.0% of world imports) in the first half of 2026, compared with USD 2.8 trillion (12.0%) in all of 2025, while export-related coverage surged from USD 163 billion (0.7% of world exports) to USD 794 billion (3.2%).

13. Specifically in relation to traffic disruptions in **the Strait of Hormuz**, WTO Members and Observers implemented 107 trade and trade-related measures between February and June 2026, 65% of which were trade-facilitating, reflecting efforts to maintain trade flows amid supply disruptions. As of 30 June 2026, virtually all, or 96 measures, remained in force. Energy products accounted for 60% of all measures, and fertilizers and fertilizer inputs for 11%, reflecting concerns over energy and agricultural supply security. Asia accounted for 34% of measures, followed by Europe (21%) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (14%).

14. Import-facilitating measures taken in relation to the Hormuz situation were greater than export ones, covering USD 360 billion (1.4% of world imports), compared to export-facilitating measures at USD 239 billion (1.0% of world exports). Export-related other trade and trade-related measures (non-facilitating, other than trade remedies) covered USD 287 billion (1.2% of world exports), compared with only USD 7.6 billion (0.03% of world imports) for other import measures. The Americas and Asia accounted for the largest shares of import-facilitating trade coverage, at 41.7% and 38.9%, respectively, while the Middle East accounted for 56% of export-facilitating coverage. Overall, the trade policy response to the Strait of Hormuz situation was stronger than that following the outbreak of the war on Ukraine but smaller than during COVID-19. Its higher share of trade-facilitating measures pointed to a stronger focus on sustaining trade. Members and Observers also introduced 140 general economic support measures to address broader economic effects.

15. As of 30 June 2026, the **stockpile**[4] **of import-related other trade and trade-related measures** (restrictive and other non-facilitating measures, excluding trade remedies) introduced since 2009 and still in place reached USD 5.4 trillion (21.3% of world imports), up from USD 4.8 trillion (20.4%) at the end of 2025. The **stockpile of such export-related measures** increased significantly, reaching USD 1.5 trillion and covering 6.3% of world exports as of 30 June 2026, up from 4.0% (USD 907 billion) at the end of 2025 and 3.7% (USD 819 billion) at the end of 2024.

16. Across selected **sectors that have attracted particular attention in recent trade policy debates**, the trade coverage of newly implemented import measures was generally higher in the first half of 2026 than during the whole of 2025. Compared with 2025 as a whole, average sectoral trade coverage in the first half of 2026 was 223.6% higher for import-facilitating measures and 74.3% higher for other import measures. Import-facilitating measures covered more than half of global imports of semiconductors and rare earths (52.9% and 51.2%, respectively) and showed substantial increases in trade coverage for energy products and fertilizers and inputs. Other import measures (restrictive and other non-facilitating measures, excluding trade remedies) had broader trade coverage than facilitating measures for PV cells and electric vehicles, covering 34.7% and 22.8% of sectoral imports, respectively.

17. **Trade remedy actions** continued to be a frequently used trade policy tool among WTO Members, although the trade affected by these measures remained limited. In 2025, 538 trade remedy actions were recorded, comprising 391 initiations and 147 terminations, with initiations averaging 32.6 per month and covering USD 89.8 billion (0.4% of world imports). In the first half of 2026, 249 actions were recorded, comprising 218 initiations and 31 terminations; initiations increased to 36.3 per month while terminations fell to 5.2, with trade coverage reaching USD 71.0 billion for initiations (0.3% of world imports) and USD 6.0 billion for terminations (less than 0.1%).

18. **General economic support measures** appeared to remain significant for WTO Members and Observers, although the information submitted to the WTO has declined and provides only a partial picture of their scope and evolution. External data sources provide broader coverage and suggest that industrial and agricultural support reached a post-global financial crisis high of USD 108 billion in 2024, with particularly strong support directed to sectors such as solar panels, semiconductors, steel, and aluminium and remained at high levels in 2025-2026. There was a growing emphasis on industrial policies aimed at pursuing strategic and broader policy objectives, including strengthening supply chain resilience and addressing national security and geopolitical concerns. In 2025-26, support measures remained largely motivated by competitiveness, resilience and security of supply, and climate change mitigation, together accounting for 89% of stated policy rationales, while national security and geopolitical considerations accounted for the remaining 11%.

[4] The stockpile refers to the value of trade covered by measures introduced since 2009 that remained in force as of the reporting date.

19. WTO Members continued to use the **SPS and TBT Committees' transparency mechanisms** to notify their sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures and to discuss and often resolve their specific trade concerns (STCs) non-litigiously. In the first half of 2026, Members submitted 1,115 SPS notifications, and 2,496 notifications in 2025, with food safety remaining the most frequent objective of regular notifications. A total of 95 SPS STCs were raised or discussed during the reporting period, including 32 new concerns and 10 addressing persistent issues. In the first half of 2026, Members submitted 1,322 new regular TBT notifications and 2,879 notifications in 2025, most of which indicated the protection of human health or safety as their main objective. About 209 (40 new and 169 previously raised) STCs were discussed in the TBT Committee in 2025, while 70 STCs were discussed in the first half of 2026, including 18 new STCs and 11 addressing persistent issues.

20. Throughout the review period, many WTO Committees remained important platforms for addressing trade-related issues, enabling Members to engage constructively on actual or potential areas of friction. For instance, in the **Committee on Agriculture (CoA),** Members posed a total of 344 questions on specific implementation matters (SIMs), individual notifications, notification compliance, and outcomes achieved in agricultural negotiations. Most of these (88% of questions on notifications and 60% on SIMs) concerned domestic support policies. Of the 99 SIMs raised during the reporting period, 52 were raised for the first time, with 73% of these new SIMs concerning domestic support policies. The Committee also actively engaged on the topic of technology transfer in agriculture and continued its discussions on food security under the dedicated Work Programme targeting the food security concerns of least-developed countries (LDCs) and net food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs), including follow-up to its agreed recommendations.

21. WTO Members and Observers introduced 130 new **measures affecting trade in services** in 2025, and 52 new measures in the first six months of 2026, broadly in line with the pace observed in previous years. Among the 116 new measures introduced over the past 12 months, most (60%) were aimed at facilitating trade or enhancing regulatory frameworks. Half were horizontal measures affecting multiple service sectors and modes of supply, while the remainder mainly targeted Mode 3 (commercial presence), Mode 4 (movement of natural persons), or digital services across multiple modes of supply.

22. WTO Members and Observers continued to refine **their intellectual property (IP)** regimes. Recognizing the IP's growing importance as a driver of innovation, competitiveness, and economic growth, they continued to modernise their IP systems, reflecting global, regional, and domestic initiatives to keep pace with technological advances and evolving economic realities.

23. This Report also provides updates on several other important trade-related developments and discussions, including fisheries subsidies; e-commerce; Aid for Trade; government procurement; dispute settlement; trade and development; trade facilitation; trade finance; micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs); regional trade agreements (RTAs); and trade and environment.

MAIN FACTS AND FIGURES

Trade measures recorded for goods in the first six months of 2026 and in 2025

- Jan-Jun 2026: 1,048 new measures by 109 WTO Members and Observers were recorded: 466 trade-facilitating measures, 249 trade remedy actions (218 initiations and 31 terminations) and 333 other trade and trade-related measures.
- 2025: 1,229 new measures by 105 WTO Members and Observers: 391 trade-facilitating measures, 538 trade remedy actions (391 initiations and 147 terminations) and 300 other trade and trade-related measures.
- Trade policy activity remained high, with the number of trade-facilitating measures increasing significantly in the first six months of 2026. At the same time, new other trade and trade-related measures (restrictive and other non-facilitating, excluding trade remedies) reached their highest level since 2009 during the first half of 2026 alone.

Trade coverage of new trade measures on goods recorded in the first six months of 2026 and 2025

Trade-facilitating measures[5]

- Import-facilitating measures covered an estimated USD 1.3 trillion of imports (5.2% of world imports) in January-June 2026, compared with USD 1.6 trillion (6.7% of world imports) in 2025.

[5] See Box 1.1 for definitions and context.

- Export-facilitating measures covered an estimated USD 570 billion of exports (2.3% of world exports) in January-June 2026, compared with USD 102 billion (0.5% of world exports) in 2025.
- Based on trade coverage estimates, the monthly pace of trade-facilitating measures increased in the first six months of 2026 compared with 2025, particularly for export-facilitating measures.

Trade remedies

- Initiations of trade remedy investigations covered an estimated USD 71.0 billion of imports (0.3% of world imports) in January-June 2026, compared with USD 89.8 billion (0.4% of world imports) in 2025.
- Terminations of trade remedy actions covered an estimated USD 6.0 billion of imports (less than 0.1% of world imports) in January-June 2026, compared with USD 21.4 billion (0.1% of world imports) in 2025.
- The monthly pace of trade covered by initiations increased in the first six months of 2026 compared with 2025, while that of terminations declined. Anti-dumping was the most frequently used trade remedy, accounting for more than 80% of initiations and about 90% of terminations in both periods.

Other trade and trade-related measures (restrictive and other non-facilitating measures, excluding trade remedies)

- Import-related other measures covered an estimated USD 2.0 trillion of imports (8.0% of world imports) in January-June 2026, compared with USD 2.8 trillion (12.0% of world imports) in 2025.
- Export-related other measures covered an estimated USD 794 billion of exports (3.2% of world exports) in January-June 2026, compared with USD 163 billion (0.7% of world exports) in 2025.
- The monthly pace of trade covered by other measures increased in the first six months of 2026 compared with 2025, with a particularly significant increase for export measures.

Stockpile of other measures (restrictive and other non-facilitating measures, excluding trade remedies): the value of trade covered by measures introduced since 2009 and remaining in force as of the reporting date

- As of 30 June 2026, 21.3% of world imports (USD 5.4 trillion) were affected by such import measures introduced since 2009 and still in place, compared with 20.4% (USD 4.8 trillion) at the end of 2025 and 12.1% (USD 2.9 trillion) at the end of 2024. The stockpile expansion of measures affecting imports slowed down in the first half of 2026, following a substantial expansion between 2024 and 2025.
- As of 30 June 2026, 6.3% of world exports (USD 1.5 trillion) were affected by such export measures introduced since 2009 and still in place, compared with 4.0% (USD 907 billion) at the end of 2025 and 3.7% (USD 819 billion) at the end of 2024. The stockpile of measures affecting exports has grown continuously since 2022, with a substantial further increase in the first half of 2026.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1. This Report is submitted to the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) pursuant to Paragraph G of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism mandate in Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement. Paragraph G provides for an annual Report by the Director-General to assist the TPRB in undertaking its annual overview of developments in the international trading environment that are having an impact on the multilateral trading system. The previous Report was circulated on 20 November 2025.[1]

1.2. Following the informal consultations on Trade Monitoring led by the TPRB Chair, Ambassador Kairat Torebayev of Kazakhstan, between 30 September 2025 and 2 February 2026, the timing of the circulation of the WTO Trade Monitoring Report was advanced by one month, and the annual reporting period adjusted to a June-to-June cycle, facilitating the presentation of annual and semi-annual statistics. Accordingly, this Report covers trade and trade-related measures up to 30 June 2026[2], unless otherwise indicated, and presents annual indicators for the full year 2025 and semi-annual indicators for the first six months of 2026.

1.3. The Report is issued under the responsibility of the Director-General and is based on data. It has no legal effect on the rights and obligations of Members, nor does it have any legal implication with respect to the conformity of any measure noted in the Report with any WTO Agreement. The Report is also without prejudice to the right of Members to implement trade measures. Further background on Trade Monitoring and methodological explanations are contained in Box 1.1. The objective of the Trade Monitoring Reports is to assist Members in providing transparency regarding the latest trends and developments in the implementation of a broad range of trade policy measures. The Report also includes concise updates on a wide range of substantive WTO activities and provides the latest information on key indicators of the world economy and global trade.

1.4. At the WTO's 8th Ministerial Conference in December 2011, Ministers recognized the regular work undertaken by the TPRB in monitoring trade and trade-related measures, took note of the work initially undertaken in the context of the Global Financial Crisis in 2009, and directed it to be continued and strengthened. They invited the Director-General to continue presenting the Trade Monitoring Reports on a regular basis. Ministers committed to duly comply with the existing transparency obligations and reporting requirements for the preparation of these Reports, and to continue to support and cooperate with the WTO Secretariat in a constructive manner.[3]

1.5. Information on measures included in this Report and in the WTO Trade Monitoring Database (TMDB)[4] has been collated from inputs submitted by WTO Members and Observers and from other official sources, including notifications to the WTO and public sources. The latter include governmental websites, portals of other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and specialized monitoring initiatives such as the Global Trade Alert. For the preparation of this Report, initial responses to the Director-General's request for information along with information gathered from other public and official sources were made available to delegations for verification. Overall, responses to the Director-General's request for information and to the subsequent verification request were received from 66 Members (counting the European Union and its member States separately) (Box 1.2), representing 41.5% of the membership, and covering around 72.1% of world imports. Three Observers also replied to the request for information.

1.6. In 2023, the WTO Secretariat introduced an online platform through the TMDB to facilitate the submission and verification of trade measures by Members and Observers and the exchange of information between the Secretariat and delegations. The platform aims to increase participation in the Trade Monitoring Exercise and continues to be refined, including based on input and suggestions from delegations.

1.7. The TMDB provides online access to trade measures implemented during the reporting period, as well as to measures implemented outside the reporting period and those recorded since the beginning of the Trade Monitoring Exercise in October 2008.

[1] WTO document WT/TPR/OV/28, 20 November 2025.
[2] In addition to the trade policy measures implemented during the period under review and recorded by this Report, other measures that impact trade flows may have been taken by WTO Members and Observers.
[3] WTO document WT/L/848, 19 December 2011.
[4] WTO, Trade Monitoring Database. Viewed at: http://tmdb.wto.org.

1.8. The structure of this Trade Monitoring Report is as follows: Section 1 provides an Introduction. Section 2 provides a brief account of recent economic and trade developments and includes the most recent forecasts for world trade growth. Section 3 provides information on trade and trade-related policy developments during the reporting period, with a particular focus on goods trade, including the incidence, composition and trade coverage of new and existing measures, alongside concise updates on several areas of WTO work. Policy developments in trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) are included in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 provides a factual overview of the compliance and timeliness of Members' notifications to the WTO.

1.9. The Report contains several topical boxes prepared by the WTO Secretariat. The boxes in Section 3 provide an overview of the impact of disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz on global fertilizer trade and as well as recent trends in global trade in critical minerals.

1.10. In addition, the Report includes boxes contributed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Global Trade Alert (GTA), respectively entitled "OECD MAGIC Database: New Insights into Global Industrial Subsidies", "Taking the Pulse of Global Trade Policy" (jointly prepared with the WTO Secretariat) and "Two Tracks Diverge: Support Measures and the Shifting Logic of Policy Intervention".

Box 1.1 About the WTO Trade Monitoring Report

Since 2009, the WTO Trade Monitoring Reports have provided Members with regular updates on trade and trade-related developments. Initially conceived to provide the WTO Director-General with regular briefings on the trade implications of the global financial crisis, the WTO Trade Monitoring Exercise under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) quickly developed into a collaborative exercise with WTO Members and Observers. The verification process is an important element in this exercise, allowing Members and Observers to check, adjust, or rectify the description and coverage of their own trade and trade-related measures. Several TPRM Appraisals since 2009 have confirmed the importance that delegations attach to the verification process and to the close collaboration between the WTO Secretariat and WTO Members and Observers. Delegations have also highlighted the contribution of the Trade Monitoring Exercise to enhancing transparency regarding trade and trade-related developments.

The Trade Monitoring Report is a transparency exercise, providing information on recent trends in the implementation of a broad range of policy measures affecting trade and an up-to-date overview of the global trading environment. The Report is factual in nature and has no legal effect on the rights and obligations of WTO Members. In line with the overall objectives of the TPRM, the information it contains carries no legal implication with respect to the conformity of any measure with any WTO Agreement.[a]

The Reports categorize trade measures as: Measures Facilitating Trade; Trade Remedies; Other Trade and Trade-Related Measures; Measures Affecting Trade in Services[b]; and Trade-related measures concerning Intellectual Property Rights. In the context of regular TPRB meetings on Trade Monitoring and consultative processes undertaken as part of the TPRM Appraisals, delegations have emphasized the importance of taking into account the specific, and sometimes complex, contexts in which trade measures are implemented, including with respect to Trade Remedies and Other Trade and Trade-Related Measures.

Trade Remedies comprise anti-dumping, countervailing duties, and safeguard measures. Discussions among WTO Members have recognised that certain trade remedy measures may be taken to address perceived market distortions resulting from the trade practices of other trading partners. The Anti-Dumping Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures allow WTO Members to impose anti-dumping (AD) or countervailing duties (CVD) to offset what is perceived to be injurious dumping or subsidization of products exported from one Member to another. The Trade Monitoring Reports aim to enhance transparency regarding the use of such instruments through the systematic collection and statistical analysis of relevant data.

Trade measures on goods that fall outside the categories of Measures Facilitating Trade and Trade Remedies are classified under Other Trade and Trade-Related Measures. This category reflects the fact that only some of these measures may directly restrict trade (following, for example, Deardorff's (2014)[c] definition), while others may have more ambiguous effects on trade, depending, for instance, on how they are designed or applied in practice. This category therefore serves as the repository for measures that are neither clearly trade-facilitating nor trade remedies.

Some delegations have emphasised that measures listed in the Other Trade and Trade-Related Measures category should be considered in their specific context. For instance, certain measures may have been introduced in response to actions taken by other trading partners. The Secretariat seeks to reflect relevant contextual information in the description of individual measures, based on information provided through official sources and by the delegation concerned during the verification process.

Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures covered in the Reports are reported separately in the relevant sections and are not classified or counted as either trade-facilitating or other measures. The substantive sections on SPS and TBT developments note that an increase in notifications may reflect, among other factors, greater transparency regarding these measures. They also recall that the SPS and TBT Agreements provide Members with the possibility to adopt such measures in pursuit of legitimate policy objectives.

Trade Monitoring Reports – Circulation and access

Since 2009, the Trade Monitoring Reports have been circulated under the WTO document series WT/TPR/OV, entitled "Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment" – Annual Report by the Director-General. The document series has its basis in Annex 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO and is intended to assist the TPRB in its deliberations. The Trade Monitoring Report is circulated as an official WTO document through DocsOnline, rather than as a WTO publication through the WTO Publications portal. This distinction is relevant when comparing access and download statistics for the Trade Monitoring Report with those for WTO publications.

By comparison, the World Trade Report and the WTO Annual Report are WTO publications intended for a broader audience and are made available through the WTO Publications portal. Trade Policy Reviews are also available through both the WTO Publications portal and DocsOnline, the WTO's official documentation portal.

The WTO webpages for the WTO-wide and G20 Trade Monitoring Reports circulated in November and December 2025 recorded around 13,100 page views between late October 2025 and 24 September 2026, and the 2025 Reports were downloaded about 1,090 times. These figures are not directly comparable with those reported in previous years, as the WTO has adopted a new method for measuring website use. They may also reflect changes in how users find information online, including the growing use of AI-generated search summaries, which allow users to access information without visiting the WTO website directly.[d]

The WTO Trade Monitoring Database, which provides the underlying platform for the Trade Monitoring Exercise and serves as a basis for the Trade Monitoring Reports, provides a further channel for accessing information on trade and trade-related measures and for downloading the Reports. Available usage statistics for the TMDB start from 7 December 2020. Between that date and 22 September 2026, the database recorded 63,054 visits by 55,579 unique visitors, a 28% increase in unique visitors compared with the corresponding figure reported in the previous Report. During the most recent 12-month period, 11,765 unique visitors accounted for 12,802 visits, a 6% increase in unique visitors compared with the corresponding figure reported in the previous Report. The five leading countries of origin for these visits were China (more than 2,500 visits), the United States (780), Switzerland (750), Viet Nam (620) and India (450).

a See also paragraphs A and G of Annex 3 to the Marrakesh Agreement.
b In previous years, trade measures were presented in the Annexes of the Reports as follows: Annex 1 – Measures Facilitating Trade; Annex 2 – Trade Remedies; Annex 3 – Other Trade and Trade-Related Measures; and Annex 4 – Measures Affecting Trade in Services. Trade measures have often been referred to by their corresponding Annex number.
c Deardorff, A. V. (2014), Terms of Trade: Glossary of International Economics, 2nd Revised Edition.
d These figures reflect data from 26 October 2025 to 24 September 2026.

Source: WTO Secretariat statistics based on data from the WTO website and TMDB.

Box 1.2 Participation in the preparation of this Report

1. Albania
2. Algeria[a]
3. Argentina
4. Australia
5. Azerbaijan[a]
6. Bangladesh
7. Brazil
8. Canada
9. Chile
10. China
11. Colombia
12. Costa Rica
13. Dominican Republic
14. Egypt
15. European Union
16. Hong Kong, China
17. Jamaica
18. Japan
19. Republic of Korea
20. Lebanon[a]
21. Macao, China
22. Maldives
23. Mauritius
24. Mexico
25. Montenegro
26. Myanmar
27. New Zealand
28. North Macedonia
29. Peru
30. Philippines
31. Russian Federation
32. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
33. Seychelles
34. Singapore
35. South Africa
36. Sri Lanka
37. Switzerland
38. Chinese Taipei
39. Thailand
40. Türkiye
41. Ukraine
42. United Kingdom

a Observer.

Note: Participation refers to responses received from Members and Observers following the Director-General's request for information of 30 March 2026 and the request for verification of 26 August 2026.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

2 RECENT ECONOMIC AND TRADE DEVELOPMENTS

2.1. Merchandise trade remained resilient in the first half of 2026 as headwinds from the ongoing conflict in the Middle East were outweighed by stronger than expected demand for AI-enabling goods. The conflict also had a negative impact on commercial services trade, particularly transport and travel services, while the boost from AI-related spending was smaller than for merchandise trade. In response, the WTO has upgraded its forecast for world merchandise trade volume growth in 2026 while downgrading its expectations for services trade growth. Merchandise and commercial services trade are both expected to pick up in 2027, although the outlook for next year is highly dependent on the course of the Middle East conflict and the durability of AI-related investment.

2.2. According to the WTO's latest Global Trade Outlook and Statistics (GTOS) report of 8 October 2026, growth in the volume of world merchandise trade should reach 3.9% in 2026, stronger than the 1.9% rise foreseen in the baseline forecast from the previous GTOS report in March. Meanwhile, commercial services trade volume growth should come to 3.3% in 2026, less than the March baseline forecast of 4.8%. Trade growth should strengthen globally in 2027, reaching 4.1% for merchandise and 6.4% for commercial services. Based on current projections, the volume of world goods and services trade is expected to increase by around 3.7% in 2026 and 4.7% in 2027. Trade growth will be accompanied by world GDP growth at market exchange rates of 2.6% in 2026 and 2.9% in 2027. Projections for next year are premised on a timely resolution to the Middle East conflict.

2.3. Asia is expected to record the strongest merchandise export volume growth of any region in 2026 at 9.9%, followed by North America at 5.7%, Africa at 5.6%, and South America[1] (3.4%). The volume of exports should decline slightly in Europe at -0.1%, while sharper contractions are expected in the CIS[2] region at -3.9%, and in the Middle East at -17.2%. Asia is also expected to have the strongest import volume growth at 9.5%, followed by Africa at 8.9%, the CIS at 8.8%, and South America at 4.6%. Imports are likely to grow more slowly in North America at 1.4% and in Europe 0.5%, whereas a sharp contraction is expected in the Middle East at -15.4% (Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Merchandise trade volume and GDP growth, 2022-2027

Annual % change

	Historical data				March 2026 baseline forecast		Updated forecast	
	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2026	2027
World trade[a]	**2.4**	**-0.9**	**2.7**	**4.2**	**1.9**	**2.6**	**3.9**	**4.1**
Exports								
North America	4.0	3.5	2.2	2.8	1.4	2.7	5.7	1.5
South America[b]	3.1	2.5	6.1	3.4	3.5	2.5	3.4	3.4
Europe	2.3	-2.9	-2.0	-0.5	0.5	1.9	-0.1	1.8
CIS[c]	-2.2	-3.9	4.5	0.9	1.3	-0.5	-3.9	5.3
Africa	-2.0	5.7	-1.4	5.9	1.2	2.2	5.6	-0.7
Middle East	3.9	7.9	6.3	5.2	0.6	2.6	-17.2	23.3
Asia	0.4	0.2	8.3	9.6	3.5	3.2	9.9	5.2
Imports								
North America	5.8	-2.0	4.6	2.8	0.3	3.2	1.4	2.7
South America[b]	3.9	-4.4	6.0	8.8	2.5	3.4	4.6	4.7
Europe	4.7	-4.9	-2.0	2.1	1.3	1.9	0.5	1.4
CIS[c]	-5.9	18.1	5.1	2.5	-2.0	0.1	8.8	2.2
Africa	5.9	3.0	2.1	9.5	3.2	3.7	8.9	5.3
Middle East	11.3	8.8	10.2	6.8	1.0	3.0	-15.4	17.0
Asia	-0.8	-0.6	4.7	6.8	3.3	3.1	9.5	5.6
GDP at market exchange rates								
World	3.5	2.8	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.9
North America	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.0	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.1

[1] Refers to South and Central America and the Caribbean.
[2] Refers to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including certain associate and former member states.

	Historical data				March 2026 baseline forecast		Updated forecast	
	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2026	2027
South America[b]	4.3	2.0	2.5	2.9	2.4	2.9	2.5	2.7
Europe	3.8	0.7	1.3	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.3	1.4
CIS[c]	-0.1	4.4	5.1	2.4	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.8
Africa	4.1	3.2	3.3	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.1	4.2
Middle East	7.4	2.1	2.6	2.8	3.3	3.6	-4.0	7.1
Asia	3.5	4.2	4.1	4.4	3.9	3.7	4.3	3.9
Memo items:								
World trade excluding intra-EU	2.3	-0.2	4.0	5.1	2.0	2.6	4.1	4.7
Exports of Europe excluding intra-EU	0.5	-1.8	-1.7	-1.0	0.0	2.0	0.3	2.6
Imports of Europe excluding intra-EU	7.5	-5.9	-0.7	3.7	1.7	1.9	1.4	1.8
Exports of least-developed countries	-2.1	6.1	6.2	7.2	2.9	2.8	4.2	2.6
Imports of least-developed countries	0.0	0.0	4.0	11.4	4.5	5.6	4.3	4.1
GDP of least-developed countries	4.9	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.8	4.7	3.6	4.2

a Average of exports and imports.
b Refers to South and Central America and the Caribbean.
c Refers to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including certain associate and former member states.

Note: Figures for exports of Africa, the Middle East, CIS and least-developed countries in 2025 are low-quality estimates due to insufficient data and should be interpreted with caution.


Sources: WTO-UNCTAD for historical trade statistics. WTO estimates for trade forecasts. Consensus estimates are based on data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations (UN), national statistics and WTO calculations for GDP.

2.4. Chart 2.1 shows regional merchandise trade volume developments through the second quarter of 2026, including the impact of the conflict in the Middle East. Year-on-year export growth in Middle East exports dropped from +13.9% in the fourth quarter of 2025 to -9.5% in the first quarter of 2026, then to -27.7% in the second quarter. Meanwhile, the region's import growth fell from 4.5% in the final quarter of last year to -11.8% in the first quarter of this year, and finally to -19.7% in the second quarter. Figures for the Middle East in Q2 reflect the full impact of the recent conflict in the region, which effectively began in the final month of Q1.

2.5. Chart 2.1 also explains why the forecast for North American import growth in 2026 is relatively modest despite a recent sharp increase in AI-related investment spending. North American imports were down 10.6% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026 mostly due to frontloading of inbound goods shipments in the first quarter of 2025 ahead of higher tariffs. By the second quarter of 2026 year-on-year growth had recovered to 5.3% and annualized quarter-on-quarter growth stood at 10.1%, indicating that underlying import demand in North America is stronger than the 1.4% forecast for the current year might suggest.

Chart 2.1 Merchandise export and import volume indices by region, 2023Q1-2026Q2

Volume index, 2023Q1=100



a Refers to South and Central America and the Caribbean.
b Refers to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including certain associate and former member states.

Note: Quarterly merchandise trade volume indices may diverge slightly from annual indices due to differences in data availability and methodology.

Source: WTO-UNCTAD.

2.6. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the forecast for commercial services trade as measured by exports, since suitable deflators for imports do not exist. Europe is expected to see the strongest export growth of any region at 4.6%, followed by Asia at 4.0%, Africa at 3.1%, North America at 1.7%, the CIS region also at 1.7%, and South America at 1.3%. Meanwhile, the Middle East is expected to register a sharp decline of 10.3%. The category of "Other commercial services" and its subset "Digitally-delivered services" are both expected to record solid growth of 4.8% this year, while Transport and Travel are expected to see growth slow to 0.9% and 0.2%, respectively, as a result of disruptions related to the Middle East conflict. Commercial services trade growth is expected to rise to 6.4% globally in 2027 while growth in Middle East exports is expected to bounce back to 21.1% (assuming the conflict in the region does not extend far into 2027).

Table 2.2 Commercial services trade volume growth, 2023-2027

Annual % change

	Historical data			March 2026 baseline forecast		Updated forecast	
	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2026	2027
World exports	**7.5**	**7.8**	**5.3**	**4.8**	**5.1**	**3.3**	**6.4**
By region							
North America	5.6	7.2	4.2	2.4	2.5	1.7	2.5
South America b	7.6	6.8	4.0	3.4	3.8	1.3	4.8
Europe	4.4	4.9	4.5	5.5	5.1	4.6	5.3
CIS c	5.2	8.2	0.4	2.7	1.2	1.7	3.0
Africa	16.5	8.5	5.9	3.7	3.4	3.1	3.5

	Historical data			March 2026 baseline forecast		Updated forecast	
	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2026	2027
Middle East	18.1	0.3	1.7	6.5	5.6	-10.3	21.1
Asia	12.6	15.4	8.3	4.9	6.4	4.0	8.9
By sector							
Transport	-4.2	7.3	0.5	2.6	2.8	0.9	4.6
Travel	27.2	11.7	5.2	3.9	5.5	0.2	9.2
Other commercial services	6.0	7.0	6.6	5.7	5.5	4.8	6.2
of which: Digitally delivered services	6.4	6.3	5.7	5.6	5.5	4.8	6.3


a Figures for 2026 and 2027 are projections. Trade refers to exports.
b Refers to South and Central America and the Caribbean.
c Refers to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including certain associate and former member states.

Source: WTO Secretariat estimates.

2.7. Chart 2.2 shows world commercial services trade growth by sector in current US dollar terms in the first half of 2026. The value of Transport services was up 10% year-on-year in the first quarter, while preliminary estimates for the second quarter show growth picking up to 15%, considerably outpacing the trade volume forecast due to sharply higher freight rates. Meanwhile, growth in Travel services slowed sharply over the same period, from 15% in Q1 to just 5% in Q2, due to the severe impact of the Middle East conflict on passenger transport, tourist arrivals, jet fuel prices and travel costs. The broad category of other commercial services saw a more modest slowdown, from 14% in the first quarter to 10% in the second quarter. Among its sub-components, Construction appears to have been hardest hit by the conflict, with year-on-year growth in value terms slowing to -2% in Q2 from +10% in Q1.

Chart 2.2 Commercial services trade growth by main sector, 2026 Q1-Q2

Year-on-year % change



Note: Services trade measured as exports.

Source: WTO Secretariat estimates. Preliminary estimates for 2026 Q2.

2.8. Booming AI-related investment has fuelled demand for imported AI-enabling goods including electronic components, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and other key inputs. Until recently, trade in these goods moved broadly in line with overall merchandise trade, but since 2024 it has risen sharply to become one of the main drivers of global trade growth (Chart 2.3). As a result, AI-enabling goods trade contributed 47% of total world merchandise trade growth in value terms in the first half of 2026, while its share in the world total rose to 14.8% from 8.0% in 2023. However, AI-enabling goods trade is highly concentrated geographically, dominated by a handful of Asian economies on the export side and by North America on the import side. Looking ahead, the short-term outlook for trade will depend on whether the AI-related investment proves to be durable and whether gains from this trade are more widely distributed.

Chart 2.3 AI-enabling merchandise trade, 2016-2026 (first half)

Year-on-year % change in USD values and percentage share



Note: Trade is an average of imports and exports. Estimates for AI-enabling goods trade are based on available reporters in the Trade Data Monitor. Data for Viet Nam and the Russian Federation are mirrored.

Source: WTO-UNCTAD (world)/WTO Secretariat estimates (AI-enabling goods).

3 TRADE AND TRADE-RELATED POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

3.1 Overview of policy developments in trade in goods

3.1. This Section builds on the analysis presented in the previous Trade Monitoring Report[1] and examines recent trends in trade and trade-related policy developments in goods. It covers developments in 2025 and the first six months of 2026, following the standard categorization used by the Trade Monitoring Exercise[2]: Measures Facilitating Trade, Trade Remedies and Other Trade and Trade-Related Measures.[3] The Section also covers some specific developments since the circulation of the previous Report, including those in the context of the Strait of Hormuz situation. Trade and trade-related measures collected under the mandate of the Trade Monitoring Exercise are available through the WTO Trade Monitoring Database (TMDB) in all three official WTO languages.

3.2. In 2025, 1,229 new trade and trade-related measures were recorded by 105 WTO Members and Observers, comprising 391 trade-facilitating measures, 538 trade remedy actions (391 initiations and 147 terminations), and 300 other trade and trade-related measures. In the first six months of 2026 alone, another 1,048 new measures were recorded by 109 WTO Members and Observers, comprising 466 trade-facilitating measures, 249 trade remedy actions (218 initiations and 31 terminations), and 333 other trade and trade-related measures, reflecting a substantially higher monthly pace than in 2025 (Chart 3.1).


3.3. Trade policy activity remained high in 2025 and the first half of 2026, with the number of measures recorded reaching levels among the highest observed since the Trade Monitoring Exercise began in 2009, particularly for other trade and trade-related measures. This development partly reflected a series of bilateral and global trade actions taken by a range of WTO Members since early 2025. At the same time, WTO Members continued to pursue constructive dialogues and stepped up efforts to reach negotiated solutions, including on underlying imbalances.

[1] WTO document WT/TPR/OV/28, 20 November 2025.

[2] In previous years, trade measures were presented in the Annexes of the Reports as follows: Annex 1 – Measures Facilitating Trade; Annex 2 – Trade Remedies; Annex 3 – Other Trade and Trade-Related Measures; and Annex 4 – Measures Affecting Trade in Services. Trade measures have been often referred to by their corresponding Annex number. See also Box 1.1. SPS and TBT measures are excluded from this categorization and are addressed separately in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.

[3] By its title, the category - Other Trade and Trade - Related Measures may cover trade-restrictive measures but also acknowledges the possible ambiguous impact on trade of certain measures or the difficulty to determine their effects. Hence, for the purposes of this report, this category serves as a repository for measures that are neither clearly trade-facilitating nor classified as trade remedies. Also, some of the measures recorded in this category may have been introduced in response to actions taken by trading partners.

Chart 3.1 Number of measures introduced by WTO Members and Observers, 2016 to June 2026



Source: WTO Secretariat, Trade Monitoring Database (TMDB), as of 2 October 2026.

3.4. The trends identified above are also borne out by a broader analysis combining different trade policy datasets. The Trade Policy Activity (TPA) Index uses a dynamic factor model to identify common underlying patterns in global trade policy activity and distinguish longer-term trends from cyclical fluctuations. Box 3.1 presents the Index and its latest developments, which point to persistently high levels of global trade policy activity during 2025-2026 amid heightened trade policy tensions among large economies. Moreover, a preliminary nowcast based on the TPA Index through June 2026[4], points to a further potential increase in trade policy activity, despite some slowing earlier in the year.

Box 3.1 Taking the Pulse of Global Trade Policy

Tariffs and other trade measures have moved to centre stage. But how much has trade policy changed globally, and how do recent changes compare with the past? Governments deploy tariffs, export controls, subsidies and other non-tariff measures at high frequency. This multi-instrument, dynamically changing policy environment poses a measurement challenge, which existing indicators address only partially.


The Trade Policy Activity (TPA) Index, developed in joint research by WTO and IMF economists (Centorrino et al. 2025), addresses this gap by constructing a monthly indicator of global trade policy dynamics. Drawing on two complementary monitoring sources — the WTO Trade Monitoring Database (TMDB) and the Global Trade Alert (GTA) — and covering 197 countries and territories since the Global Financial Crisis, it applies a Dynamic Factor Model that treats records of a wide range of policy measures as imperfect signals of latent global trade policy activity and extracts their common dynamics. A trend-cycle decomposition distinguishes long-term shifts from cyclical fluctuations, while a block structure separates the global signal from category-specific variation, with weights determined endogenously from the data. The Index reported here is extended through May 2026.

Figure 1 shows that trade policy activity rose gradually for over a decade before accelerating from around 2020 onwards, coinciding with heightened use of trade policy for broader objectives, such as industrial policy or economic or national security. Distinct peaks are visible around the escalation of US-China tariffs (2018-19), the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic (2020), the war on Ukraine (2022), and renewed trade tensions (2025),

[4] See WTO | 2026 News items - Updated WTO-IMF TPA Index shows continued rise in global trade policy activity, 23 July 2026.

with trade policy activity remaining high and on an upward trend over the years between. The updated data extend this picture through mid-2026.

Figure 1 Trade Policy Activity Index




Note: Trade Policy Activity (TPA) Index (solid black line) refers to the global factor estimated using a dynamic factor model with a block structure. The index is normalized so that its average equals zero over January 2010–December 2011. Positive values indicate heightened activity and negative values reduced activity relative to the baseline. The dashed line shows the estimated trend, and the indicator is smoothed using a three-month moving average. The vertical dotted line marks the end of the baseline sample (October 2025); data through May 2026 are added using the rolling-window approach (see the paper).

Source: Authors' calculations based on Centorrino, Diakantoni, Keck, Ruta, Sztajerowska, and Wei (2025).

The Index reached a new high for the series in early 2026, the most pronounced since the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, when data collection began. Averaged over January-May 2026, global trade policy activity ran nearly twice its 2024 level, and about a quarter above its 2025 average, pointing to a marked intensification of trade policy activity globally.

A key question is how different categories of trade policy contribute to the global pattern. Figure 2 decomposes the Index by distinguishing facilitating measures – actions that reduce restrictiveness or ease trade – from other measures, and further separating the latter into strictly restrictive measures following Deardorff (2014) (e.g., tariff increases, bans, quotas) and other measures, composed mostly of subsidies.

Figure 2 The Role of Facilitating, Restrictive and Remaining Other Measures



Note: The figure shows counterfactual indices for facilitating, restrictive, and remaining other measures. Facilitating measures refer to actions that reduce restrictiveness or ease trade; restrictive measures include tariff increases, bans, quotas and similar measures, following Deardorff (2014), while remaining other measures are composed largely of subsidies. Each line reflects the global factor estimated using baseline loadings for one category only. The level and scale are normalized for comparability across the indices (average equals zero in January 2010–December 2011). Series are smoothed using a three-month moving average. The vertical dotted line marks the end of the baseline sample (October 2025); data through May 2026 are added using the rolling-window approach (see the paper).

Source: Authors' calculations based on Centorrino, Diakantoni, Keck, Ruta, Sztajerowska and Wei (2025).

What patterns emerge?

- First, facilitating and non-facilitating measures display strong co-movement at the global level. During crises like COVID-19 and the war on Ukraine, both categories surged together as countries bundled policies, restricting exports of essential goods while facilitating imports.
- Second, certain episodes – including 2018-19 and 2025 – are marked by divergence across measure categories, which the block structure accommodates.
- Third, the recent rise in activity is driven predominantly by restrictive measures, which have climbed the most steeply through 2025 and into 2026, and is accompanied by a steady increase in subsidies and remaining other measures. Facilitating measures, by contrast, accelerated more modestly in recent years, with a notable exception for measures related to the Strait of Hormuz situation, further widening the divergence registered in 2025.

Importantly, the rise in trade policy activity is not driven by the largest economies alone: while the most pronounced peaks tend to appear among G20 economies, the upward movement is broad-based, with non-G20 economies also rising markedly toward the end of the sample period (see the working paper).

By tracking policy changes by governments, the Index complements broader indicators of trade policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk and provides a timely read on the global trade policy environment. It also lends itself to regular updates and to nowcasting applications, illustrated in the WTO news item.

Note: Centorrino, Samuele, Antonia Diakantoni, Alexander Keck, Michele Ruta, Monika Sztajerowska, and Yuting Wei (2025). "Measuring Global Trade Policy Activity" IMF Working Paper No. 2025/220, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C, and WTO Staff Working Paper No. ERSD-2025-07, Geneva. Deardorff, Alan V. (2014). Terms of Trade: Glossary of International Economics, 2nd ed. World Scientific. This box is largely based on the VoxEU column "Taking the pulse of global trade policy", by Samuele Centorrino, Antonia Diakantoni, Alexander Keck, Michele Ruta, Monika

Sztajerowska, Yuting Wei, 15 June 2026. For IMF authors: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. For WTO authors: This box has been prepared under our own personal responsibility. The opinions expressed in this paper/publication are ours only. They do not represent the positions or opinions of the WTO or its Members and are without prejudice to Members' rights and obligations under the WTO. Any errors are attributable to us as the authors.

Source: IMF and WTO Secretariat.

Measures facilitating trade

3.5. In 2025, a total of 391 new trade-facilitating measures were recorded for WTO Members and Observers. The pace of implementation accelerated sharply in the first half of 2026, with 466 measures recorded between January and June, equivalent to a monthly average of 77.7 measures, the highest level observed in over a decade. This compares with monthly averages of 37.6 in 2022, 29.2 in 2023, 28.8 in 2024 and 32.6 in 2025 (Table 3.1). This increase also includes 70 temporary trade-facilitating measures introduced in response to disruptions related to the Strait of Hormuz situation, as further described in Section 3.1.2.

3.6. Reductions or removals of import tariffs continued to account for the largest share of trade-facilitating measures among all measures recorded since January 2025. Their prominence increased further in the first half of 2026, when 287 such measures were recorded, equivalent to around 61.6% of the total in the semester. The relaxation of quantitative restrictions (QRs) continued to feature prominently in the first half of 2026, with import and export QR measures equivalent to around 8.4% and 11.2% of the total, respectively. Measures aimed at simplifying import customs procedures accounted for around 2.8% of measures recorded during the first half of 2026.

3.7. Import-facilitating measures implemented between January and June 2026 targeted a wide range of products. Among the measures for which product information was available, machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 84) were affected by 33.6% of measures, followed by electrical machinery and equipment (HS 85) (19.4%) and mineral fuels and oils (HS 27) (18.4%). As individual measures may affect products falling under more than one HS chapter, these shares are not mutually exclusive.

Table 3.1 Measures facilitating trade, 2016 to June 2026

Type of measure	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Jan-Jun 2026
Import	**160**	**128**	**158**	**111**	**125**	**163**	**358**	**278**	**283**	**298**	**372**
- Tariff	120	99	121	95	105	132	287	179	174	168	287
- Customs procedures	31	21	17	4	3	10	23	27	34	39	20
- Tax	6	4	7	7	10	9	7	10	19	14	13
- QRs	1	3	4	3	7	9	36	47	45	66	39
- Other	2	1	9	2	0	3	5	15	11	11	13
Export	**43**	**27**	**23**	**18**	**18**	**30**	**91**	**71**	**60**	**91**	**79**
- Duties	9	2	7	11	9	13	25	7	13	38	11
- QRs	7	5	2	3	3	14	57	49	31	34	52
- Other	27	20	14	4	6	3	9	15	16	19	16
Other	**6**	**1**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**5**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**2**	15
Total	**209**	**156**	**183**	**130**	**144**	**198**	**451**	**350**	**345**	**391**	**466**
Average per month	*17.4*	*13.0*	*15.3*	*10.8*	*12.0*	*16.5*	*37.6*	*29.2*	*28.8*	*32.6*	*77.7*

Note: Revisions of the data reflect changes undertaken in the TMDB to fine-tune and update the available information.


Source: WTO Secretariat, Trade Monitoring Database (TMDB), as of 2 October 2026.

3.8. The trade coverage of import-facilitating measures remained high in 2025 and continued at a similar pace in the first half of 2026. In 2025, import-facilitating measures introduced during the year covered an estimated USD 1,574 billion, equivalent to 6.7% of world merchandise imports. Between January and June 2026, the trade coverage was an estimated USD 1,324 billion, or 5.2% of world merchandise imports (Chart 3.2, Panel A). Nearly 30% of this coverage was related to the Strait of Hormuz situation.


3.9. Despite covering only six months, the trade coverage of import-facilitating measures in 2026 amounted to 84.1% of the full-year 2025 level and is likely to surpass the level in 2025 if trends continue.

Chart 3.2 Trade coverage of new import and exports-facilitating measures in each reporting period (not cumulative) in USD billion

Panel A - Import facilitating measures in each reporting period



Panel B - Export facilitating measures in each reporting period



Note: These figures are estimates and represent the trade coverage of the measures (i.e. annual imports or exports of the products concerned from economies affected by the measures) introduced during each reporting period, and not the cumulative impact of the trade measures. Figures have been recalculated to reflect annual data and revised consistently back to 2009. For measures where HS codes were updated, the revised classifications have been incorporated. The data also reflect historical revisions to trade statistics published over time by UN Comtrade.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.10. The trade coverage of export-facilitating measures increased significantly in the first half of 2026. Measures introduced between January and June covered an estimated USD 570 billion, equivalent to 2.3% of world merchandise exports, the highest level recorded since 2012. This was more than five times the USD 102 billion of trade covered by export-facilitating measures introduced during the whole of 2025, equivalent to 0.5% of world merchandise exports (Chart 3.2, Panel B).

3.11. Nearly 40% of the export-facilitating coverage in 2026 was related to the Strait of Hormuz situation.

3.12. Export-facilitating measures implemented between January and June 2026 most frequently affected mineral fuels and oils (HS 27), covered by 44.4% of the 36 measures for which product information was available, followed by cereals (HS 10) (16.7%). Milling products (HS 11), food-industry residues and prepared animal fodder (HS 23), inorganic chemicals (HS 28) and fertilizers (HS 31) were each covered by 8.3% of measures.

Trade remedy actions

3.13. In 2025, 538 trade remedy actions were recorded for WTO Members and Observers, comprising 391 initiations and 147 terminations. Anti-dumping continued to be by far the most frequent type of trade remedy action, accounting for 82.6% of all initiations and 89.1% of all terminations. Trade remedy actions represented 43.7% of all trade-related measures recorded during the year. In the first half of 2026, 249 trade remedy actions were recorded, comprising 218 initiations and 31 terminations, representing 26.2% of all measures recorded. Anti-dumping continued to account for the large majority of trade remedy actions, representing 80.3% of initiations and 87.1% of terminations during this period.

3.14. The 2025 monthly average of initiations of trade remedy investigations stood at 32.6, down from 37.9 in 2024, but remained above the levels recorded in most other years since 2016. The average number of trade remedy terminations also declined, from 16.8 per month in 2024 to 12.3 in 2025, one of the lowest levels recorded over the period shown in Table 3.2. The pace of initiations increased to 36.3 per month in the first half of 2026, while terminations fell more sharply to 5.2 per month, the lowest level recorded in Table 3.2 and Chart 3.3.

3.15. The trade coverage of trade remedy investigations initiated in 2025 was estimated at USD 89.8 billion, equivalent to 0.4% of world merchandise imports. Trade remedy terminations covered an estimated USD 21.4 billion, representing 0.1% of world imports. In the first half of 2026, investigations initiated covered an estimated USD 71.0 billion, or 0.3% of world imports, while terminations covered USD 6.0 billion, representing less than 0.1% of world imports (Table 3.3).

3.16. Trade remedy investigations initiated between January and June 2026 affected a broad range of products. Among the initiations for which product information was available, organic chemicals (HS 29) were the most frequently affected products, covered by 24 initiations (18.9%), followed by iron and steel (HS 72) with 16 (12.6%), plastics and articles thereof (HS 39) with 14 (11.0%), articles of iron or steel (HS 73) with 12 (9.4%), and miscellaneous chemical products (HS 38) with 9 (7.1%). Glass and glassware (HS 70) and electrical machinery and equipment (HS 85) were each covered by 7 initiations (5.5%). As individual investigations may cover products falling under more than one HS chapter, these shares are not mutually exclusive.

Table 3.2 Number of trade remedy actions, 2016 to 30 June 2026


Type of measure	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Jan-Jun 2026
Initiations	**343**	**298**	**273**	**281**	**433**	**214**	**112**	**230**	**455**	**391**	**218**
- AD	298	249	202	215	355	186	89	191	375	323	175
- CVD	34	41	55	36	56	18	19	27	64	54	28
- SG	11	8	16	30	22	10	4	12	16	14	15

Type of measure	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Jan-Jun 2026
Average per month	*28.6*	*24.8*	*22.8*	*23.4*	*36.1*	*17.8*	*9.3*	*19.2*	*37.9*	*32.6*	*36.3*
Terminations	**171**	**158**	**223**	**185**	**214**	**301**	**238**	**132**	**202**	**147**	**31**
- AD	141	129	198	167	182	257	202	112	169	131	27
- CVD	15	12	25	8	13	23	24	9	22	8	2
- SG[a]	15	17	0	10	19	21	12	11	11	8	2
Average per month	*14.3*	*13.2*	*18.6*	*15.4*	*17.8*	*25.1*	*19.8*	*11.0*	*16.8*	*12.3*	*5.2*

a The figures for antidumping and countervailing actions are based on the semi-annual notifications.
b The figure for safeguards for a specific year is the sum of the following: (i) all ongoing investigations terminated during the course of that specific year, without any measure; and (ii) all imposed measures expired during the course of that specific year.

Source: WTO Secretariat, Trade Monitoring Database (TMDB), as of 2 October 2026.

Chart 3.3 Trade remedies initiations and terminations, average number per month



Note: Values are rounded.

Source: WTO Secretariat and Trade Monitoring Database (TMDB), as of 2 October 2026.

Table 3.3 Share of trade covered by trade remedy initiations, 2016 to June 2026

(%)

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Jan-June 2026
Share in total world imports	0.28	0.30	0.56	0.38	0.62	0.19	0.10	0.21	0.48	0.38	0.28

Source: WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.

Other trade and trade-related measures

3.17. Other trade and trade-related measures include measures that are neither clearly trade-facilitating nor classified as trade remedies. Some of these measures may have direct restrictive effects on trade.[5]

3.18. In 2025, a total of 300 new other trade and trade-related measures were recorded for WTO Members and Observers, the highest annual number recorded since the inception of the Trade Monitoring Exercise in 2009 and above the previous peak of 286 measures in 2011. The pace increased further in the first half of 2026, with 333 measures recorded, equivalent to a monthly average of 55.5, compared with 25.0 per month in 2025 (Table 3.4). About 37 of the 333 measures recorded in the first six months of 2026 were related to the Strait of Hormuz situation.

3.19. Most measures recorded in 2025 were import-related, accounting for 226 measures, or 75.3% of the total. Increases in import tariffs were the most frequent type of measure, representing 62.8% of all import-related measures and 47.3% of all measures recorded during the year. The composition shifted notably in the first half of 2026, as the share of export-related measures increased substantially, from 24.3% of all measures in 2025 to 30.6% between January and June 2026. A total of 102 export-related measures were recorded during the first half of 2026, exceeding the 73 measures recorded in the whole of 2025. These measures consisted primarily of export taxes and licensing requirements (57 measures), followed by export quantitative restrictions (33 measures), and export duties (12 measures) (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 Other trade and trade-related measures, 2016 to June 2026

Type of measure	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Jan-Jun 2026
Import	**102**	**87**	**110**	**79**	**74**	**76**	**80**	**128**	**117**	**226**	**229**
- Tariff	63	46	64	41	39	35	44	56	60	142	173
- Customs procedures	18	21	7	9	11	24	12	36	20	33	21
- Tax	7	9	13	6	6	5	0	2	5	13	13
- QRs	13	9	17	18	12	10	18	25	25	32	15
- Other	1	2	9	5	6	2	6	9	7	6	7
Export	**20**	**21**	**17**	**23**	**30**	**74**	**154**	**102**	**54**	**73**	**102**
- Duties	5	4	8	7	5	14	15	15	6	26	12
- QRs	10	9	4	4	11	28	112	61	38	34	33
- Other	5	8	5	12	14	32	27	26	10	13	57
Other	**10**	**11**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**3**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**1**	**2**
- Local content	6	9	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	1	0
- Other	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
Total	**132**	**119**	**127**	**103**	**104**	**153**	**234**	**231**	**171**	**300**	**333**
Average per month	*11.0*	*9.9*	*10.6*	*8.6*	*8.7*	*12.8*	*19.5*	*19.3*	*14.3*	*25.0*	*55.5*


Note: Revised data reflect changes undertaken in the TMDB to fine-tune and update the available information.

Source: WTO Secretariat, Trade Monitoring Database (TMDB), as of 30 June 2026.


[5] See e.g. Deardorff, A. V. (2014), Terms of Trade: Glossary of International Economics, 2nd Revised Edition. In some cases, measures may have been introduced as responses to actions taken by other trading partners and/or may have more nuanced dynamic and general equilibrium effects. Some WTO delegations have emphasized the importance of adopting a more holistic perspective—one that considers the broader context and underlying motivations behind the implementation of certain trade measures.

Chart 3.4 Trade coverage of new other trade and trade-related measures affecting imports and exports identified in each period (not cumulative) in USD billion, 2012 to June 2026

Panel A - Import other measures in each reporting period



Panel B - Export other measures in each reporting period



Note: These figures are estimates and represent the trade coverage of the measures (i.e. annual imports or exports of the products concerned from economies affected by the measures) introduced during each reporting period, and not the cumulative impact of the trade measures. Figures have been recalculated to reflect annual data and revised consistently back to 2009. For measures where HS codes were updated, the revised classifications have been incorporated. The data also reflect historical revisions to trade statistics published over time by UN Comtrade.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.20. The trade coverage of other trade and trade-related measures affecting imports introduced in 2025 was estimated at USD 2,818 billion, equivalent to 12.0% of world merchandise imports, the highest level recorded in the series shown in Chart 3.4, Panel A. Measures introduced during the first half of 2026 alone covered an estimated USD 2,029 billion, or 8.0% of world imports, equivalent to around two thirds of the trade coverage recorded for the whole of 2025. Of this amount, USD 7.6 billion (0.03% of world imports) was related to import measures introduced in response to the Strait of Hormuz situation.

3.21. These estimates are based on annual trade values of the products concerned, while the 2026 figure includes only measures introduced between January and June. Accordingly, although the first-half estimate cannot be mechanically annualized, its magnitude suggests that if the pace of new measures remains similarly high during the remainder of the year, trade coverage in 2026 could surpass the record trade coverage observed in 2025 (Chart 3.4).

3.22. Other trade and trade-related measures affecting imports implemented between January and June 2026 covered a broad range of products. Among the import measures for which product information was available, electrical machinery and equipment (HS 85) were the most frequently affected products, covered by 26.3% of measures, followed by machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 84) (23.7%), articles of iron or steel (HS 73) (21.9%) and plastics and articles thereof (HS 39) (16.7%). As individual measures may affect products falling under more than one HS chapter, these shares are not mutually exclusive.

3.23. Export-related measures implemented between January and June 2026 also affected a broad range of products. Among the measures for which product information was available, mineral fuels and oils (HS 27) were the most frequently affected products, covered by 36.4% of measures, followed by organic chemicals (HS 29) and iron and steel (HS 72), each covered by 13.0%. Animal, vegetable or microbial fats and oils (HS 15), sugars and sugar confectionery (HS 17), and fertilizers (HS 31) were each covered by 9.1% of measures. As with import measures, these shares are not mutually exclusive.

3.24. The trade coverage of newly introduced other trade and trade-related measures affecting exports was estimated at USD 163 billion in 2025, equivalent to 0.7% of world merchandise exports. Trade coverage increased sharply in the first half of 2026, reaching an estimated USD 794 billion, or 3.2% of world exports (Chart 3.4, Panel B). Out of this amount, USD 286.7 billion (1.2% of world exports), was related to measures introduced in response to the Strait of Hormuz situation.

3.25. Despite covering only six months, the USD 794 billion in trade coverage recorded in the first half of 2026 was nearly five times the USD 163 billion recorded for the whole of 2025.

Stockpile[6] of other trade and trade-related measures


3.26. The stockpile provides a complementary perspective to the flow of newly introduced measures described earlier in this Report. Rather than focusing on measures introduced during a particular time period, it encompasses all import-related other trade and trade-related measures introduced since 2009 that remained in force at each reference date, thereby reflecting their cumulative effect on imports. The stockpile represents the estimated value of imports potentially affected by these measures and is calculated using annual merchandise import values from the previous year. This applies also to the semi-annual estimate for 2026. Where import flows are unavailable, the latest available import data are used.

3.27. Estimating the roll-back of these measures and their impact on the stockpile of measures that remain in force since the Global Financial Crisis in 2009 is complicated by the fact that many temporary measures remain in place beyond their intended termination dates. In addition, the Secretariat does not always receive timely and accurate information on changes to and terminations of recorded measures.


[6] The stockpile refers to the value of trade covered by measures introduced since 2009 that remained in force as of the reporting date.

Chart 3.5 Stockpile of other trade and trade related import and export measures introduced since 2009 and in force as of the reporting date,

Panel A - Import other measures in force



Panel B - Export other measures in force



Note: The January-June 2026 estimate is based on other trade and trade related import and export measures up to 30 June 2026. The cumulative trade coverage estimated by the Secretariat is based on information available in the TMDB as of 2 October 2026 on other trade and trade related import measures recorded since 2009. The estimates include import measures for which HS codes were available. The figures do not include trade remedy measures. The import values were sourced from the UN Comtrade database.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.28. The stockpile of other trade and trade-related measures affecting imports introduced since 2009 and that are still in force has increased markedly, although not monotonically. As of 30 June 2026, these measures covered an estimated USD 5.4 trillion, equivalent to 21.3% of world merchandise imports, up from 20.4% at the end of 2025 (USD 4.8 trillion) and 12.1% at the end of 2024 (USD 2.9 trillion), highlighting a substantial increase since 2024 (Chart 3.5, Panel A).

3.29. A substantial increase was also recorded in the trade coverage of terminated measures, rising from USD 60.8 billion in 2025 to USD 1,620 billion as of 30 June 2026, largely reflecting the termination of measures introduced by the US under IEEPA.

3.30. The stockpile of other trade and trade-related measures affecting exports introduced since 2009 and that are still in force has also increased significantly, reaching USD 1,549 billion and affecting 6.3% of world exports, as of 30 June 2026, up from USD 907 billion (4.0%) at the end of 2025 and USD 819 billion (3.7%) at the end of 2024. The stockpile of export-related other measures has continuously increased since 2022, where a first significant increase was recorded, followed with a substantial further increase in the first six months of 2026 (Chart 3.5, Panel B).

Trade coverage of newly implemented import measures in selected sectors


3.31. This subsection examines the trade coverage of newly implemented import measures for a range of sectors receiving considerable media and policy attention over the reporting period, thus providing a more detailed perspective on the aggregate trends presented above. It compares the coverage of import-facilitating and other import measures across selected sectors in 2025 and the first half of 2026. Coverage is expressed as a share of annual imports in the corresponding sector, allowing for the identification of differences in the relative size of covered trade.

3.32. Chart 3.6 presents the shares of global sectoral imports covered by import-facilitating and other import measures implemented in 2025 and between January and June 2026. The sectors shown were selected because they have attracted particular attention in recent trade policy debates and government initiatives, notably in discussions concerning technological development, industrial competitiveness, supply-chain resilience, economic security, and the energy transition. They include essential inputs and technologies used across economic activities, alongside products central to food and energy security. The estimates use annual trade values. Comparisons should therefore take account of the different periods during which measures were implemented.

3.33. Across most sectors examined, measures implemented during the first half of 2026 already covered substantially larger shares of sectoral imports than those introduced during the whole of 2025, indicating broader trade coverage of policy activity in these sectors. Import-facilitating measures generally covered larger shares than other import measures, highlighting Members' efforts to ease access to these products. Facilitating coverage was particularly high for semiconductors and rare earths, at 52.9% and 51.2% of their respective global imports. For semiconductors, this compared with 0.7% in 2025, while import facilitating measures for rare earths remained above half of sectoral imports in the first half of 2026 despite a decrease from 55.1% in 2025. Other notable increases in facilitating coverage included mineral fuels and oils, from 11.7% to 47.7%, and fertilizers and inputs, from 5.6% to 38.7%. These increases partly reflected measures introduced in response to supply disruptions associated with the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, as Members sought to maintain access to essential energy and agricultural inputs.

3.34. For photovoltaic (PV) cells, other measures covered 34.7% of sectoral imports, up from 20.1% in 2025 and above facilitating coverage of 32.1%. This high coverage occurred against a backdrop of trade tensions among major producing and importing economies over market access, domestic industry support and competitive conditions in the sector. Electric vehicles (EVs) were the only other sector examined in which other measures had broader coverage than facilitating measures in the first half of 2026, at 22.8% and 15.3%, respectively.

Chart 3.6 Trade coverage of import measures implemented in selected sectors, 2025 and January–June 2026 (% of annual sector imports)



Note: The sectors shown are non-exhaustive and based on HS product groupings that may overlap. Estimates cover measures implemented during the whole of 2025 and between January and June 2026, respectively, and use annual trade values. HS codes for the advanced technology products group are drawn from the US Census Bureau. Agriculture and fertilizer codes follow the list based on the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) product definition and the product groupings used by the Agriculture and Commodities Division (AGCD). The batteries group covers lithium-ion batteries, fuel cells and other battery categories. The iron and steel group follows the US Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration classification of steel mill products, covering flat products, long products, pipes and tubes, semi-finished products, and stainless steel. The solar PV group follows Caravella et al. (2024), covering photovoltaic cells and modules, upstream inputs, manufacturing equipment and other components along the solar PV supply chain. The semiconductor group comprises five HS subheadings within heading 8541. Rare earth codes follow Hu et al. (2023), while ICT goods codes are drawn from UNCTAD's ICT goods classification. The mineral fuels and oils group covers HS Chapter 27. The critical minerals group is based on the USGS final 2025 List of Critical Minerals, with product codes drawn from the trade-code mapping in Appendix 2 of the accompanying technical report, Open-File Report 2025–1047. The electric vehicles (EVs) group comprises five HS subheadings within heading 8703.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.35. Box 3.2 below provides an overview of recent trends in global trade in critical minerals, drawing on data from the joint WTO-Asian Development Bank (ADB) Trade in Critical Minerals Database. It illustrates the significant expansion of global trade in critical minerals and related products between 2015 and 2024, with exports of finished goods tripling to more than

USD 400 billion and imports increasing more than fivefold, from USD 70 billion to USD 360 billion. These trends underscore the growing importance of critical minerals for the deployment of electronics and microchips, defense and aerospace, low-carbon technologies, medical technology, and the need for resilient and diversified supply chains.

Box 3.2 The growing trade in critical minerals - evidence from the WTO-ADB database

The joint WTO-Asian Development Bank (ADB) database on Trade in Critical Minerals provides trade and tariff data for a non-exhaustive list of approximately 260 critical mineral-related products, identified on the basis of Harmonized System (HS) codes at the subheading level of 6 digits. HS codes are further classified by their stage in the supply chain. Data for 2015–2024, a 10 year-period, show that intermediate goods—partially processed minerals that have undergone some refining—account for the highest trade value in both imports and exports. Over the same period, the export of finished goods—such as batteries, magnets, electronic components critical for many industries, including green technologies like electric vehicles and renewable energy systems, —has tripled since 2015, with annual exports reaching over USD 400 billion in 2024 (Figure 1). Similarly, annual imports of finished goods surged from USD 70 billion in 2015 to USD 360 billion in 2024 (Figure 2).

Figure 1 Gross exports 2015 – 2024





Figure 2 Gross imports 2015 – 2024



Source: Trade in Critical Minerals joint Database WTO-ADB.

Trade in raw and semi-processed minerals also expanded between 2015 and 2024, with a marked increase in 2021–2024, when average exports and imports stood at 74% and 80% above their 2015 levels, respectively. The distribution of export activity across economies shows that Chile and Peru are the leading exporters of raw and semi-processed minerals (Figure 3), while Switzerland and China are the principal exporters of intermediate goods (Figure 4) and finished goods, respectively (Figure 5).

Figure 3 Top of exporters of raw and semi-processed minerals 2015-2024






Figure 4 Top exporters of intermediate goods 2015-2024



Source: Trade in Critical Minerals joint Database WTO-ADB.

Figure 5 Top exporters of finished goods 2015-2024



Source: Trade in Critical Minerals joint Database WTO-ADB.

The rising demand for critical minerals represents an opportunity for developing countries to attract investment and move beyond extraction, making the critical minerals supply chain more resilient. Greater focus on other stages of the value chain, including processing, manufacturing and recycling, could support more sustainable economic growth and reduce vulnerability arising from supply chain concentration in producer countries. International cooperation, including through trade agreements and partnerships, may allow countries to facilitate technology dissemination, reduce barriers to access export markets, and ease the movement of skilled workers.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

Overview of some specific developments

3.36. Similar to the specific developments described in the last Trade Monitoring Report, published in November 2025, the current reporting period was characterized by continued activity on new and adjusted trade measures in major economies, alongside the easing of some bilateral trade tensions and the intensification of others.

3.37. In the US, several measures were introduced under alternative legal authorities following the US Supreme Court's ruling on the use of IEEPA as the basis for reciprocal tariffs. On 24 February 2026, the US introduced a temporary 10% import surcharge under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, citing fundamental international payments problems. The import surcharge applied to imports from all trading partners, subject to certain exemptions. The measure expired on 24 July 2026.

3.38. Separately, on 24 July 2026, the US imposed duties of 10% or 12.5% on imports from 60 economies[7] in response to concerns regarding imports produced using forced labour[8]. During the

[7] Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Australia; Bahamas; Kingdom of Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brazil; Cambodia; Canada; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; European Union; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Iraq; Israel; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Republic of Korea; State of Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Mexico; Morocco; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Peru; Philippines; Qatar; Russian Federation; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South Africa; Sri Lanka; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; and Viet Nam.

[8] Section 301 investigations concerning excess capacity in 16 economies and separate investigations concerning Viet Nam and Germany remained ongoing.

reporting period, the US concluded Agreements on Reciprocal Trade (ARTs) with 10 WTO Members (Argentina, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, and Chinese Taipei) and negotiated Frameworks with the EU, India, Japan, North Macedonia, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland/Liechtenstein, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The 10 WTO Members that concluded ARTs with the US benefited from the lower 10% Section 301 tariff, and in the case of Chinese Taipei, from a combined MFN and Section 301 tariff capped at 10%. Some economies with which Frameworks were negotiated, including the EU and India, similarly benefited from the lower 10% tariff or specific tariff treatment.[9] The US ARTs and related frameworks covered not only tariff commitments, but also a broader range of trade and economic issues, including market access, investment, supply chains, regulatory cooperation, and sector-specific arrangements, as well as commitments to adhere to certain disciplines under the WTO.

3.39. The US also continued to expand and adjust sector-specific trade measures adopted under Section 232, introducing new tariffs and adjusting existing tariff rates, product coverage and tariff-calculation methodologies. Section 232 duties were imposed on trucks and parts (1 November 2025), advanced computing chips (14 January 2026), selected pharmaceuticals (2 April 2026), and unmanned aircraft systems (3 September 2026), while measures on copper, steel, aluminium, and machinery were adjusted in April and June 2026. In some cases, actual rates imposed on certain trade partners under Section 232 tariffs appear to have been calibrated with reference to ARTs and Framework Agreements. The US also maintained the suspension of duty-free de minimis treatment for low-value imports from all economies. As of 24 February 2026, a single *ad valorem* duty rate replaced the previous tiered duty structure for international postal shipments.

3.40. During the reporting period, China was also reported to adjust a range of trade-related measures. According to various media outlets, on 8 November 2025, China introduced export licensing requirements for lithium-ion batteries and related materials reportedly extending them, from 1 January 2026, to also cover certain strategic minerals and battery electric passenger vehicles. According to media reports, China also banned exports of gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel on 11 March 2026, partially easing these measures on 20 April 2026, while introducing export bans on selected fertilizers on 14 March 2026, reportedly terminated on 31 August 2026. China also reportedly prohibited exports of helium on 10 July 2026. While these measures were widely reported in the press, the Chinese delegation, in verifying measures included in the TMDB, stated that these measures were neither adopted nor documented by any official sources, and that several of them had been in place for several years and regularly notified to the WTO.

3.41. On 1 January 2026, China implemented its 2026 Tariff Adjustment Plan, applying lower temporary import duties to 935 product categories. On 1 May 2026, zero-tariff treatment was extended to 20 additional African countries, thereby covering all 53 African countries with which China has diplomatic relations.

3.42. In the EU, tariffs on imports of nitrogen-based fertilizers and related raw material inputs were suspended on 22 May 2026 for one year. On 1 July 2026, the EU introduced a new tariff-rate quota regime for 26 steel product categories, with a 50% out-of-quota duty, replacing the previous EU steel safeguard measure under Regulation (EU) 2019/159. The regime provided differentiated access for MFN and FTA partners and enhanced quotas for Ukraine. On the same date, EU Regulation 2026/1455 reduced tariffs on a significant number of items imported from the US to zero. Also, on 1 July 2026, the EU introduced a EUR 3 customs duty per item on low-value consignments with an intrinsic value not exceeding EUR 150 imported from outside the EU.

3.43. During the reporting period, the US–Canada trade relationship was subject to several trade-policy changes. On 1 July 2026, the deadline for extending USMCA for a further 16 years, the USTR announced that the US would not renew the agreement "in its current form," and subsequently introduced tariff measures under two legal authorities. In addition to the 10% tariff under the Section 301 forced-labour action, the US imposed an additional 50% tariff on wine, dairy, cement, clothing, and sporting goods on 22 August 2026, under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930. The measure covered an estimated USD 20 billion of imports (around 5% of all Canadian exports to the US) and excluded products subject to Section 232 duties. On 29 September 2026, the measure was expanded to include an import ban on certain Canadian products. Canada introduced tariffs of 15%, 25%, or 50% on 648 tariff lines on 8 September 2026, covering around USD 27.6 billion of

[9] The combined MFN and Section 301 tariff was set at 10% where the MFN tariff was below 10%, while the Section 301 tariff was set at zero where the MFN tariff was 10% or higher.

US imports, including steel and aluminium, dairy, appliances, agricultural equipment, pulp and paper, and electronics. US seafood products were excluded from the measure, with Canada being a key export market for such products.

3.44. The bilateral truce between the US and China, effective from 10 November 2025 to 10 November 2026, and subsequently extended through January 2027, resulted in lower or suspended tariffs and the easing of certain export restrictions. The US lowered its fentanyl-related tariffs on Chinese goods to 10% while keeping the existing 10% reciprocal tariff in place, bringing the import duty on most Chinese products to 20%. China maintained a 10% tariff on US goods by suspending, until 10 November 2026, the additional tariffs introduced on 4 March 2025 in response to the US reciprocal tariffs imposed on Chinese products. China also lifted its rare-earth export controls and issued general export licences for key materials.

3.45. During the same period, the US introduced two measures affecting semiconductors. On 23 December 2025, it imposed an additional Section 301 tariff on specified Chinese semiconductors, following a USTR determination that China's practices to dominate the industry were actionable. The tariff was initially set at 0% and is scheduled to rise on 23 June 2027 to a rate to be announced at least 30 days in advance. On 15 January 2026, the US also eased export-licensing requirements for certain advanced computing chips bound for China and Macao, China, shifting the review standard from a presumption of denial to case-by-case review for exports meeting specified certification, security, end-use, and supply-availability requirements.

3.46. On 17 May 2026, the US and China announced a package of commitments and agreed to establish a US–China Board of Trade and a US–China Board of Investment. China committed to easing restrictions on rare earths, critical minerals and related technologies, increasing purchases of US aircraft and agricultural products, restoring market access for US beef, and resuming poultry imports. The Board of Trade released the "30-for-30" framework on 27 September 2026, under which the US and China will each consider reducing tariffs on about USD 30 billion of imports from the other, with no rates or timeline set yet.

3.47. Separately, on 12 January 2026, the EU and China agreed to a framework for price undertakings by Chinese exporters of battery electric vehicles (BEVs). The European Commission issued a guidance document on the submission of minimum-price offers which, if accepted, would suspend the countervailing duties of up to 35.3% imposed in October 2024. During the reporting period, the EU and China also introduced several export-control measures affecting entities from both sides, including measures adopted in April and, reportedly, July 2026.

3.48. Other developments included US tariff measures affecting imports from economies supplying oil to Cuba and certain imports from Nicaragua. Colombia and Ecuador introduced reciprocal tariffs on each other between February and April 2026, which were removed in June 2026. Trade tensions between China and Japan during the reporting period included Chinese restrictions on Japanese seafood and dual-use items introduced in November 2025 and January 2026, respectively, as well as export-control measures affecting certain Japanese entities in June 2026.

3.49. Traffic disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz also had important implications for trade during the reporting period. The Strait is a major maritime passage, carrying around 25% of global seaborne oil trade and nearly 34% of global crude oil trade, including exports from several major Gulf producers.[10] The Gulf region is also an important supplier of fertilizers and fertilizer inputs, often made from fossil fuels, accounting for 24.8% of global nitrogenous fertilizer exports and 11.4% of phosphatic fertilizer exports.[11] Disruptions to shipping through the Strait can therefore affect transport routes and costs, as well as the availability and prices of energy products and fertilizers on international markets. Box 3.3 provides an overview of the trade and trade-related measures introduced by WTO Members and Observers in response to the Strait of Hormuz situation, including trade coverage estimates and related general economic support measures.

[10] Strait of Hormuz Factsheet (IEA, 2026). Viewed at: https://www.iea.org/about/oil-security-and-emergency-response/strait-of-hormuz.

[11] Fertilizer trade impacted by Strait of Hormuz conflict, WTO Secretariat Data Blog. Viewed at: WTO Blog | Data Blog - Fertilizer trade impacted by Strait of Hormuz conflict.

3.50. Apart from such salient developments, notably in major economies receiving wide attention over the reporting period, a more complete and detailed overview of these and other developments is available in the Trade Monitoring Database (TMDB).

3.51. The box below provides an overview of trade and trade-related developments in response to the Strait of Hormuz situation.

Box 3.3 Developments in the context of the Strait of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz has been associated with geopolitical and shipping-related risks, and several episodes in the past affected oil prices and shipping costs, with notable increases during periods of heightened tensions, including in 2012, when Brent crude oil prices reached about USD 126 per barrel, and in June 2025, when prices rose from around USD 69 to USD 79 per barrel within a week (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Monthly Brent crude oil prices, 1987-2026




Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

The disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 affected energy and fertilizer trade and contributed to higher oil prices, with Brent crude oil prices increasing from around USD 71 per barrel in February to USD 103 in March and USD 117 in April. In response, WTO Members and Observers introduced a range of trade measures aimed at facilitating access to essential imports, maintaining domestic supply, and preserving the continuity of trade flows.

Following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz on 28 February 2026 and subsequent related developments through 30 June 2026, the WTO Secretariat identified 107 trade and trade-related measures implemented by 54 WTO Members and Observers in the context of the Strait of Hormuz situation.[12] Most of these measures were trade-facilitating (70, or 65.4%), while the remaining measures (37, or 34.6%) were other measures. As of 30 June 2026, 11 measures had been terminated, according to the available information, including 6 trade-facilitating and 5 other measures, leaving 96 measures in force (Figure 2).

[12] This covers trade and trade-related measures introduced on or after 28 February 2026 affecting goods, that either explicitly refer to the Strait of Hormuz situation or are implicitly linked to it through the products covered, namely energy products, fertilizers, food, and agricultural products. Domestic support measures and general economic support are not covered.

Figure 2 Number of trade and trade-related measures implemented and terminated, between 28 February and 30 June 2026



Source: WTO Secretariat, Trade Monitoring Database (TMDB), as of 2 October 2026.

Among the 96 active measures, 42 targeted imports and 37 targeted exports, with the remainder covering broader trade-related measures. Import tariffs (18 measures) were the main instrument affecting imports, while quantitative restrictions (21 measures) predominated on the export side. Measures were concentrated in energy products, which accounted for 59 measures (62.1%), followed by fertilizers and fertilizer inputs (11 measures, or 11.6%). Regionally, Asia recorded the largest number of measures (34, or 35.4%) followed by Europe (20, or 20.8%) and the CIS (13, or 13.5%).

In trade-value terms, Hormuz-related measures were an important component of trade-facilitating coverage during the first half of 2026, accounting for nearly 30% of import-facilitating coverage and about 40% of export-facilitating coverage; they also represented around one-third of other export coverage, but less than 1% on the import side. Specifically, import-facilitating measures remaining in force covered an estimated USD 360.2 billion, or 1.4% of world imports, while non-facilitating import measures covered USD 7.6 billion (0.03%). On the export side, non-facilitating measures covered USD 286.7 billion (1.2% of world exports) and export-facilitating measures USD 239.0 billion (1.0%).

Energy products dominated the estimated trade coverage of Hormuz-related measures, accounting for 88.3% of import-facilitating, 77.8% of other import, 96.7% of export-facilitating and 95.4% of other export coverage. Besides energy, fertilizers and fertilizer inputs were a notable component of trade-facilitating coverage, accounting for 4.5% of import-facilitating coverage and 3.1% of export-facilitating coverage. Their share of non-facilitating export coverage was more limited, at 1.1%.

Across regions, policy responses were diversified, mirroring varying levels of exposure across economies. Notably, measures implemented by economies in the Americas and Asia accounted for a dominant share of import-facilitating coverage, at 41.7% and 38.9% of import-facilitating coverage, respectively. Meanwhile, the Middle East accounted for the largest share of export-facilitating coverage (56.4%), highlighting efforts by Gulf exporters to maintain or reroute exports.[13]

The Secretariat also identified 140 general economic support measures by 64 WTO Members and Observers in the context of the Strait of Hormuz situation during the reporting period.[14] Domestic support was provided through a range of instruments, most commonly tax reliefs, direct grants, credit support and price-support measures. Tax relief and price-support measures were largely associated with energy products, while grants, production subsidies and credit support covered a broader mix of products, including food, feed and fertilizers. In terms of targeted sectors, many measures were horizontal applying across sectors of the economy, while others targeted the agricultural sector or specific sectors, such as transportation, energy production and generation, energy-intensive industries, small and medium-sized enterprises, and tradable sectors.

Compared with major episodes covered in recent review periods, the policy response to the Strait of Hormuz situation differed in both scale and composition. Over comparable periods, 96 trade and trade-related measures remained active in the context of the Strait of Hormuz, compared with 71 following the outbreak of

the war on Ukraine and 212 during the COVID-19 pandemic. Trade-facilitating measures represented 66.7% of active Hormuz-related measures, compared with 59.0% during COVID-19 and 39.4% in the context of the war on Ukraine. The Secretariat also recorded 140 general economic support measures in the Hormuz context, more than triple the 46 measures identified during the comparable period following the outbreak of the war on Ukraine, but well below the 440 measures recorded during the COVID-19 pandemic.


Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.52. The box below provides an overview of recent developments in fertilizer trade following disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, including their implications for fertilizer prices, trade flows and import-dependent economies.

Box 3.4 Fertilizer trade affected by disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz

The conflict in the Persian Gulf brought outbound fertilizer shipments through the Strait of Hormuz to a near standstill, where they have remained since, despite efforts to reopen the Strait. In 2024, **Gulf region economies[15] supplied 24.8% of global exports of nitrogenous fertilizers** and 11.4% of phosphatic fertilizers. Urea prices spiked following the outbreak of the conflict before returning to pre-conflict levels while phosphate prices increased to a lesser extent but have remained at these levels (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Urea prices increased sharply before returning to pre-conflict levels



Source: World Bank.

The extent of exposure to the disruption varies across importing economies. Analysis by the WTO Secretariat focusing on nitrogenous fertilizers, the nutrient category most exposed to the disruption, combines two indicators for 81 importing economies: the share of net imports as a percentage of domestic consumption of nitrogenous fertilizers, and the share of those imports sourced from Gulf region suppliers. Economies scoring high on both indicators are exposed twice: they cannot substitute domestic production for lost imports, and a large part of their supply base is directly affected by the closure of the strait.


Figure 2 shows that **18 economies, located in the upper-right quadrant, are particularly exposed to disruptions in nitrogenous fertilizer supplies from the Gulf region economies**. The group is dominated by developing economies in Africa — Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe, as well as includes Brazil, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Seven of the 18 are least developed countries.

[13] Alternative routes include Saudi Arabia's west coast, Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates, and the Iraq-Türkiye pipeline.

[14] This covers domestic support measures introduced on or after 28 February 2026 that either explicitly refer to the Strait of Hormuz situation or are implicitly linked to it through the products covered, namely energy products, fertilizers, food, and agricultural products.

[15] "Gulf region economies" include the Kingdom of Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, the State of Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Figure 2: Eighteen economies are particularly vulnerable to nitrogen fertilizer disruptions in the Gulf



Source: WTO Secretariat and FAOSTAT.

Trade policy measures have compounded the shock and narrowed the scope for rerouting supplies. Secretariat estimates suggest that export licences, quotas, and bans introduced since the outbreak of the conflict could affect up to 15% of world fertilizer exports, rising to 23.3% if the closure of the Strait is treated as a de facto restriction on all Gulf exports. Both figures are upper bounds: licensing requirements are not outright bans, and some shipments have continued via alternative routes. Measures recorded by the Agriculture Market Information System[16] since February include tightened controls and subsequently a quota system in China covering urea and sulphuric acid, extended fertilizer export quotas and a temporary ban on sulphuric acid exports in the Russian Federation, and a temporary ban on sulphur exports in Türkiye. Because sulphur is a key input for phosphate fertilizers and also used as a secondary nutrient, such measures affect availability even where finished products are not directly targeted.

For the economies dependant on nitrogenous fertilizer imports identified in Figure 2, the combination of a physical supply shock and restrictions applied by alternative suppliers may limit substitution options. As a direct consequence of the disruption, application rates of fertilizers could be reduced in the upcoming planting seasons, combined with adverse climatic conditions, particularly the anticipated effects of El Niño across many regions, could lead to lower agricultural yields. This, in turn, may exert additional upward pressure on domestic food prices, food security, and the financial viability of farms, with the impact further compounded by higher energy costs.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.2 Trade remedy trends[17]

3.53. This Section describes trends in trade remedy actions between 2023 and 2025.[18]

3.54. WTO Members initiated 391 trade remedy investigations in 2025, covering anti-dumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard investigations. This represents a 14% decrease from the 455 initiations recorded in 2024. By contrast, the total number of trade remedy measures applied

[16] AMIS (Agricultural Market Information System), including the series and data on fertilizers.
[17] This Section is without prejudice to Members' right to take trade remedy actions under the WTO.
[18] These periods coincide with the periods covered by Members' semi-annual reports of anti-dumping and countervailing actions.

by Members increased significantly, rising by 86% from 153 measures in 2024 to 285 measures in 2025.

3.55. Anti-dumping actions account for the largest number of trade remedy initiations and measures applied. Since 2023, most anti-dumping actions have targeted products in the metals, chemicals, plastics and rubber sectors. In 2025, metals, chemicals and machinery products accounted for the largest share of countervailing duty initiations.

3.56. Safeguard measures apply to imports of the product under investigation from all sources and are subject to different rules and timelines than anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures. Initiations of safeguard investigations peaked in 2019, with 30 cases, but have since declined sharply, falling to 4 in 2022, before increasing to 16 in 2024 and decreasing again to 14 in 2025.

Anti-dumping measures[19]

3.57. The total number of anti-dumping initiations increased by 69% between 2023 and 2025 (Table 3.5). Although anti-dumping investigations do not necessarily result in the imposition of measures, an increase in initiations may be an early indicator of a subsequent increase in measures. Between 2023 and 2025, a total of 450 anti-dumping measures were applied. Since anti-dumping investigations may take up to 18 months to conclude, measures applied during a given period may not necessarily relate to investigations initiated during that same period.

Table 3.5 Number of initiations of anti-dumping investigations and measures applied, by Member

Member	2023		2024		2025	
	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures
Argentina	6	6	1	4	0	0
Armenia[a]	5*	2*	1*	0*	7*	6*
Australia	3	0	16	0	8	6
Bahrain, Kingdom of; Kuwait, State of; Oman; Qatar; Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of; United Arab Emirates[b]	4	5	3	1	2	5
Brazil	7	3	37	6	32	16
Canada	1	1	8	4	26	5
Chile	2	0	0	0	0	0
China	1	1	11	2	6	7
Colombia	3	0	6	3	3	4
Dominican Republic	0	0	1	0	1	0
Egypt	0	0	2	0	2	0
European Union[c]	10	5	29	6	30	23
Georgia	0	0	3	0	0	0
Guatemala	0	0	1	0	0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0	1	0
India	45	14	81	33	81	42
Indonesia	10	0	11	3	1	3
Israel	0	0	2	0	0	0
Japan	0	0	1	0	6	1

[19] Anti-dumping and countervailing investigations are counted based on the number (*n*) of exporting countries or customs territories affected by an investigation. Thus, one anti-dumping or countervailing investigation involving imports from n countries/customs territories is counted as n investigations.

Member	2023		2024		2025	
	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures
Jordan	0	0	0	0	1	0
Kazakhstan[a]	5*	2*	1*	0*	7*	6*
Korea, Republic of	3	7	9	2	0	7
Kyrgyz Republic[a]	5*	2*	1*	0*	7*	6*
Malaysia	1	1	9	0	3	9
Mexico	4	6	11	6	20	4
Morocco	2	1	3	1	3	1
New Zealand	0	0	0	0	1	0
Pakistan	0	1	7	4	4	2
Paraguay	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peru	1	1	1	1	4	1
Philippines	1	1	0	0	0	0
Russian Federation[a]	5*	2*	1*	0*	7*	6*
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of[d]	4	0	3	4	2	3
South Africa[e]	1	7	8	2	8	1
Chinese Taipei	1	3	1	1	4	3
Thailand	0	0	3	0	3	3
Türkiye	6	1	23	6	16	20
Ukraine	0	4	7	0	4	6
United Kingdom	1	1	5	0	3	5
United States	64	14	65	39	38	45
Uruguay	1	0	0	1	0	0
Viet Nam	4	1	6	1	3	6
Total	**191**	**86**	**375**	**130**	**323**	**234**


a Member of the Eurasian Economic Union ("EAEU"). All Actions are taken at the level of the EAEU and are counted as one.
b Notified by all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member States collectively, as investigations are initiated by the GCC regional investigating authority on behalf of all GCC member States.
c The European Union is counted as one.
d Notified by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia individually, as these investigations are initiated by its own investigating authority and not by the GCC regional investigating authority.
e Notified by South Africa, but investigations are initiated at the level of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) on behalf of its member States (also for Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia).

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.58. Chart 3.7 shows that anti-dumping initiations and measures have fluctuated considerably over the 2008–2025 period. Initiations peaked at 355 in 2020, before falling sharply to 89 in 2022, they then rebounded to 191 in 2023 and surged to 375 in 2024, the highest level since 1995, before declining to 323 in 2025. Measures applied generally followed movements in initiations with a time lag, reaching their highest level in 2021, with 287 measures, following the 2020 increase in investigations. The strong rebound in initiations in 2024 was followed by a marked increase in measures in 2025, rising to 234 from 130 in 2024.

3.59. Forty-three exporting Members were affected by new anti-dumping investigations in 2023, while 46 were affected in 2024 and 57 in 2025. Imports from China were the most frequent subject of anti-dumping initiations between 2023 and 2025, accounting for 38% of all investigations, compared with 28% in 2013-2015, an increase of 10 percentage points. Imports from India, Thailand and Viet Nam, respectively, accounted for 5% each? of all initiations.

Chart 3.7 Number of initiations of anti-dumping investigations and measures applied, 2008-2025



Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.60. There was little change in terms of the products affected by anti-dumping investigations initiated between 2023 and 2025, with the majority of initiations focused on products in the metals, chemicals, and plastics, and rubber sectors.

3.61. At the regular meetings of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices on 29 October 2025 and on 28 April 2026[20], concerns were raised with respect to 56 anti-dumping actions. Most of these concerns (91%) were raised with respect to anti-dumping actions by India (13), Mexico (9), the European Union (6), China (5), the United States (5), Australia (3), Brazil (3), Indonesia (3), the Republic of Korea (2) and Ukraine (2). The remaining trade concerns were raised with respect to individual anti-dumping actions by Pakistan, South Africa, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and Viet Nam.

3.62. Other issues and concerns raised at the regular meetings were: (i) the length of the United States prolonged anti-dumping measures, and the United States' sunset reviews in general (raised by Japan); (ii) European Union's Regulation (EU) 2017/2321 and Regulation (EU) 2018/825 (Russian Federation); (iii) length of China's anti-dumping measures – prolonged measures – China's sunset reviews in general (raised by Japan); (iv) overall importance of prompt submission of missing legislative notifications for transparency purposes (raised by the United States); (v) European Union's application of anti-dumping measures to products already subject to safeguard measures (raised by Japan); (vi) sharp increase in the number of anti-dumping investigations and measures by the European Union (raised by China) (vii) the negative effects of the geopolitical situation on the Ukrainian economy, its infrastructure, vital production facilities, capacities, cost of production, production, export potential and the ability of the interested parties to defend their interests in anti-dumping investigations (raised by Ukraine); (viii) India's initiation of investigations based on insufficient evidence of dumping (raised by the Russian Federation); (ix) India's intensive use of anti-dumping measures (raised by China); (x) transparency in Canada's administrative reviews (raised by China); duplicative remedies in the United States anti-dumping measures (raised by China); and, the inclusion of "particular market situation" in anti-dumping investigations

[20] WTO documents G/ADP/M/68, 27 November 2025; and G/ADP/M/69, 27 May 2026, respectively.

conducted by China (raised by Canada), conducted by the European union (raised by Japan and Türkiye), and conducted by the United States (raised by Japan).

Countervailing measures

3.63. The data reveal a significant increase in initiations of countervailing investigations, rising from 27 in 2023 to 64 initiations in 2024. In 2025, the number of initiations declined to 54. The overall number of measures applied also increased in 2024, from 11 in 2023 to 15, before rising to 41 in 2025 (Table 3.6). This pattern appears consistent with the time lag between the initiation and conclusion of investigations, as investigations can take up to 18 months. The high number of initiations recorded in 2024 may therefore have contributed to the substantial increase in measures applied in 2025.

3.64. Between 2023 and 2025, 30 exporting WTO Members were affected by new countervailing investigations. Imports from China were the most frequent subject of investigations (63), accounting for 43% of all investigations during this period. Imports from India (17), the second most frequent subject, accounted for 12% of initiations, followed by imports from Viet Nam (10), which accounted for 7% of the total number of initiations.

Table 3.6 Number of initiations of countervailing investigations and measures applied, by Member


Member	2023		2024		2025	
	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures
Australia	0	0	9	0	6	0
Brazil	1	0	0	0	0	0
Canada	1	1	1	1	7	1
China	0	0	1	0	0	0
Colombia	0	0	1	0	0	0
European Union[a]	2	0	3	1	2	3
Iceland	0	0	0	0	1	0
India	3	3	3	0	5	4
Mexico	0	0	1	0	1	0
United Kingdom	1	2	0	0	2	1
United States	19	5	45	13	30	32
Total	**27**	**11**	**64**	**15**	**54**	**41**

a The European Union is counted as one.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.65. Chart 3.8 illustrates the trends in the number of initiations of countervailing investigations and measures from 2008 to 2025.

Chart 3.8 Number of initiations of countervailing investigations and measures applied, 2008-2025



Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.66. At the regular meetings of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures on 28 October 2025 and 30 April 2026[21] concerns were raised with respect to countervailing duty investigations by Australia (1), China (1), the European Union (1), India (2), the United Kingdom (2), and the United States (8).

3.67. Other issues and concerns raised at the regular meetings were: (i) the elimination of export subsidies by the Members that received extensions under Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement; (ii) the low and declining rates of submission of notifications required under the SCM Agreement; (iii) the alleged discriminatory subsidies policies and measures of the United States; (iv) subsidies and overcapacity; (v) France's alleged subsidy scheme for electric vehicles; (vi) United States' use of adverse facts available in certain countervailing duty investigations; (vii) United States' countervailing duty investigations regarding transnational subsidies; (viii) China's First Set Technology Equipment Programme; (ix) United Kingdom's electric car grant; (x) GNP per capita calculations for all WTO Members using the methodology in G/SCM/38; (xi) challenges of United States' information requests in certain countervailing investigations; (xi) subsidies and the level playing field; and (xii) transnational subsidies.

Safeguard measures

3.68. Safeguard measures are temporary measures applied in response to increased imports of goods that are causing serious injury, and are applied on products from all sources, i.e. all exporting countries/customs territories.[22] Safeguard measures are subject to different rules and timelines than anti-dumping and countervailing measures and are, therefore, not directly comparable to these other types of trade remedies.

3.69. In 2025, 14 safeguard investigations were initiated compared to the 16 initiations in 2024 (Table 3.7). The number of measures applied increased from eight in 2024, to ten in 2025.

[21] WTO documents G/SCM/M/133, 1 December 2025 and, G/SCM/M/135, 2 June 2026, respectively.
[22] With the exception of exporting Members covered by the special and differential treatment provided for developing countries in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.

Table 3.7 Number of initiations of safeguard investigations and measures applied, by Member

Member	2023		2024		2025	
	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures	Initiations	Measures
China	0	0	1	0	0	0
Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0	1	0
Egypt	0	0	0	0	3	0
European Union[a]	0	0	1	0	0	1
Ghana	0	0	0	1	0	0
India	1	2	1	1	0	0
Indonesia	5	0	2	0	0	3
Jordan	0	0	1	0	0	1
Madagascar	4	2	2	3	2	1
Morocco	0	0	1	0	0	1
Philippines	1	0	1	0	1	1
South Africa[b]	0	0	1	0	2	1
Thailand	0	0	0	0	1	0
Tunisia	0	1	0	0	0	0
Türkiye	1	0	3	2	3	1
United States	0	0	1	1	1	0
Zimbabwe	0	0	1	0	0	0
Total	**12**	**5**	**16**	**8**	**14**	**10**


a The European Union is counted as one.
b Notified by South Africa, but investigations are initiated at the level of the Southern African Customs Union, i.e. also in respect of Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Namibia.

Note: Some notifications are ambiguous about the timing when the measures took effect. For those, an additional notification clarifying, *ex post*, the effective date of the measure is sometimes filed. For this reason, the number of applications of measures in a given period indicated in past reports may differ from the figures indicated in the most recent report. The same applies to the following chart.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.70. Chart 3.9 shows the number of initiations of safeguard investigations and application of measures on a calendar-year basis. As shown in the Chart, the figures for 2019 (30 initiations and 12 measures) were among the highest since 2008. The number of initiations in 2024 (16) was slightly higher than in 2023 (12) and represented the highest number of initiations recorded in a calendar year since 2020. The number of measures applied rose steadily, from 5 in 2023 to 8 in 2024 and 10 in 2025.

Chart 3.9 Number of initiations of safeguard investigations and measures applied, 2008 2025



Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.71. At the meetings of the Committee on Safeguards held on 27 October 2025 and on 27 April 2026[23], concerns were raised with respect to 30 safeguard investigations by Australia (1), China (1), Egypt (3), the European Union (3), India (1), Indonesia (6), Madagascar (1), Philippines (1), South Africa (2), Thailand (1), Türkiye (4), United Kingdom (1), United States (2), Viet Nam (1), and Zimbabwe (2).

3.72. Other issues and concerns raised at the regular meetings were: (i) Members imposing safeguard measures in response to global overcapacity; (ii) EU's proposal to replace its existing safeguard measure upon its expiry in June 2026 with new restrictions on steel imports; (iii) UK's proposal to replace its existing safeguard measure upon its expiry in June 2026 with new restrictions on steel imports; (iv) Canada's response to the United Kingdom's proposed suspension of concessions in relation to Canada's tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on imports of certain steel goods; (v) United States' response to certain members' requests for consultations and proposed suspensions of concessions in respect of recent US tariff measures on certain goods; (vi) EU and US statements regarding the critical nature of WTO safeguard notifications and (vii) the WTO online portal for safeguard notifications.

3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures[24]

3.73. This Section covers matters related to SPS transparency, including specific trade concerns discussed in SPS Committee meetings, since the last Trade Monitoring Report. In addition, a separate Section highlights developments under the recently adopted Sixth Review of the SPS Agreement.

3.74. Under the SPS Agreement, WTO Members are obliged to provide an advance notice of intention to introduce new or modified SPS measures[25], or to notify immediately when emergency

[23] WTO documents G/SG/M/67, 12 December 2025; and G/SG/M/68, 12 June 2026, respectively.

[24] Information presented in this Section was retrieved from the ePing SPS&TBT Platform. Viewed at: https://eping.wto.org/ This Section is based on notifications to the WTO for the period 1 January to 30 June 2026. Specific trade concerns (STCs) are raised at SPS Committee meetings, and this Section summarizes the STCs raised at the 5-7 November 2025, 11-13 March and 24-26 June 2026 SPS Committee meetings. More detailed searches on STCs have been retrieved from the Trade Concerns Database, viewed at: https://tradeconcerns.wto.org/en.

[25] Transparency obligations are contained in Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement.

measures are imposed. The main objective of complying with SPS notification obligations is to inform other Members about new or changed regulations that may significantly affect international trade. Therefore, an increased number of notifications does not necessarily imply greater use of protectionist measures, but rather enhanced transparency regarding food safety and animal and plant health measures, most of which are, presumably, legitimate health-protection measures.

Notifications submitted to the SPS Committee

3.75. In 2025, Members submitted a record 2,496 notifications (regular and emergency, including revisions, addenda and corrigenda) to the SPS Committee, surpassing the previous peak of 2,172 notifications in 2022. The total number increased by 16% compared to 2024. Regular notifications rose by 7% from 1,280 (and 27 revisions) in 2024 to a record of 1,370 (and 21 revisions) in 2025, while emergency notifications declined by 2%, from 176 (and one revision) to 172 (a decrease of 2%). Members also submitted a record number of addenda to existing notifications, which significantly increased from 621 in 2024 to 892 in 2025, representing a 44% increase.

3.76. From 1 January to 30 June 2026, 1,115 SPS notifications (regular and emergency, including revisions, addenda and corrigenda) were submitted[26] to the WTO, a 14% increase compared to the first half of 2025 (981 notifications from 1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025). The share of notifications from developing Members, accounting for 75% (834 notifications) of the total, was slightly lower than the 77% (752 notifications) recorded in the first half of 2025.

3.77. During the first half of 2026, WTO Members submitted 975 regular SPS notifications (including revisions, addenda and corrigenda), 75% (727 notifications) of which were submitted by developing Members. Compared with the first half of 2025, the total number of regular notifications increased by about 16%, while those submitted by developing Members increased by about 11%.


3.78. The total number of emergency notifications (including revisions, addenda and corrigenda) remained unchanged during the current reporting period compared with the first semester of 2025, at 140 notifications in both periods. However, the share submitted by developing Members increased, accounting for 77% during the period under review compared with 68% in the first half of 2025. High percentages of emergency notifications by developing Members have been considered consistent with the general trend of most emergency measures being notified by developing Members, perhaps because they have less extensive SPS regulatory systems compared with those of developed-country Members. Consequently, when facing emergency challenges, developing Members are more likely than developed-country Members to introduce new regulations or change existing ones.

3.79. Many Members follow the recommendation to notify SPS measures even when they are based on a relevant international standard[27], as this substantially increases transparency. In this context, of the 728 regular notifications (excluding addenda and corrigenda) submitted from 1 January to 30 June 2026, 46% indicated that at least one international standard, guideline, or recommendation was applicable to the notified measure (Chart 3.10). Of these, about 89% indicated that the proposed measure was in conformity with the applicable international standard. International standards often provide useful guidance regarding measures to address disease outbreaks and other emergency situations. Indeed, 67 out of 73 (about 92%) emergency notifications (excluding addenda and corrigenda) submitted during the first half of 2026 indicated that an international standard, guideline, or recommendation was applicable to the notified measure.

[26] For this Report, "submission" refers to the date of circulation.

[27] WTO document G/SPS/7/Rev.5, 16 January 2023, para. 2.3. WTO document G/SPS/7/Rev.5 was updated in January 2023 to reflect relevant changes in the set of tools available for Members to search for SPS-related information, namely the new ePing SPS&TBT Platform.

Chart 3.10 Regular and emergency SPS notifications (excluding addenda) and international standards



Note: Codex Alimentarius (Codex), World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, founded as OIE) and International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC).

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.80. International standards often provide useful guidance regarding measures to address disease outbreaks and other emergency situations. Indeed, 67 out of 73 (about 92%) emergency notifications (excluding addenda and corrigenda) submitted during the first half of 2026 indicated that an international standard, guideline or recommendation was applicable to the notified measure.

3.81. Of the 728 regular notifications (excluding addenda and corrigenda) submitted during the first semester of 2026, the majority (61%) were related to food safety.[28] The remainder related to plant protection, the protection of the Member's territory from other damage from pests, and animal health, and to a lesser extent, the protection of humans from animal diseases or plant pests. Regular notifications usually contain more than one objective.

3.82. Of the 73 emergency measures (excluding addenda and corrigenda) notified in the same period, the majority (79%) related to animal health, followed by those related to food safety, the protection of humans from animal diseases or plant pests, plant protection, and the protection of the Member's territory from other damage from pests. Emergency notifications may also contain more than one objective.

3.83. The WTO Secretariat prepares annual transparency reports containing detailed information on the implementation of the transparency provisions of the SPS Agreement.[29]

3.84. While there is no formal provision for "counter notification," concerns regarding the failure to notify an SPS measure, or regarding a notified measure, can be raised as a specific trade concern (STC) at any of the regular meetings of the SPS Committee each year.

[28] The objective of an SPS measure falls under one or more of the following categories: (i) food safety; (ii) animal health; (iii) plant protection; (iv) protection of humans from animal/plant pests or diseases; and (v) protection of territory from other damage from pests. Members are required to identify the purpose of the measure in their notifications. It is common for more than one objective to be identified for a measure.

[29] See the latest revision of WTO document G/SPS/GEN/804/Rev.18, 18 February 2026.

Measures discussed in the SPS Committee (STCs)

3.85. Since the last Trade Monitoring Report, three SPS Committee meetings were held: on 5-7 November 2025, 11-13 March, and 24-26 June 2026.[30] The participation of capital-based delegates in Geneva enhances opportunities for bilateral discussions on the margins of Committee meetings, facilitating dialogue and the resolution of trade concerns. During the three meetings[31], several specific trade concerns (STCs) were either withdrawn or not raised by the Members concerned. While the reasons may vary, this trend may suggest that bilateral engagement before and during SPS Committee meetings contributes to addressing concerns and easing trade frictions.

3.86. At the November 2025 meeting, India withdrew one new STC: EU frequency checks prescribed concerning imports of certain products (okra, bottle gourd, yardlong beans, curry leaves, capsicum, groundnuts). In addition, the United States withdrew its support to STC ID 554 due to bilateral progress with India; and Canada withdrew its participation in STC ID 516.

3.87. At the March 2026 meeting, the European Union removed two previously raised STCs: Qatar's new import rules for dairy products (ID 529) and Viet Nam's procedure for the listing of exporting establishments - Circular 04/2024 (ID 608).

3.88. At the June 2026 meeting, China withdrew one previously raised STC: EU notifications of matrine and oxymatrine in honey (ID 546). In addition, at the March and June 2026 meetings, China withdrew one new STC: Canada's proposal to transfer the maximum levels for ethyl carbamate in alcoholic beverages to the list of contaminants and other adulterating substances in foods.

3.89. In the three SPS Committee meetings, 32 STCs were raised for the first time, and 63 previously raised STCs were discussed again.[32] Forty-eight previously raised STCs were raised at all three meetings.[33] Of these, 10 addressed persistent problems that have been discussed 19 times or more. In addition, 18 STCs raised for the first time in any of the three meetings were discussed again in March or June 2026.[34]

3.90. Of the 32 STCs raised for the first time at the three SPS Committee meetings, 20 (63%) concerned food safety, 9 (28%) concerned measures covering animal health/animal diseases, 2 (6%) related to plant health and 1 (3%) covered other concerns.[35] Regarding the 63 previously raised STCs during the reporting period, 18 concerned measures covering food safety, 23 concerned animal health/animal diseases, 8 related to plant health and 14 covered other types of concerns. Of the 95 STCs raised or discussed during the reporting period, 38 concerned measures covering food safety, 32 covered animal health/animal diseases, 10 concerned plant health and 15 related to other types of concerns. Discussions among Members in the SPS Committee continue to be multifaceted and dynamic.

3.91. The WTO Secretariat prepares annual reports containing detailed information on STCs discussed in the SPS Committee.[36] Members are invited to provide updates of the status of the STCs they have raised under the dedicated agenda item, helping to ensure that WTO databases are kept updated. Since 2013, the Secretariat has periodically contacted Members to request information on the status of STCs (resolved, partially resolved or not resolved) that have not been raised for two

[30] See summary reports in WTO documents G/SPS/R/118 of 19 December 2025, G/SPS/R/119 of 22 April 2026 and G/SPS/R/121, 31 July 2026 (forthcoming).

[31] The November 2025, March and June 2026 meetings were held in person, and Members were also able to participate remotely via a virtual conferencing platform (WTO documents WTO/AIR/SPS/53, 17 October 2025, WTO/AIR/SPS/55, 20 February 2026, and WTO/AIR/SPS/57, 8 June 2026).

[32] The 63 previously raised STCs, which were discussed again were STC IDs 193, 306, 332, 348, 382 392, 406, 431, 439, 441, 442, 446, 448, 466, 508, 509, 516, 521, 527, 529, 530, 532, 533, 534, 535, 539, 542, 543, 544, 546, 548, 549, 552, 553, 554, 556, 557, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 568, 569, 574, 575, 577, 579, 580, 581, 582, 585, 586, 593, 596, 597, 598, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, and 608.

[33] These were STC IDs 193, 306, 332, 348, 382, 392, 406, 431, 439, 441, 446, 448, 508, 516, 521, 527, 532, 533, 534, 535, 539, 542, 543, 544, 548, 549, 552, 553, 554, 556, 563, 564, 565, 568, 569, 574, 577, 579, 580, 581, 585, 586, 593, 596, 597, 604, 606 and 607.

[34] These were STC IDs 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 620, 621, 622, 626, 627, 628, 630, and 631.

[35] Other issues such as certification requirements, or control, inspection or approval procedures.

[36] See the latest revision of the annual report on STCs G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.26 (18 February 2026) and the Trade Concerns Database.

years. The most recent exercise was conducted in November 2024, and the results were circulated in WTO document G/SPS/GEN/2261, which also includes results from similar exercises in 2013, 2017, 2020, and 2022. In the 2024 exercise, 40 Members were contacted, reporting 41 STCs as resolved and 26 STCs as partially resolved.[37] The next exercise will be conducted in the fall of 2026.

3.92. At the November 2025 meeting, the Secretariat reported that no Member had requested consultations under the ad hoc procedure to encourage and facilitate the resolution of specific sanitary or phytosanitary issues among Members in accordance with Article 12.2 (WTO document G/SPS/61).[38]

3.93. During the November 2025 meeting week, one thematic session was held on science-based SPS import controls to facilitate safe trade, based on an initial proposal by the European Union. During the June 2026 meeting week, the Secretariat organized a two-day thematic workshop on transparency for SPS notification authorities, enquiry points and transparency experts. The SPS Transparency Working Group, which took place immediately after the workshop, benefited from the insights of participants from 26 developing Members and Observers.[39,40]

Follow-up to the Sixth Review of the SPS Agreement

3.94. Following the adoption of the Sixth Review of the Operation and Implementation of the SPS Agreement (G/SPS/74 and G/SPS/74/Add.1), the Committee established a Transparency Working Group (TWG) with an initial 2-year mandate. The TWG held its first meeting in November 2025. At its fifth meeting held in June 2026, the TWG agreed to develop practical solutions for the priority topics identified for discussion at upcoming meetings. Priority topics include issues related to improving the quality and clarity of SPS notifications, attaching PDF files versus providing links, deviations from international standards, and cross-cutting capacity building matters. The TWG may also explore enhancements to certain ePing features and the channelling of comments through SPS enquiry points.[41]

3.95. Another key recommendation included in the Sixth Review was the launch of a pilot mentoring programme to support interested developing Members in engaging more effectively on SPS matters and enhancing the transparency of their SPS regulations. At its June 2026 meeting, following the success of the one-year pilot phase of the mentoring programme, the SPS Committee decided to extend the initiative for another two years.[42]

3.4 Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)

3.96. WTO Members continued to use the TBT Committee's transparency mechanisms to notify their TBT measures and to discuss and often resolve specific trade concerns (STCs) non-litigiously. Most of the new regular TBT notifications submitted by WTO Members referred to protection of human health or safety as their main objective.

Notifications submitted to the TBT Committee

3.97. Under the TBT Agreement, WTO Members are required to notify their intention to introduce new or modified technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures, or to notify adopted emergency measures immediately. The principal objective of complying with the TBT notification

[37] In WTO document G/SPS/GEN/2261, the status of STC 108 should be marked as partially resolved rather than resolved, as Israel has not reported on its possible resolution.

[38] See annual report contained in WTO document G/SPS/GEN/2346.

[39] Please visit the SPS Events, Workshops and Training webpage to access programmes, reports, presentations and recordings of the thematic sessions and workshop: WTO | Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures — events, workshops and training.

[40] See also the moderator's report of the thematic session in WTO document G/SPS/GEN/2373 (19 December 2025) and a summary of the follow-up reflection of the thematic session on science-based SPS import controls to facilitate safe trade circulated by the European Union in WTO document G/SPS/G/SPS/GEN/2392 (4 March 2026).

[41] See the TWG Work Plan in the latest revision of WTO document G/SPS/W/376/Rev.# and the compilation of challenges, proposed solutions, and suggested next steps in WTO document G/SPS/W/378/Rev.2. See also the dedicated TWG webpage: WTO | SPS Transparency Working Group.

[42] See the Secretariat's SPS mentoring system report on the pilot phase contained in WTO document G/SPS/GEN/2423.

obligations is to inform other Members about new or changed regulations that may significantly affect trade and provide an opportunity for comments.

3.98. During 2025, WTO Members submitted 2,879 new regular notifications of TBT measures.[43] Members which notified the most measures, accounting for 57% of all new regular notifications, were Tanzania (237), Kenya (234), Rwanda (225), Uganda (221), China (206), Burundi (163), Malawi (97), the Republic of Korea (94), the United States (83), and the European Union (82). Most of these new regular TBT notifications indicated the protection of human health or safety as their main objective. Various other notifications related to quality requirements, consumer information and labelling, prevention of deceptive practices and consumer protection, harmonization, reducing trade barriers and facilitating trade, and protection of the environment.

3.99. A total of 2,327 follow-up notifications (i.e. addenda, corrigenda, or supplements) were submitted during 2025. The frequent use by Members of follow-up notifications is beneficial as it increases transparency and predictability across the measures' regulatory lifecycle.

3.100. During the first half of 2026, WTO Members submitted 1,322 new regular notifications of TBT measures. Members which notified the most measures, accounting for about 66% of all new regular notifications, were Tanzania (160), Kenya (127), Rwanda (127), Uganda (117), Burundi (100), China (89), the United States (43), Viet Nam (42), the European Union (34), and Chile (33). Most of these new regular TBT notifications indicated the protection of human health or safety as their main objective. Various other notifications related to quality requirements; reducing trade barriers and facilitating trade; consumer information and labelling; prevention of deceptive practices and consumer protection; harmonization; and protection of the environment.

3.101. A total of 809 follow-up notifications (i.e. addenda, corrigenda, or supplements) were submitted during the first half of 2026.

Measures discussed in the TBT Committee (STCs)

3.102. WTO Members use the TBT Committee as a forum for discussing trade issues related to specific TBT measures proposed or maintained by other Members. Issues can range from requests for additional information and clarification to questions on the consistency of measures with TBT Agreement disciplines. The overall trend suggests an increasing use of the TBT Committee as a forum for Members to raise and resolve trade concerns non-litigiously.

3.103. A total of 209 (40 new and 169 previously raised) STCs were discussed during the three Committee meetings held in 2025 (meetings of 26-28 March, 25-27 June and 12-14 November 2025). The 40 new STCs concerned TBT measures by India (10); Indonesia (8); the European Union (6); Viet Nam (3); Australia (2); China (2); the State of Kuwait (2); and one each by the Kingdom of Bahrain, Chile, Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.[44] These new STCs covered regulations on a wide range of products (e.g. electrical products and equipment, home appliances, self-driving vehicles and other vehicles, batteries, industrial chemicals, cotton bales, biodegradable plastic products, energy and warehouse storage systems, steel, tin, paper, audio and video equipment, fertilizers, cosmetics, and food and liquor products), and dealt with a variety of issues (e.g. eco-design, recycling and recovery of materials, cybersecurity, certification, packaging, and labelling requirements).

3.104. During 2025, several Members shared progress of their discussions of six STCs. In some cases, this included references to the withdrawal or revisions of technical regulations or conformity assessment procedures that were subjects of STCs.

3.105. During the three Committee meetings held in 2025, 12 persistent STCs were discussed (these STCs have each been previously raised on more than 16 occasions in the TBT Committee meetings).

[43] Viewed at: ePing SPS&TBT platform.

[44] One of the new STCs was raised regarding the measure of seven Members (the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).

3.106. A total of 70 (18 new and 52 previously raised) STCs were discussed during the Committee meeting of 4-6 March 2026. The 18 new STCs concerned TBT measures by Viet Nam (4); Chile (2); the European Union (2); the United Arab Emirates (2); and one each by China, India, Indonesia, the State of Kuwait, Mexico, Oman, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Thailand. These new STCs covered regulations on a wide range of products (e.g. pharmaceuticals, tyres, alcoholic beverages, energy drinks, tobacco products, electrical appliances) and dealt with a variety of issues (e.g. cybersecurity and cybercrime, digital tax stamps, energy efficiency, food traceability, nutritional labelling).

3.107. During the first half of 2026, several Members shared progress of their discussions of four STCs. In some cases, this included references to revisions or updates to technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures that were subjects of STCs as well as extensions of the interval between their publication and entry into force.

3.108. During the Committee meeting held in the first half of 2026, 11 persistent STCs were discussed (these STCs have each been previously raised on more than 16 occasions in the TBT Committee meetings).

3.5 Policy developments in agriculture

3.109. The Committee on Agriculture (CoA) provides a forum for Members to discuss matters related to agricultural trade, and to consult on the implementation of commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). The review work of the CoA is based on Members' notifications regarding their commitments and on matters raised under Article 18.6 of the AoA, commonly referred to as Specific Implementation Matters (SIMs). The CoA has also been tasked with monitoring the implementation of specific outcomes reached under the agriculture negotiations. Additionally, it takes up other matters, including the follow-up to the Marrakesh Decision on Least-developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs). Following instructions from the 12th Ministerial Conference,[45] the Committee undertook a dedicated work programme to consider the food security concerns of least-developed and net food-importing developing countries (LDCs and NFIDCs) and, in April 2024, adopted by consensus a report[46] containing a set of recommendations. Since then, the Committee has deliberated on the follow-up to the agreed recommendations of the work programme. Since 2023, Members have also deliberated on the theme of technology transfer in the agriculture sector.

3.110. Since the last Trade Monitoring Report, the CoA held two regular meetings, on 24-26 November 2025, and 27-28 May 2026.[47] Members posed a total of 344 questions[48], of which 150 questions concerned SIMs under Article 18.6, 156 questions concerned individual notifications, 8 questions concerned overdue notifications, and 30 questions were in relation to the follow-up to the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition[49].

3.111. Domestic support continued to dominate discussions in the CoA. About 88% of questions under individual notifications and 60% of SIMs under Article 18.6 concerned domestic support policies. Of the 99 SIMs raised during the reporting period, 52 were raised for the first time. The majority of the new SIMs (73%) concerned domestic support policies. Members sought clarification on support policies targeting specific sectors or products, including rice (Japan's rice policy; Nigeria's National Rice Development Strategy II), corn (Indonesia's Corn Price Stabilization Program), dairy and livestock (Argentina's dairy support programmes; Japan's Livestock Stabilisation Programme; New Zealand's Dairy Beef Opportunities programme; Paraguay's cattle herd recovery initiatives), fruit and vegetables (China's walnut support; India's procurement of potatoes), and oilseeds (U.S. aid to farmers through tariff revenues). Several questions also concerned broader domestic support programmes aimed at improving climate resilience, sustainability, innovation, research, and farm

[45] WTO document WT/MIN(22)/28 - WT/L/1139, 17 June 2022.
[46] WTO document G/AG/38, 17 April 2024.
[47] WTO documents G/AG/R/116, 18 December 2025; and G/AG/R/117, 30 June 2026.
[48] Questions can be accessed through the compilation of questions issued for each CoA meeting under WTO documents G/AG/W/258, 10 November 2025 (24-26 November meeting); and G/AG/W/261, 13 May 2026 (27-28 May meeting). All questions and answers are available in the Agriculture Information Management System (AG-IMS).
[49] WTO Document WT/MIN(15)/45 - WT/L/980, 21 December 2015.

incomes, including measures implemented by Australia, Brazil, the European Union, Japan, Nigeria, New Zealand, Oman, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Uruguay.

3.112. Measures potentially limiting market access were the second area of interest in the CoA. Some 15 questions concerning notifications and 25 SIMs were raised during the reporting period. On notifications, most questions (12) concerned imports under tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). Out of the 25 SIMs concerning market access policies, 12 were discussed for the first time. These new SIMs related to policies potentially affecting market access for specific products or groups of products, including cereals (Thailand's maize import policy; the Philippines' new system for distributing import allocations for rice), livestock and poultry (Cameroon's import policies for poultry and pork; Gabon's import ban on broiler chicken), alcoholic beverages and tobacco (Switzerland's draft amendment on wine tariff quota distribution; Türkiye's domestic content requirements for tobacco-derived products), and broader agricultural products (Indonesia's new import regulations on agricultural and livestock products). Other new concerns related to the European Union's Vision for Agriculture policy, the European Union's special safeguard entitlements and new rules on the application of special safeguards, and Papua New Guinea's applied import duties in excess of bound tariff rates.

3.113. There were a total of 30 questions raised to 16 Members[50] as follow-up to the implementation of the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition. Two new SIMs raised during the period concerned policies potentially supporting agricultural exports. These related to the United States' funding to specialty crop producers and questions regarding New Zealand's reporting of exports of dairy-related protein products.

3.114. Of the SIMs discussed during the reporting period, 47 were follow-ups to issues previously raised in Committee meetings. Several of these matters have been recurring topics in the CoA, with some brought up repeatedly over the years. Notably, eight SIMs have each been discussed more than a dozen times (one of them as many as 26 times) across various CoA meetings, collectively generating a total of 290 questions. This includes Canada's special milk class scheme - raised 26 times; India's public stockpiling – raised 20 times; India's pulse policies – raised 17 times; Canada's tariff-rate quota for cheese - raised 17 times; EU's deforestation and forest degradation strategy – raised 16 times; India's export restrictions – raised 15 times; India's transport and marketing assistance and Nigeria's import prohibitions on certain agriculture products - raised 13 times each. Other agricultural policies from 19 Members were also the subject of repeated concerns under Article 18.6.[51]

3.115. Food security has continued to feature prominently on the agenda of the CoA, especially since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the period under review, the Committee continued to follow-up on the agreed report and recommendations under the Work Programme, pursuant to paragraph 8 of the MC12 Declaration on food insecurity. Since the adoption of the report in April 2024, this item has remained a standing agenda point in all formal Committee meetings covered by this report. The adopted recommendations cover several important aspects, including export restrictions, international food aid, the contribution of the WTO agricultural subsidy framework to enhancing agricultural productivity and resilience, and inter-agency collaboration on food security. Members have continued to advance the recommendations through discussions in the Committee and other WTO bodies. The recommendations informed Members' deliberations under the third triennial review[52] of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on Export Competition and the Committee's adoption of a decision[53] to introduce a new export competition notification format under Table EC:1 and continued discussions on improving transparency in reporting technical and financial assistance to LDCs and NFIDCs under Table NF:1. Members also stressed the importance of enhancing market transparency, strengthening cooperation with international organizations, improving access to food import financing for LDCs and NFIDCs, and advancing capacity-building initiatives to strengthen agricultural productivity, resilience and food security.

3.116. References to the war on Ukraine continued to feature in the CoA's discussions, both within the broader dialogue on food security, and within the Committee's Q&A-based review process.

[50] Bangladesh, Brazil, China, European Union, Ghana, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Thailand, Türkiye, and the United States.
[51] Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, China, Egypt, European Union, Iceland, India, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States.
[52] WTO document G/AG/39, 16 December 2024.
[53] WTO document G/AG/2/Add.2, 16 December 2024.

Contributions by observer international organizations also frequently highlighted geopolitical developments and conflicts and their impact on global food security. The Russian Federation submitted written questions to a number of Members, covering issues such as economic and trade sanctions, port restrictions, customs duties exceeding WTO bindings, prohibitions on access to ports, and banking and financial restrictions. Several Members, including Ukraine, continued to express concerns over the ongoing war and its impact on global food security, and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the restoration of lasting peace.

3.117. The Committee has remained actively engaged on the topic of technology transfer in agriculture, following the July 2023 submission by the African Group (G/AG/W/238, 5 July 2023). During the reporting period, discussions focused on how WTO rules, particularly under the Agreement on Agriculture, could support agricultural innovation, technological capacity-building and productivity growth. Expert presentations highlighted the role of extension services, digital tools and public services in facilitating technology dissemination. Recognising the important role of public general services in the transfer of technology, Members acknowledged a close link between the implementation of the Bali Ministerial Decision on General Services and technology transfer and expressed support for addressing both topics jointly in future work of the Committee.

3.6 General and economic support measures

3.118. Reporting on general economic support measures has been part of the trade monitoring exercise since its inception in 2009 following the Global Financial Crisis. There is a high degree of variation in terms of both the frequency of such policies and the transparency which surrounds them. WTO Members have expressed continued interest in understanding the evolving trends and implications of these policies, which now often extend beyond traditional economic objectives to encompass broader considerations of national security and resilience.

3.119. In response to the Director-General's request for information for the Trade Monitoring Exercise on 30 March 2026, 37 WTO Members[54] volunteered information on 2,055 general economic support measures, up significantly from 1,013 measures recorded for the same period in 2025. Support focused on innovation and digitalization, energy transition, SMEs, transport, and agriculture, primarily through grants and subsidies, concessional financing, tax incentives, and export-support instruments.

3.120. Economic support measures appear to remain significant, although the information submitted to the WTO provides a partial picture of their scope and evolution. Additional sources provide broader coverage and suggest that industrial and agricultural support remained at high levels in 2025-2026 and a growing emphasis on industrial policy to pursue strategic and broader policy objectives that protect the supply of the economy.[55]

3.121. The following box, contributed by the OECD, presents key insights from the OECD Manufacturing Groups and Industrial Corporations (MAGIC) database, a firm-level dataset that tracks industrial subsidies received by major firms across sectors and regions worldwide. It shows that industrial subsidies reached a post-global financial crisis high of USD 108 billion in 2024, with particularly strong support directed to sectors such as solar panels, semiconductors, steel, and aluminium, and suggests that subsidies may have contributed to around 22% of the global market-share gains of firms that expanded between 2005 and 2023.

Box 3.5 OECD MAGIC Database: New Insights into Global Industrial Subsidies


The firm-level OECD MAGIC database of industrial subsidies takes a unique approach; it is not based on the subsidies governments disclose, but on the amounts that firms receive. This firm-level approach allows MAGIC to measure subsidies provided globally and to identify subsidies given at the subnational (city, county, state) level. Looking at what firms receive makes it possible to identify subsidies provided in the form of below-market finance (including cheap, below market, loans offered by state banks), and to shed new light on the role of state-owned enterprises as both important recipients and providers of subsidies.

[54] Albania; Australia; the European Union (counting the EU-27 and its member States separately); Canada; China; Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; Montenegro; Philippines; and Viet Nam.

[55] OECD (2026). OECD MAGIC Database of Industrial subsidies. Viewed at: https://doi.org/10.1787/ce94f33b-en; Global Trade Alert (2026). Broad economic support leads Hormuz Policy Response. Viewed at: Broad Economic Support Leads Hormuz Policy Response - Global Trade Alert.

The public MAGIC dashboard provides aggregate information on the subsidies received by the largest firms accounting for the bulk of global sales across 15 industrial sectors from 2005-24, tracking the evolution of grants, tax concessions, and below-market borrowing to firms over time and across regions. The data reveal that industrial subsidies, expressed as a percentage of firms' sales revenue, reached their highest levels since the global financial crisis at 1.3% of revenue in 2024 – which corresponds to USD 108 billion in nominal terms (Figure A).

Figure A: Industrial subsidies reached in 2023-24 their highest level since the global financial crisis



Source: OECD MAGIC database.

Between 2005 and 2024, the production of solar photovoltaic panels, semiconductors, aluminium, steel, and shipbuilding were – as a percentage of firms' sales revenue – the top five recipients of subsidies across the 15 sectors covered in the OECD MAGIC database. This ranking was largely similar when looking at 2024 alone, with the exception of the production of wind turbines, which witnessed a significant increase over the period covered.

Econometric analysis using the OECD MAGIC database shows that around 22% of the global market share gains of firms that grew between 2005 and 2023 can be explained by the subsidies they received. This underscores the importance of having reliable data on industrial subsidies to monitor what governments are doing worldwide and analyse how subsidies are shaping global markets. In turn, such evidence can help countries build a shared understanding of the challenge, paving the way for co-operative efforts to find solutions.


Source: OECD.

3.122. Box 3.6 contributed by Global Trade Alert (GTA), provides a complementary perspective on recent trends in government support measures, comparing them also toother trade-related policy interventions.

Box 3.6 Two Tracks Diverge: Support Measures and the Shifting Logic of Policy Intervention

Drawing on GTA data for the period up to June 2026, support measures (defined as domestic subsidies, public procurement preferences, and localization requirements) reveal three patterns of policy intervention.
Support measures alone are no longer the whole story. Their share climbed steadily through the 2010s, peaking at 73% of all recorded measures in 2020–2024 as pandemic and industrial-policy spending surged, before falling back to 58% since (Figure 1). Governments are increasingly turning to other instruments, beyond subsidies, localization, and public procurement measures.


Figure 1. Share of support measures vs other measures, by period



Source: GTA (2026).

Governments are concentrating support on strategic sectors where products are classified as dual-use, advanced-technology, or critical minerals. Among support measures, the strategic-sector share rose from 24% in 2009–2016 to 35% by 2025–2026 (Figure 2, left panel). But the sharper concentration lies elsewhere: among other instruments, it reached 46%, running 10 to 15 percentage points ahead of support measures in every period since 2017 (Figure 2, right panel). Seen from the global perspective, tariffs, import barriers, and export controls, not subsidies, localization, and procurement, have become a more prominent feature of government policy responses in recent years to promote strategic sectors. Of course, policy mixes vary across governments and there may be exceptions to this general tendency.

Figure 2. Strategic-sector targeting: support measures vs other measures, by period




Source: GTA (2026).

The clearest divergence is in the reasons governments give for intervention. Support measures remain anchored in familiar economic logic. Competitiveness, resilience and security of supply, and climate change mitigation together account for the large majority of stated motives throughout the period, representing still 89% of motive mentions in 2025–2026, with national-security and geopolitical concerns cited in just 11% of

cases (Figure 3, left panel). Among other instruments, the picture is nearly the reverse: national-security and geopolitical rationale climbed from 5% of motive mentions in 2009–2016 to 74% by 2025–2026 (Figure 3, right panel).

Figure 3. Share of motive mentions: support vs other measures, by period



Source: GTA (2026).

These patterns describe two increasingly distinct tracks. Subsidies, procurement, and localization remain rooted in economic aims: building capacity, securing inputs, meeting climate goals. Trade barriers such as tariffs and export controls have become the channel through which security and geopolitical concerns are expressed, and it is there that strategic-sector targeting is most pronounced.

Source: GTA, authored by Simon J. Evenett, and Fernando Martín.

3.7 Other selected trade-related policy issues

3.123. This Section provides a brief overview of other trade-related policy issues where important developments took place during the reporting period.

Aid for Trade

3.124. Launched at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005, the Aid for Trade (AfT) initiative has mobilized over USD 795 billion to support developing countries in their fuller integration into global trade. Around 60% of Aid for Trade is provided by bilateral donors, primarily countries that are members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, while the remaining 40% is provided by multilateral donors, including the World Bank and regional development banks.[56] Its 20th anniversary coincides with the 10th Global Review of Aid for Trade, scheduled for October 2026. Over the past two years, deliberations between Members have largely centred on reviewing Aid for Trade's impact and lessons learned, addressing both longstanding and emerging priorities, improving efficiency and partnerships, and generating evidence and insights to guide future support for developing countries ahead of the 2026 Global Review. At the 65th Aid-for-Trade Session of the Committee on Trade and Development, Members also discussed a proposal on Aid-for-Trade partnerships put forth by the delegations of Australia and Barbados.[57] Members also underscored the need to reflect on the current context of declining Official Development Assistance (ODA) at the Global Review. Following the 65th Aid-for-Trade Session, an informal experience-sharing session on leveraging private sector partnerships for trade took place. Members noted that the private-sector

[56] OECD, Aid for Trade Dashboard. Viewed at: https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/aid-for-trade.html.

[57] WTO document JOB/COMTD/AFT/9/Rev.2, 19 November 2025.

co-investment has been playing an increasingly important role in areas such as trade infrastructure and digitalization. Moreover, capital-intensive assets such as ports, corridors, logistics hubs, and border facilities were considered well suited for public-private partnerships. The 66th Aid-for-Trade Session focused primarily on the implementation of the Fish Fund and Aid for Trade interventions in the Asia-Pacific region.

3.125. The 10th Global Review of Aid for Trade is scheduled for 29 and 30 October 2026 at the WTO headquarters in Geneva under the theme "Partnerships for trade development." The Review primarily reflects on two decades of trade development efforts and focuses on what comes next: new resources, new partners, and practical solutions to maximize opportunities for developing economies in the multilateral trading system. The Review will feature three plenaries, three regional spotlights, and around 30 Member-led and -designed sessions. The Review will also be accompanied by the release of approximately twenty impact stories highlighting successful Aid-for-Trade-related experiences identified by Members.

3.126. In 2024, total Aid for Trade disbursements reached USD 51.6 billion, representing a 4% increase in real terms from USD 50.6 billion in 2023. In 2024, small and vulnerable economies (SVEs) were the top recipients of AfT per capita (USD 23.21 per person - nearly 3 times the global average), followed by LDCs (USD 12.98 per person). During the period of 2006-2024, 97% of total disbursements was directed to infrastructure and productive sectors, of which productive capacity accounted for 45%, and 3% was allocated to strengthening trade policies and regulations. More broadly, ODA experienced a historic decline of 23% in 2025, with several developed countries who are the fund's major donors cutting their contributions[58]. Aid for Trade, representing one-fifth of ODA, is expected to be affected by these overall ODA trends.

Committee on Import Licensing

3.127. During the reporting period, the Committee on Import Licensing met formally on 10 October 2025[59] and 4 June 2026.[60] At the October 2025 meeting, 11 trade concerns were raised, including a new concern regarding India's policy amendment on gold potassium cyanide.[61] At the June 2026 meeting, 12 trade concerns were raised, including three new concerns regarding India's import licensing suspension for refurbished medical devices[62], India's Furniture (Quality Control) Order 2025[63], and Mexico's steel mills cancellation.[64]

3.128. Recurring concerns raised during the reporting period covered import licensing requirements affecting a range of products and measures, including agricultural and processed products, plywood and wooden flush door shutters, pneumatic tyres, PCs, tablets and other electronic products, textiles, air conditioners, steel products, agricultural, food and drink products, two-wheelers, commodity balancing mechanisms, and wheat feed. Members continued to use the Committee as a forum to seek clarification and exchange views on the operation, transparency, and implementation of import licensing regimes.

Committee on Market Access

3.129. During the reporting period, the Committee on Market Access (CMA) met formally on 15-16 October 2025[65] and 16-17 March 2026.[66] At each meeting, Members raised 35 trade concerns, including a total of 10 concerns raised for the first time. These new concerns covered a range of market access issues, including Canada's tariff-rate quota for certain steel products[67]; Indonesia's measures affecting the importation of pharmaceutical products[68]; Trinidad and Tobago's tariff rates

[58] OECD, A Historic Decline in Foreign Aid: Preliminary 2025 ODA Data, April 2026. Viewed at: https://www.oecd.org/en/data/insights/data-explainers/2026/04/a-historic-decline-in-foreign-aid-preliminary-2025-oda-data.html
[59] WTO document G/LIC/M/61, 3 December 2025.
[60] WTO document G/LIC/M/62 (forthcoming).
[61] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 54.
[62] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 55.
[63] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 56.
[64] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 57.
[65] WTO document G/MA/M/84, 22 December 2025.
[66] WTO document G/MA/M/85, 6 May 2026.
[67] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 142.
[68] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 143.

applied to alcoholic products[69]; trade-restrictive measures adopted by Colombia[70]; Ecuador's customs service fee for customs checks[71]; Egypt's restrictions on imports of sugar[72]; the European Union's measures concerning steel products[73], the renegotiation of tariff concessions on steel products[74], photovoltaic products[75]; and India's tariffs on toner cartridges.[76]

3.130. Members also continued to discuss several long-standing concerns, some of which had been raised consistently for several years. These exchanges reflected the CMA's role as a forum where Members can seek clarification and maintain dialogue on market access issues over time. Some of these concerns related to India's quantitative restrictions on imports of certain pulses[77]; the selective tax on certain imported products applied by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, the State of Kuwait, Oman and Qatar[78]; Indonesia's customs duties on certain telecommunication products[79]; and Angola's import-restricting practices.[80] More broadly, the concerns discussed during the reporting period related to tariff measures, customs duties and fees, import restrictions, quantitative restrictions, environmental measures, quality control requirements, export controls, and measures taken for national security, affecting products such as agricultural and food products, alcoholic beverages, pharmaceuticals, steel, photovoltaic products, ICT products, semiconductors and other consumer goods.

3.131. During the reporting period, the CMA also adopted a decision on the recording of the resolution of trade concerns[81], which established a mechanism for recording concerns reported by Members as "resolved" or "partially resolved". The decision is expected to improve transparency regarding the outcome of discussions on trade concerns and to highlight the role that WTO regular bodies can play in problem-solving.

Committee on Rules of origin

3.132. The Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO) held two formal meetings during the reporting period on 5-6 November 2025 and 11-12 May 2026.[82] Since mid-October 2025, no specific trade concerns have been raised at the Committee. However, in some instances, least-developed country Members have expressed concerns about specific aspects related to the rules of origin and other origin requirements applied by WTO Members granting non-reciprocal trade preferences. Some Members have also raised concerns regarding the lack of transparency of non-preferential rules of origin and have therefore encouraged other Members to notify a description of their practices in this respect using a notification template proposed by the Chairperson of the CRO in 2024.[83]

Committee on Trade and Development

3.133. Members continued their discussions on reinvigorating the work of the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD).[84] In particular, Members examined further views on the implementation of the special and differential treatment provisions across various WTO Agreements.[85] Members also continued to explore ways forward regarding the consideration of the Gulf Cooperation Customs Union in the WTO[86], and reviewed the work of the CTD on E-Commerce[87]. Furthermore,

[69] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 144.
[70] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 145.
[71] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 146.
[72] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 147.
[73] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 148.
[74] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 149.
[75] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 150.
[76] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 151.
[77] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 36.
[78] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 35.
[79] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 42.
[80] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 46.
[81] WTO document G/MA/440, 17 March 2026.
[82] See minutes of the respective meetings in WTO documents G/RO/M/85 dated 28 November 2025, and G/RO/M/86 dated 19 June 2026.
[83] WTO Document G/RO/103, 12 November 2025
[84] Informal open-ended consultations were organized on 2 February 2026 and 1 July 2026. Formal sessions of the CTD were held on 18 November 2025, 21 April 2026 and 8 July 2026.
[85] WTO document JOB/COMTD/22 and JOB/COMTD/22/Add.1, 18 November 2025 and 8 July
[86] WTO document JOB/COMTD/16 and JOB/COMTD/16/Add.1, 18 November 2025.
[87] WTO document JOB/COMTD/21, 18 November 2025.

Members discussed challenges to export diversification, with presentations from the WTO Secretariat[88], the ITC, UNCTAD and the OECD.

3.134. Several requests from Members were also discussed, including the following communications from China: "Strengthening Discussions and Cooperation on Carbon Standards"; "Heightened Trade Turbulence and Responses from the WTO"; and "Briefing on the High-Level Meeting on Accelerating Africa's Industrialization: China's Investment." A Framework for Modernizing and Revitalizing the Deliberative Function of the WTO on Trade and Development, submitted by Japan and advocating more practical, evidence-based and focused on supporting developing and least-developed Members, was also discussed (WT/COMTD/W/303).

3.135. Priorities of small economies also featured prominently in Members' discussions. Members discussed the interface of trade and climate change in the context of small economies and continued exchanges on the integration of small economies in global trade. Prior to the WTO's 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14), Members also negotiated a draft Ministerial Decision on the Work Programme on Small Economies, which was endorsed by Ministers and mandates further work with respect to the areas of trade facilitation and digital trade (WT/MIN(26)/36 - WT/L/1235).

3.136. During the latest CTD session on 8 July 2026, the Committee considered communications from Japan regarding Trade as an engine for economic growth (WT/COMTD/W/310 and JOB/COMTD/27) and from China on "The integration of trade and investment for industrialization." Members also exchanged views on the implementation of the Ministerial Decision on the Small Economies Work Programme.

Council for Trade in Goods

3.137. The Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) met formally on two occasions instead of the usual three formal meetings during the reporting period.[89] At the 27-28 November 2025 meeting[90], 34 trade concerns were raised, four of which were new. The number of trade concerns remained relatively stable as the CTG continues to be a conduit for Members to raise issues, with one Member raising the possibility of requesting the good offices of the CTG Chair regarding one long-standing trade concern.[91] New concerns related to the renegotiation of tariff concessions under Article XXVIII of the GATT and steel safeguard measures.[92] Particular emphasis was given by Members to China's export controls and restrictions on trade in strategic products, including rare earths[93], as well as the European Union's CBAM[94] and Anti-Deforestation Regulation (EUDR).[95] An additional agenda item focused on the fragmentation of global trade through tariffs and global costs, where some Members had a general discussion of the manner in which some of the most important current trade concerns were affecting world trade and the multilateral trading system.[96]

3.138. Following the adoption of the Decision on the Recording of the Resolution of Trade Concerns[97], the Council considered its first report on the trade concerns that had been reported as resolved or partially resolved[98]. At the time, the report listed 97 trade concerns that at least one Member had reported as fully or partially resolved, representing 42.5% of the 228 trade concerns discussed in the Council between 1995 and July 2025, and accounting for more than half of the concerns that had not been raised since July. Additional concerns were reported as resolved at the meeting. The Secretariat has continued updating the report to include new information provided by Members.

[88] The WTO Secretariat presentation was based on the WTO document WT/COMTD/W/301.
[89] This followed a request made by a group of Members not to hold the previously scheduled formal meeting of 30 June 2026 due to its proximity with the first meeting of the year, on an exceptional basis, keeping the possibility of holding a meeting in September 2026, should the need arise.
[90] WTO document G/C/M/153, 4 March 2026.
[91] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 120.
[92] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 229, ID 230, ID 231, ID 232
[93] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 112.
[94] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 148.
[95] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 203.
[96] See Item 9 of WTO document G/C/M/153, 4 March 2026.
[97] WTO document G/L/1578 and G/L/1578/Rev.1, 10 July 2026.
[98] WTO document G/C/W/884 and G/C/W/884/Rev.1, 5 May 2026.

3.139. The Council also considered a Secretariat report prepared at the request of the Chairperson, with a structured summary of reports on how to improve the notification of regular/periodic and one-time only notifications in the goods area[99], which compiled inputs from Members' and reports from 13 subsidiary body chairs to facilitate CTG-wide reflection on possible avenues to improve the quality and timeliness of notifications.

3.140. The 20-21 May 2026 CTG meeting[100] saw a significant increase in new trade concerns raised by Members. Almost one-quarter, or nine out of the 38 trade concerns were raised for the first time, and covered a wide range of measures and products, including: Brazil's anti-dumping investigation and trade-restrictive measures concerning imported milk powder[101]; the United Kingdom's trade-restrictive measures on steel products[102] and its final bound total aggregate measure of support (AMS)[103]; Ecuador's customs service fee[104]; the European Union's proposed reclassification of tea tree oil[105], its proposed Cybersecurity Act[106] and proposed Industrial Accelerator Act[107]; the United States Section 301 investigations and tariffs[108]; and Colombia's trade-restrictive measures.[109] Several agenda items related to ongoing renegotiation procedures under Article XXVIII of the GATT, which allows Members to modify or withdraw concessions from their Schedules. Most of the trade concerns raised during the meeting targeted measures by the European Union (12), the United States (5), India (4), China (4), and the United Kingdom (3).

3.141. At this meeting, the Council also approved the rules of procedure of the newly formed Committee on Fisheries Subsidies[110] on 9 December 2025, and considered Secretariat reports on the status of notifications[111] and the calculation of submission rates of regular/periodic and one-time only notifications, which showed an increase of 1.1% compared with 2025.[112] The meeting had been preceded by the Third Informal Session on Digital Tools and an Informal Meeting, which focused largely on how to improve Secretariat reports and tools concerning notifications.

Digital measures

3.142. Digital trade policies have become increasingly prominent in recent years, reflecting policy developments related to the digital economy that are cross-cutting in nature and may affect trade in goods and services. During the reporting period, digital policy activity focused primarily on establishing or updating regulatory frameworks governing personal data protection, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence. Around 15 measures were identified over the past 12 months, generally aimed at establishing or refining governance structures for the digital economy and for technological development, while addressing privacy and cybersecurity issues.[113]

3.143. A prominent trend was the adoption and strengthening of personal data protection frameworks. Several Members and Observers introduced or updated comprehensive data protection legislation, including Bangladesh, Djibouti, the European Union, The Gambia, the Republic of Korea, Paraguay, Viet Nam, Algeria, and the Bahamas. These measures generally regulate the processing of personal data, establish obligations for data controllers and processors, and strengthen enforcement mechanisms. A common feature across many measures is the introduction or clarification of conditions for cross-border transfers of personal data, generally requiring an adequate level of protection in the destination jurisdiction or the application of specific safeguards. For example, Bangladesh's Personal Data Protection Act 2026 imposes data governance obligations on domestic and foreign entities processing personal data and permits transfers only to countries

[99] WTO document G/C/W/886/Rev.1, 24 November 2025.
[100] WTO documents G/C/M/151, 16 May 2025 and G/C/M/151/Add.1, 4 June 2025.
[101] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 233.
[102] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 234.
[103] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 240.
[104] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 235.
[105] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 236.
[106] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 238.
[107] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 239.
[108] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 237.
[109] See Trade Concerns Database, ID 241.
[110] WTO document G/L/1628, 22 May 2026.
[111] See WTO document series G/L/223* and G/C/W/859*.
[112] WTO document G/C/W/859/Add.1, 8 April 2026.
[113] Members also introduced measures applying to digital platforms and e-commerce. These are covered in Section 4.

ensuring adequate data protection. Paraguay's Personal Data Protection Law restricts transfers unless the destination jurisdiction provides equivalent protection or alternative safeguards are in place. The Gambia's legislation applies to both domestic and foreign controllers whose activities relate to individuals in the country, while The Bahamas' Data Protection Act applies to foreign entities offering goods or services to individuals in the country and permits cross-border data transfers to jurisdictions that ensure an adequate level of protection. The European Union adopted new procedural rules introducing binding deadlines for GDPR enforcement procedures and strengthening coordination among data protection authorities in cross-border investigations.

3.144. Artificial intelligence (AI) was another area of policy activity. Viet Nam's Law on Artificial Intelligence establishes a risk-based approach to AI governance and applies to domestic and foreign entities involved in AI activities in its territory. The law requires that foreign providers of high-risk AI systems to appoint a local legal representative. Peru adopted implementing regulations for its AI framework, introducing provisions related to risk management, transparency, explainability and data governance covering any entity developing, implementing or using AI in Peru.

3.145. Cybersecurity was also addressed through dedicated cybersecurity legislation or requirements embedded into broader regulatory frameworks. China's amended Cybersecurity Law provides for strengthened risk monitoring and enhanced AI safety requirements and applies extraterritorially. Djibouti's Digital Code combines rules on data protection, cybersecurity, e-commerce and electronic transactions within a single framework. Other cybersecurity measures applying specifically to services are addressed in the relevant section.

Dispute Settlement


3.146. Measures taken by a WTO Member can be the subject of dispute settlement proceedings when another Member believes that such measures violate an agreement or a commitment contained in the WTO covered agreements.[114] Between mid-October 2025 and 30 June 2026 (the reporting period), WTO Members filed four new requests for consultations[115] (Chart 3.11). In addition, the WTO dispute settlement system continued to administer proceedings that were initiated before the reporting period. At the end of June 2026, panel proceedings in six disputes were ongoing.

3.147. The subject matter of the new disputes initiated during the reporting period spanned a wide range of issues covered under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the GATT 1994, the Import Licensing Agreement, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, and the Marrakesh Agreement.

[114] Measures can also be challenged through dispute settlement proceedings if they nullify or impair benefits accruing to a Member under a WTO agreement.

[115] A request for consultations is the first step in the dispute settlement process.

Chart 3.11 Requests for consultations, 1995-2026



Note: Based on data for January to June 2026.


Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.148. Between October 2025 and June 2026, two original and one compliance panel reports were circulated, along with one arbitration decision concerning the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations. One of the panel reports was adopted, and two were appealed.[116]

3.149. In the absence of a functioning Appellate Body, certain WTO Members have turned to alternate means to ensure effective resolution of disputes. A group of WTO Members have set up an interim appeal arrangement (MPIA) based on the arbitration provisions contained in Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. At the time of this publication, 61 WTO Members participate in this initiative, or 37%. Since the beginning of 2020, parties to 17 disputes have agreed to an alternative appeal mechanism based on arbitration proceedings under Article 25 of the DSU. Notably, during the reporting period, one dispute was terminated by the complainant (Chart 3.12).

[116] Currently, appeals cannot be considered, as in the absence of consensus among WTO Members to launch the selection process for Appellate Body members, all seven positions on the Appellate Body remain vacant.

Chart 3.12 Outcomes of disputes 2020-2026



Note: Based on data for January to June 2026.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

Electronic commerce

3.150. Discussions under the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce intensified in early 2026 ahead of MC14. Based on Members' proposals, discussions focused on the possible elements of a Ministerial decision. Members considered the continued reinvigoration of the Work Programme with a strong development dimension, as well as the establishment of a committee on digital trade that would institutionalize the Work Programme, building on the work conducted thus far. Members also debated the extension of the moratorium, particularly its duration, with some delegations favouring the traditional two-year extension, while others preferred a longer or open-ended extension. Ultimately, Members were unable to reach consensus on a Ministerial decision. The Work Programme and the moratorium therefore lapsed on 30 March 2026.

3.151. Following the conclusion of negotiations on the Agreement on Electronic Commerce (ECA) in 2024, two requests for its incorporation into Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement had been submitted to the General Council, but there was no consensus on adopting the decision. While incorporation remains the ultimate objective of the ECA co-sponsors, 67 Members announced at MC14 the adoption of interim arrangements that would allow the agreement to enter into force, pending an incorporation decision.

Fisheries Subsidies

3.152. Since the entry into force of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS) on 15 September 2025, Members have engaged in work to implement the Agreement. As of June 2026, 120 Members, or 72%, have deposited their instruments of acceptance with the WTO. The first Chair of the Committee on Fisheries Subsidies (CFS), Ana Laura Lizano from Costa Rica, was elected in December 2025, and its first regular meeting took place on 1 May 2026. At that meeting, Members adopted the Committee's Rules of Procedure, the template for its Annotated Draft Agenda, and a decision allowing the electronic submission of Members' notifications. It also granted the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) permanent observer status. In line with the notification obligations set out in the AFS, a total of 20 Members have submitted their notifications as of June 2026. Those notifications concern lists of vessels and operators affirmatively determined to have engaged in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing under Article 8.2 of the AFS;

measures in place or taken for the implementation of the Agreement under Articles 3.5 and Article 8.3 of the AFS; Members' fisheries regimes under Article 8.4 of the AFS; and the Regional Fisheries Management Organizations or Arrangements to which they are parties under Article 8.6 of the AFS.

3.153. The WTO Fisheries Funding Mechanism (Fish Fund) is a voluntary trust fund that supports developing and least-developed Members in implementing the Agreement. With the entry into force of the Agreement, the Fish Fund has become fully operational and has begun to disburse its funds and to actively support implementation efforts of the Agreement by eligible developing and least-developed country Members. As of June 2026, the Steering Committee has approved 26 grants for 24 different Members under its first Call for Proposals, covering both preparatory work and concrete implementation activities across various regions, amounting to approximately USD 3 million. In July 2026, under its second Call for Proposals, the Steering Committee is expected to assess and approve additional grants. As of June 2026, 18 WTO Members have contributed approximately USD 20 million to the Fund, ensuring a strong financial foundation for ongoing technical assistance.

3.154. Meetings of the Negotiating Group on Rules (NGR) resumed following the election of a new Chair, Ambassador Leslie Ramsammy from Guyana, in December 2025. At MC14, Members adopted a Ministerial Decision on Fisheries Subsidies, reaffirming their continued commitment to engage constructively in negotiations on additional provisions to achieve a comprehensive agreement on fisheries subsidies, including through further disciplines on certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, while recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing country Members and LDC Members should be an integral part of the negotiations.

3.155. On 29 April 2026, the NGR Chair circulated a Work Programme based on feedback received from Members, with the intention of organizing the work of 2026 in two phases. In line with the Work Programme, before the summer break, Members engaged in information sessions on the history of the negotiations on fisheries subsidies and on data regarding fisheries subsidies and fish stocks, as well as in a thematic session on a paper circulated by Indonesia regarding coherence between WTO fisheries disciplines and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Chair has convened three "fish weeks" in the second half of 2026 to continue the negotiations.

General Council

3.156. During the reporting period, the following agenda items were taken up at the General Council at the request of China, Brazil and the Republic of Korea respectively: "*Heightened Trade Turbulence and Responses from the WTO*"[117], "*Rethinking the Rules-Based Multilateral Trading System*"[118], and "*Preserving the Spirit of Open and Predictable Trade: Collective Restraint Against Actions Undermining Trade Liberalization*"[119]. Similar issues were raised by Members within the WTO Reform discussions including through written submissions[120], and at discussions at the General Council[121] and Ministerial Conversations on WTO Reform at MC14.[122]

3.157. In December 2025, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela expressed trade concerns in its statement, under "Other Business," which was subsequently circulated in document JOB/GC/487.[123] In March 2026, Venezuela circulated a revised communication in document JOB/GC/487/Rev.1 which it referred to at the General Council meeting in March under the agenda item "*Update by the*

[117] WTO document WT/GC/M/222, 13 February 2026. See also WTO documents WT/GC/272, 8 May 2025; and WT/GC/272/Add.1, 10 July 2025. This was also taken up at GC meetings in 2025 which were referred to in the previous edition of this Report.

[118] WTO document WT/GC/M/222, 13 February 2026. This was also taken up at GC meetings in 2025 which were referred to in the previous edition of this Report.

[118] WTO document WT/GC/M/222, 13 February 2026.

[119] WTO document WT/GC/M/224, 2 June 2026.

[120] A list of Members' written submissions can be seen in the dedicated webpage on WTO Reform: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/reform_e/reform_e.htm.

[121] WTO documents WT/GC/M/222, 13 February 2026; WT/GC/M/223, 30 April 2026; and WT/GC/M/224, 2 June 2026.

[122] See also WTO document WT/MIN(26)/39, 2 June 2026.

[123] WTO document WT/GC/M/222, 13 February 2026.

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on Recent Developments Affecting Trade and Development Prospects".[124]

Government Procurement

3.158. The plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) 2012 aims to open up parts of GPA Parties' government procurement markets to suppliers from other GPA Parties and to make covered government procurement more transparent and predictable.

3.159. In October 2025, the Committee on Government Procurement (CGP) marked its 100th formal meeting since the adoption in April 1994 of the first WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, the GPA 1994.

3.160. During the reporting period, GPA Parties continued to work on the accessions of several WTO Members to the Agreement. In addition, Guatemala and Barbados in 2025 and Uruguay in 2026 joined the CGP as new observers, bringing the total number of observers to 39.

3.161. To enhance the transparency of its work, the CGP adopted a decision on the derestriction of historical GPA-related documents (GPA/CD/10) as well as a forward-looking decision on the derestriction of GPA-related documents to be circulated in the future (GPA/CD/9). Two of the CGP's active Work Programmes, one on Sustainable Procurement and the other on the Collection and Reporting of Statistical Data, also continued to advance during the reporting period.

3.162. The United States and various other GPA Parties raised concerns during CGP meetings about Canada's recent federal-level Buy Canadian policy framework, which they said grants preferences for Canadian goods, services, and suppliers in federal government procurement, and about amendments to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Procurement Inquiry Regulations. The United States also raised concerns about procurement restrictions implemented by three Canadian provinces since 2025 that it said appear to discriminate against US suppliers.

3.163. Outside the CGP context, a number of GPA Parties concluded FTAs with WTO Members that are not GPA Parties and that provide for reciprocal market opening in the area of government procurement. Moreover, some GPA Parties took measures aimed at ensuring that the benefits of the GPA 2012 and other market opening trade agreements covering government procurement accrue to GPA Parties and FTA partners. Those measures included autonomous domestic policy responses and international agreements on reciprocal trade.

Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)

3.164. The MSME Group advanced practical work for Members to help small businesses trade more easily. Ahead of MC14, the Group's Coordinator, Ambassador Matthew Wilson of Barbados, issued a report[125] and two summary documents highlighting key findings from the Group's thematic discussions on business support organizations, good regulatory practices, digital trade, and informality, [126] as well as challenges and opportunities raised directly by MSMEs. [127] Following MC14 in March 2026, the Group launched a new work programme focused on artificial intelligence and intellectual property and will continue to prioritize MSME voices through MSME Spotlights at meetings, discussions with the private sector, and the INF/MSME/P documents symbol for the private sector.

3.165. The Group also began work on two new compendia: one on Good Regulatory Practices (GRP) for MSMEs[128] and another, together with the Trade and Gender Group, on Empowering Women to Trade through Digitalisation: Policy Insights.[129] It continued implementing the December 2020 Package[130] and updating the two compendia launched at MC13 on access to finance for women-led

[124] WTO document WT/GC/M/223, 30 April 2026.
[125] WTO document WT/MIN(26)/3, 16 February 2026.
[126] Viewed at: Key_Takeaways_from_the_2024–25_MSME_Group_Thematic_Sessions_Web_E.pdf
[127] Viewed at: Key_Takeaways_from_MSME_Spotlights_and_Newsletter_Interviews_Web_E.pdf
[128] WTO document INF/MSME/W/61/Rev.2, 10 June 2026.
[129] WTO document WT/MIN(26)/4 & INF/TGE/COM/13/Rev.1 & INF/MSME/W/68/Rev.1, 27 February 2026.
[130] WTO document INF/MSME/W/4/Rev.2, 11 December 2020.

MSMEs[131] and on special provisions for MSMEs in Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) programmes.[132]

3.166. Partnerships remained a major part of the Group's work. It held the annual Trade4MSMEs Network meeting, issued a joint study report with the WCO and ICC on MSME provisions in AEO programmes[133], and organized a third Joint Solutions Lab in November 2025 with Georgia, the ITU and ITC on digital innovation ecosystems and scaling digital trade solutions for MSMEs. The Group also marked the sixth ICC-ITC-WTO MSME Group Small Business Champions competition, this time with the ITU, focused on helping small businesses use AI for international trade.

3.167. By mid-2026, the MSME Group had grown from 88 Members at its launch in 2017 to 106.

Regional trade agreements (RTAs)

3.168. While at least 27 RTAs have entered into force between 1 January 2025 and 30 June 2026, only eight of them, or 30%, have been notified to the WTO, despite the CRTA having devoted attention to reducing the number of non-notified RTAs during most of 2025. Including notifications of older agreements, Members notified only 10 RTAs (including one accession) in 2025, and another five RTAs during the first half of 2026.[134]

3.169. The total number of RTAs notified to the WTO and in force as of 30 June 2026 stood at 384. Of these, Europe continues to participate in most (181), East Asian Members in 114, and South America in 73. As part of the Transparency Mechanism for RTAs, the Secretariat has also confirmed with Members an additional 79 RTAs that are in force but remain non-notified.[135]


3.170. During 2025, four of the ten notified RTAs had participation from the Middle East and from Asia/Oceania, three from Europe, and two from Africa, including the African Continental Free Trade Area. Participation in the 26 RTAs (plus one accession) that entered into force in 2025 and the first half of 2026 (whether notified or not) was also particularly strong from the Middle East and Asia/Oceania. In addition to global geographic shifts in RTA participation, the geographic distance between RTA partners has also increased over the past twenty-five years, making RTAs less "regional". Based on notified agreements and their dates of entry into force, the average distance between partners' main population centres was around 2,500 km in 2000 and had increased to around 7,000 km by 2020-2025.

3.171. In a changing global trade environment, many RTA negotiations have been newly announced, restarted, remain ongoing, or are being "accelerated" according to official statements. Several high-profile RTAs were signed or concluded during 2025 and the first half of 2026, including the EU-MERCOSUR, EFTA-MERCOSUR and EU-India. Overall, more than 40 agreements have been newly signed since the beginning of 2025, a high number compared to previous years. [136] The Middle East, and the UAE in particular[137], as well as Asia/Oceania and Europe have been particularly active. Seven of these have already entered into force. In addition, the United States concluded a large number of framework agreements, as well as 10 Agreements on Reciprocal Trade (ARTs), although their legal status remains unclear and none of the ARTs had formally entered into force, or been notified by 30 June 2026. Discussions took place among Members regarding how to increase transparency around these unusually structured (framework) agreements.

[131] WTO documents , INF/MSME/W/46/Rev.5, INF/TGE/W/7/Rev.5, 23 October 2025.
[132] WTO document INF/MSME/W/47/Rev.5, 15 October 2025.
[133] WTO–WCO-ICC Study Report on Integration of MSMEs into Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) Programmes, September 2025. Viewed at: study0925_e.pdf.
[134] The WTO RTA Database (viewed at: http://rtais.wto.org) provides updated information on all RTA notifications submitted by WTO Members under GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V, or the Enabling Clause.
[135] WTO document WT/REG/W/198, 10 June 2026.
[136] 2025 recorded a higher number of RTAs signed than previous years and than the first nine months of 2026, even after excluding Brexit-related agreements, which led the United Kingdom to conclude a large number of continuation agreements replacing EU agreements to which it was no longer a Party, and the recent negotiation activity of the UAE, which has signed 34 RTAs since 2022.
[137] As some RTAs entered into force, the UAE now has at least 22 primarily bilateral RTAs in force, most of them yet to be notified. Prior to 2023, the UAE was a Party to two bilateral and four plurilateral RTAs, three of which involved the Gulf Cooperation Council.

3.172. Most modern RTAs cover a broad range of provisions going beyond market access for goods, including on issues for which there are few or no WTO rules. More recent RTAs generally include key provisions more frequently (Chart 3.13). Compared to all RTAs, those RTAs that entered into force since 2020 include notably more often provisions on gender, e-commerce, SMEs, the environment, or labour, while the increase in the use of all other key provisions is less pronounced. For example, provisions on gender are included in RTAs more than twice as frequently since 2020 compared to all RTAs, while provisions on e-commerce are included one and a half times as often. Still, the content, scope and binding nature of these provisions differ greatly.

Chart 3.13 Most key provisions are increasingly included in newer RTAs, based on 384 RTAs notified to the WTO and in force on 30 June 2026



Note: Figures are based on 384 RTAs notified to the WTO and in force on 30 June 2026; 84 of these have entered into force since 2020. The momentum of provisions being included in RTAs is calculated based on the percentage point change between all RTAs and recent RTAs: stable - between 0 and 5; moderate momentum – increase of between 5 and 10; high momentum – increase above 10. For more details on these provisions, see: https://rtais.wto.org/USERGUIDE/Glossary_MT_Eng.pdf.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

3.173. A number of recent RTAs or ongoing negotiations contain novel features such as chapters relating to energy and raw materials, trade and sustainable development, gender issues, or the digital economy. For example, the RTAs of the European Union with Chile (in force since February 2025), the EU's modernized RTA with Mexico (signed in May 2026), or ongoing negotiations between India and Chile cover provisions relating to energy and raw materials. The inclusion of these topics in RTAs remains relatively rare compared to the growing number of other instruments relating to critical minerals, such as memoranda of understanding or of cooperation. However, the more binding nature of commitments (at times also subject to dispute settlement provisions), for example under the EU-Chile or EU-Mexico agreements, sets their coverage in RTAs apart from the other often more aspirational instruments. Included provisions generally address issues such as access to resources, research and development, the development of value chains in resource-rich countries, standards, pricing, and trade restrictions. Chapters on trade and sustainable development increasingly include enforceable provisions, at times under a specific dispute settlement mechanism.

3.174. Provisions relating to the digital economy, initially mostly covered in stand-alone agreements, are also more frequently included in new, or added to existing RTAs. For example, the


recently concluded Digital Economy Agreement between EFTA and Singapore would be included as a chapter in the existing EFTA-Singapore FTA, and all the RTAs concluded by the UAE contain digital provisions. The recently concluded ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement is also expected to be integrated into the broader ASEAN treaty structure.

Trade Facilitation

3.175. The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) entered into force on 22 February 2017, when two-thirds of WTO Members deposited their instruments of acceptance amending the Marrakesh Agreement to incorporate the TFA into Annex 1A (Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods). During the reporting period, Tonga ratified the TFA, bringing the total number of ratifications to 162 Members, representing 98% of the membership.

3.176. The TFA's current global rate of implementation commitments stands at 89.5%. During the reporting period, Members submitted 49 notifications, which are summarized in Chart 3.14.

Chart 3.14 Number of TFA notifications received by WTO Members between 13 October 2025 and 30 June 2026



Source: WTO, TFA database. Viewed at: https://www.tfadatabase.org.

3.177. During the reporting period, the TFAF assisted Angola, Djibouti, and Myanmar in advancing the implementation of trade facilitation reforms through diagnostic studies. The TFAF launched the execution of implementation grants approved for Kenya, the Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Sri Lanka. Through these grants, TFAF directly supports trade facilitation improvements in Members in the areas of risk management, advance rulings, pre-arrival processing, paperless trade, and fees and charges for trade procedures.

3.178. During the reporting period, two G20 Members, Brazil and France, provided in-kind experts to TFAF activities in support of LDC Members.

Trade Financing

3.179. Recent WTO-International Finance Corporation (IFC) studies in West Africa[138], the lower Mekong region[139] and Central America[140] showed that only 25% of goods trade was supported by trade finance. The share of bank-intermediated trade finance for the WTO-IFC target countries in West Africa is below the continental average of 34% and remains well below global levels, where more than 80% of international trade is supported by trade finance (AfDB, 2026).[141] Globally, over 90% of trade relies on trade finance[142]. In selective, fragmented trade-finance markets, bank rejection rates for trade-finance applications are high and tend to fall disproportionately on new clients and smaller firms. When selected, these firms face higher interest rates and collateral requirements.

3.180. In a recent research paper by the IFC and WTO Secretariat based on data from the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)[143] spanning more than 100 countries, it was found that bank-intermediated trade finance tends to expand at a faster rate within more financially developed markets. This finding corroborates the earlier regional studies. Trade finance tends to grow in countries with a stronger financial infrastructure, not necessarily where trade flows grow the fastest. Moreover, the volatility of global financial conditions tends to impair the flow of bank-intermediated supply of trade finance to emerging markets faster than in mature financial markets. These findings highlight the importance of multilateral institutions' trade finance programs aimed at bolstering the flow of trade credit into local markets and at strengthening the ability of these markets to support international trade expansion.

Trade and environment

3.181. Since the last report in October 2025, the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) was chaired by Ambassador Erwin Bollinger (Switzerland) until MC14 and by Ambassador Ram Prasad Subedi (Nepal) thereafter. The Committee deepened its work on key topics[144] particularly on trade and climate change, sustainable agriculture, and transparency. This was done through various formats, including thematic and interactive sessions, alongside formal and informal meetings, and the Seventh Trade and Environment Week held in June 2026.[145] A new pilot information sharing exercise on trade and climate measures was launched on a voluntary basis as set out in WT/CTE/COM/19, paragraph 2.5. A template was considered as a tool for information sharing.[146] The CTE received regular updates from the UNFCCC Secretariat, the COP30 Presidency of Brazil, and the COP31 Presidency of Türkiye on preparations and developments related to COP30 (2025) and COP31 (2026) respectively. The UNFCCC Secretariat also updated Members on the June 2026 first-ever UNFCCC trade and climate dialogue convened pursuant to the COP30 Mutirão decision. The WTO Secretariat also provided related briefings to the CTE.

3.182. Some WTO Members continued their work through other platforms. For example, the 48 co-sponsors of the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR[147]) initiative met twice during the period, with Members and stakeholders sharing experiences on approaches to reform and advancing work on all three pillars, namely on enhancing transparency; designing temporary crisis measures; and identifying and addressing harmful fossil fuel subsidies. This work produced a Ministerial Statement (WT/MIN(26)/23), alongside a coordinator's progress report (WT/MIN(26)/24). The 79 co-sponsors

[138] WTO and IFC (2022), Trade finance in West Africa. Viewed at: WTO | Trade Finance in West Africa.
[139] WTO and IFC (2023), Trade Finance in the Mekong Region. Viewed at: WTO | Trade Finance in the Mekong Region: A study of Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam.
[140] WTO and IFC (2025), Trade Finance in Central America and Mexico. Viewed at: WTO | Trade Finance in Central America and Mexico.
[141] African Development Bank (2026), Trade Finance Supply in Africa. Viewed at: Trade_Finance_Report_2026_ENGLISH_HighRes_May26.pdf.
[142] UNCTAD (2025), "Over 90% of global trade now depends on finance, reshaping opportunities and deepening vulnerabilities", 2 December. Viewed at: https://unctad.org/news/over-90-global-trade-now-depends-finance-reshaping-opportunities-and-deepening-vulnerabilities.
[143] IFC and WTO (2026). Trade Finance: How volatile financial conditions influence its availability and impact trade levels, IFC Market Insight and WTO blog (forthcoming).
[144] Annual Report 2025, WTO document WT/CTE/32, 15 December 2025.
[145] Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_0106202610_e/envir_0106202610_e.htm.
[146] See WT/CTE/W/271.
[147] Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/fossil_fuel_e.htm.

of the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD[148]) met several times to finalize the technical summaries of discussions in the initiative's four working groups, namely on trade-related climate measures (WT/MIN(26)/22/Add.2), environmental goods and services (WT/MIN(26)/22/Add.3), circular economy - circularity (WT/MIN(26)/22/Add.4) and subsidies (WT/MIN(26)/22/Add.5). Together with a Co-convenors Ministerial Statement (WT/MIN(26)/22) and Report on the first five years of work (WT/MIN(26)/22/Add.1), these formed the initiative's "MC14 package" presented in a special event held in March 2026.[149] The 83 co-sponsors of the Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade (DPP[150]) met five times to advance work towards concrete, pragmatic, and effective MC14 outcomes, with the coordinators' presenting at MC14 a Ministerial Statement and a package of five technical documents[151], and co-sponsors also launching discussions on the DPP's work for 2026-2027.

Trade and gender

3.183. The Informal Working Group on Trade and Gender (IWG), established in September 2020 as a follow-up to the Buenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women's Economic Empowerment, comprises 130 WTO Members and 5 Observers. Since October 2025, WTO Members under review have reported on gender-responsive trade initiatives through their Trade Policy Reviews, reflecting the continued integration of gender considerations into trade policy.

3.184. In this context, gender equality has become a regular part of development strategies and trade policies. The Reviews confirm that support for women entrepreneurs, access to finance, and gender-disaggregated data collection are now firmly established priorities within trade policy frameworks.

3.185. Targeted programmes to support women entrepreneurs range from training, mentoring, export readiness support, and networking to market access initiatives. They are increasingly focusing on women's integration into domestic and global value chains, rather than simply promoting business creation. Recognizing financial exclusion as a major barrier to women's economic participation, many governments have introduced concessional financing schemes, credit guarantees, financial inclusion strategies, women-focused banking services, and fintech solutions.

3.186. In addition, gender-disaggregated data collection has been strengthened, including through SheTrades Outlook, enhanced monitoring frameworks, and stakeholder consultations, to better identify barriers faced by women traders and entrepreneurs.

3.187. Gender considerations have consequently expanded beyond targeted initiatives and are increasingly embedded across a broad range of trade and trade-related policy areas, including investment, entrepreneurship development, and economic transformation. A related trend is the growing incorporation of gender considerations into free trade agreements, with more substantive provisions and their increasing inclusion in trade cooperation frameworks such as the Global Trade and Gender Arrangement (GTAGA).

3.188. Another notable development is the emphasis on digital trade as a vehicle for women's economic empowerment. Many governments now view digitalization, e-commerce, fintech, and digital skills development as key enablers of women's access to markets, finance, information, and business opportunities.

3.189. Therefore, gender equality is no longer regarded solely as a social policy goal. It is increasingly recognized as an economic imperative that benefits both women and the broader economy.

[148] Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tessd_e/tessd_e.htm.
[149] Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/tessd_19mar26_331_e.htm.
[150] Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ppesp_e/ppesp_e.htm.
[151] WTO document WT/MIN(26)/21, 18 March 2026.

4 POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN TRADE IN SERVICES

Regular measures affecting trade in services

4.1. WTO Members and Observers introduced 130 new trade in services measures in 2025, and 52 new measures in the first six months of 2026. Over the twelve months to June 2026, a total of 114 new measures affecting trade in services were identified, a figure consistent with those reported in recent years. Almost 60% of these measures were conducive to liberalizing trade in services and enhancements to the regulatory framework and can be considered as trade-facilitating, a slight decrease compared to previous reporting periods. Half of the measures were horizontal policies affecting trade across multiple sectors, half of which specifically affected mode 3 (commercial presence), one third concerned mode 4 (movement of natural persons) and the rest related mostly to digital services measures affecting multiple modes. Regarding sector-specific measures, 18% related to financial services, 15% concerned communications, computer and IT-enabled services, with transport and other services (e.g., professional, other business, distribution, gaming, and tourism) accounting for the remainder.

4.2. The Trade Monitoring Database provides additional information on these new measures affecting trade in services introduced by 51 Members and 2 Observers (Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan).[1]

Measures affecting supply through multiple modes and across various sectors

4.3. Some Members introduced measures directly focusing on the supply of digital services.[2] The Russian Federation adopted on 31 July 2025 legislation establishing a legal framework for intermediary e-commerce platforms that includes transparency, equal access and non-discrimination requirements. It also includes provisions that apply to foreign vendors, such as the requirement for a foreign legal entity to disclose on the product page that the product is being sold by a foreign vendor. Costa Rica established on 16 April 2026 a regulatory framework for the provision of digital services and e-commerce, including rules applicable to digital service providers and online platforms.

4.4. Viet Nam adopted on 10 December 2025 a framework for the regulation of intermediary platforms, large digital platforms, and social networks offering e-commerce or livestream sales, which introduces enhanced oversight of cross-border e-commerce activities and requires foreign platforms to appoint an authorized legal entity or representative, or establish a legal entity in Viet Nam, depending on the nature of the platform's operations. Viet Nam also revised on 10 December 2025 its Cybersecurity Law to mandate that companies offering telecommunications, internet, or other online services establish branches or representative offices in the country, while requiring specific data to be stored locally. Both measures became effective on 1 July 2026.

4.5. China introduced a measure designed to promote imports of high-quality producer and consumer services to enhance domestic productivity and people's livelihoods. This includes services such as research and design, environmental and sustainability solutions, consulting, professional services, and healthcare-related services.

Measures affecting supply through commercial presence and across various sectors

4.6. Since 1 July 2025, many Members introduced measures affecting the supply through commercial presence, mostly aiming to liberalize or facilitate foreign investment. The Philippines opened several sectors to foreign investment under its Thirteenth Regular Foreign Investment Negative List, effective on 13 April 2026, allowing up to 100% foreign ownership in transport services, among others, as well as for telecommunications services where reciprocity exists. In the absence of reciprocity, foreign equity is capped at 50%. Bahrain also eased foreign ownership restrictions, effective on 18 December 2025, allowing 100% foreign ownership in a number of activities, including data monitoring and protection consultancy, port operations, real estate brokerage and electric power transmission and distribution, while permitting full foreign ownership

[1] The inclusion of any measure in TMDB implies no judgement by the WTO Secretariat on whether such measure, or its intent, is protectionist in nature. Moreover, nothing in the TMDB and the Trade Monitoring Reports should be interpreted as expressing any judgement, direct or indirect, on the consistency of any measure with the provisions of any WTO agreement.

[2] This Section covers only services-related digital measures. For digital measures applying horizontally, please refer to Section 3.7.

in several additional activities subject to specified conditions (e.g. rail transport and ship recycling services).

4.7. Nepal expanded on 16 February 2026 the automatic route for foreign direct investment from 60 to 102 industry areas, notably covering the operation of existing infrastructure, film cities or studios, and international cargo activities and transport auxiliary services. The previous investment ceiling of NPR 500 million was removed, and the minimum investment threshold of NPR 20 million was withdrawn for specified information technology and digital sectors. Effective 30 December 2025, prior central bank approval is no longer required for certain foreign investments and brownfield investments, and commercial banks are allowed to approve the repatriation of dividends and investment proceeds. Bangladesh also eased restrictions on share transfers between foreign investors and the repatriation of investment proceeds.

4.8. China's Catalogue of Industries for Encouraged Foreign Investment became effective on 1 February 2026, expanding the number of encouraged activities to 1,679 activities, with a particular focus on, inter alia, research and development, computer and related services, and health-related services. Foreign-invested enterprises operating in listed sectors benefit from preferential treatment. Viet Nam implemented its 2025 Law on Investment on 31 March 2026, outlining an updated negative list of market access restrictions for foreign investors and allowing them to establish an economic organization prior to obtaining an Investment Registration Certificate. The investment framework was further revised on 11 December 2026, removing licensing requirements for 38 conditional business lines and narrowing the scope of projects requiring in-principle approval to 20 clearly defined categories.

4.9. Maldives revised entry requirements for, inter alia, tourism, real estate, and financial services, encouraging foreign investment and activities that bring new technologies and expertise. At the same time, certain sectors and activities are reserved for Maldivian businesses, such as wholesale and retail trade, logistics services, maritime transport and construction projects valued at USD 15 million or less. Zimbabwe reduced foreign equity participation in certain reserved sectors, such as distribution services, passenger transport, logistics services and employment and advertising agencies. Existing foreign shareholding should be reduced to a maximum of 25% within three years, with at least 25% of equity transferred to Zimbabwean nationals each year. Foreign participation may be eased subject to requirements relating to employment creation, technology transfer and sustainable value-chain development, while certain capital-intensive sectors are subject to minimum investment and employment thresholds.

4.10. Several Members adopted more restrictive requirements for the screening of foreign investment, particularly on national security grounds. Switzerland adopted a new law on 19 December 2025, establishing a foreign investment screening mechanism requiring prior approval for acquisitions in a defined list of critical sectors, including defence-related activities, critical energy and water infrastructure, telecommunications, transport infrastructure, health services, pharmaceuticals, food distribution, and systemically important financial institutions, subject to specified size and turnover thresholds. The law will become effective once implementing provisions are adopted. The European Union introduced mandatory minimum screening rules on 26 June 2026 for all its member States, broadening the scope of screening to additional sensitive sectors, including critical technologies and infrastructure and financial system entities. The regime also extends to certain intra-EU investments ultimately owned or controlled by third-country investors. Croatia and Cyprus introduced their screening regimes in line with the EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Screening Regulation (EU) 2019/452, effective from 13 November 2025 and 2 April 2026 respectively. Some EU member States revised their regimes, expanding them to new areas (e.g. Czech Republic, Netherlands). Hungary relaxed specific screening rules on 19 August 2025 by reinstating a 30-business-day review period, extendable by an additional 15 calendar days for standard FDI transactions. Additionally, the State's pre-emption right in the case of a blocking decision was eliminated for most sectors.

4.11. Japan also strengthened its foreign investment screening framework through amendments to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (FEFTA), partially promulgated on 5 June 2026, requiring the Minister of Finance and the competent Ministers to seek the opinions of the heads of relevant administrative authorities where deemed necessary from the perspective of national security and other interests protected under FEFTA. The other amendments, notably extending the scope of the screening regime, will enter into force on a date to be specified by Cabinet Order within one year from the date of promulgation. In the Russian Federation, amendments signed on

8 March 2026, most of which entered into force on 7 June 2026, broadened screening and notification requirements for investments in strategic companies to cover additional activities and transactions, and extended notification requirements to certain investors holding 5% or more of a company.

Measures affecting supply of communication services

4.12. A total of 13 Members implemented new measures concerning communication services, with some notably introducing new or updated regulatory frameworks for telecommunications services. Bangladesh introduced a new policy introducing an 85% foreign ownership limit for the network access licence category, which includes telecommunications operators, while streamlining the licensing regime. Nicaragua adopted a new General Law on Convergent Telecommunications on 6 November 2025, replacing the previous telecommunications framework and establishing new rules governing operators and providers, users' rights and obligations, and the administration and use of radio spectrum and public numbering resources, while promoting investment, innovation and the efficient use of telecommunications networks and services. In the Philippines, the National Telecommunications Commission ordered the phased decommissioning of 2G and 3G mobile networks, effective mid-September 2025 with a full shutdown by 31 December 2026, requiring covered public telecommunications entities, including foreign-invested entities, to submit Technology Transition Plans and establishing new device type-approval restrictions. This transition aims to free up radio frequency spectrum for the expansion of 4G and 5G services, enhancing network efficiency and digital connectivity nationwide.

4.13. Several Members also introduced new requirements affecting audiovisual services. In Canada, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission approved, on 21 May 2026, expenditure obligations for foreign online streaming groups with annual revenues of CAD 25 million or more, requiring them to allocate at least 15% of revenues to Canadian programming. The National Assembly of Quebec adopted a measure giving the government the right to require that streaming services and device manufacturers promote and prioritize French-language content for Quebec users. France introduced additional sub-quotas from 2026 under its existing regime for subscription video-on-demand services, which includes catalogue quotas for European and French works and investment obligations of up to 25% of net annual French revenues, requiring, inter alia, at least 20% of the investment obligation to be devoted to animation, documentaries, recordings or recreations of live shows.

Measures affecting supply of financial services

4.14. A total of 14 Members introduced measures affecting trade in financial services, some of which provided for greater market access. For example, El Salvador passed a law on 7 August 2025, permitting both domestic and foreign natural and legal persons to become shareholders in investment banks. However, acquisitions exceeding 1% of the share capital require prior approval. The law authorizes the establishment of investment banks focused on asset management, financial advisory services, mergers and acquisitions, structured financing, and market analysis, and it allows these institutions to operate using bitcoin. In Viet Nam, a new law allows foreign investors to execute trades through international brokerage intermediaries, rather than requiring a direct relationship with a Vietnamese securities firm, effective on 3 February 2026.

4.15. There were also a number of new measures aimed at facilitating innovation and the development of new financial products. The Bank of Thailand launched a temporary initiative on 24 December 2025 to test financial service innovations associated with capital market and digital asset businesses in collaboration with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This initiative is part of the Programmable Payment Project within the Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox, which facilitates a fully electronic, end-to-end process to support the digital capital market ecosystem. The United Kingdom published the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Cryptoassets) Regulations 2026 on 4 February 2026, under which firms carrying out specified cryptoasset activities in the United Kingdom or serving UK customers must generally be authorized by the Financial Conduct Authority (e.g. stablecoin issuance, dealing as principal or agent, arranging deals, safeguarding cryptoassets or operating a cryptoasset trading platform), subject to specified exemptions. The authorisation application window will be open from 30 September 2026 to 28 February 2027, and the regulations will come into force in October 2027.

4.16. Seychelles amended its National Payment System (Licensing and Authorisation) Regulations, 2014, modifying the conditions for authorization by the central bank and requiring applications to be in the country's public interest, effective from 14 January 2026. The Philippines adopted a series of measures affecting banks and other financial institutions, covering, inter alia, the mandatory industry-wide adoption of the ISO 20022 messaging standard for retail payment systems and the establishment of a new Digital Financial Marketplace regulation for presenting financial products and services on digital platforms.

4.17. One measure was related to insurance services. India increased the foreign direct investment ceiling in insurance companies from 74% to 100% under the automatic route and eased certain requirements applicable to foreign reinsurer branches, effective from 2 May 2026. The minimum net-owned-fund requirement for foreign reinsurer branches was reduced from INR 50 billion to INR 10 billion. Only one of the chairperson, chief executive officer or managing director must be an Indian resident. Finally, the equity-transfer approval threshold was raised from 1% to 5%, and insurer mergers with non-insurance companies are allowed subject to approval.

Measures affecting supply of transport services

4.18. In the transport services sector, the vast majority of measures related to maritime transport, with a number aimed at facilitating the supply of services. The Philippines introduced new rules, approved on 23 October 2025, governing the temporary utilization of foreign-registered ships within the Philippines' maritime zones, allowing such vessels to provide maritime services only where no suitable Philippine-registered vessel is available and for government-approved or endorsed projects, infrastructure support or similar strategic purposes. On 11 August 2025, India relaxed the requirement for full Indian ownership by allowing partial ownership by entities registered in India and cooperatives, with the goal of simplifying regulatory procedures for ship ownership and registration. The United States approved, on 24 April 2026, a 90-day extension of a Jones Act waiver initially issued on 17 March 2026 and subsequently extended until 15 November 2026. The waiver permits, *inter alia*, foreign-flagged, foreign-built and foreign-owned vessels to transport covered cargo between US ports, including Hawaii, Alaska and Puerto Rico, which would otherwise be reserved for US-qualified vessels.

4.19. Other measures related to land transport. Thailand's Rail Transport Act became effective on 27 March 2026, establishing a framework allowing private operators to access state rail infrastructure and operate freight or passenger services using their own rolling stock through track-sharing arrangements, while the State Railway of Thailand retains ownership of the rail infrastructure. In the context of a new measure governing administrative authority and market entry for transportation network companies (e.g. ride-hailing platforms) and transportation network vehicle services (i.e. drivers affiliated with such platforms), the Philippines imposed, on 23 October 2025, a moratorium on new applications for platform accreditation.

Measures affecting supply of other services

4.20. Other services sectors were affected by Members' policy changes during the reporting period. For example, beginning in May 2026, India banned online money games, including those based on chance, skill, or a combination of both. The law also prohibits the advertising, promotion, and facilitation of these games, along with the processing of related financial transactions via banks or payment systems. In Türkiye, a new measure was published on 1 May 2026, requiring online gaming platforms with more than 100,000 daily users in the country to designate a representative in Türkiye.

4.21. The Maldives introduced new licensing requirements for tour operators in December 2025, under which foreign operators are required to obtain a tour operator licence and may operate in the country only in collaboration with a locally licensed tour operator under an affiliation agreement. Existing partnerships are not expected to be materially disrupted. Georgia established, on 1 October 2025, a three-year permit for information technology professionals, which can be renewed up to a maximum total stay of 12 years, and which allows foreign IT professionals to work for locally established companies or as freelancers.

Measures affecting the supply through the movement of natural persons

4.22. Some Members introduced restrictive measures affecting the supply of services through the movement of natural persons during the review period. From 25 November 2025, Mozambique requires employers to demonstrate that no nationals are available before hiring a foreign national, except for foreign directors and legal representatives. Kazakhstan implemented a labour market test requiring job vacancies to be posted on the Electronic Labour Exchange for 15 days. In addition, a local staff quota applies to small businesses, requiring that at least 70% of heads and deputies and at least 90% of experts and qualified workers be Kazakh nationals. Japan changed the requirements for the "Business Manager" residence status, including, inter alia, requirements concerning the employment of full-time local staff and staff with Japanese-language skills.

4.23. Saudi Arabia announced on 30 November 2025 an increase in the mandatory Saudisation rate for procurement professions from 50% to 70% for establishments employing three or more workers in the covered professions, thereby increasing the share of positions to be filled by Saudi nationals. Covered establishments were given a six-month grace period to comply with the new requirement. Georgia introduced a mandatory work-authorization regime, effective from 1 March 2026, for most foreign nationals without permanent residence who engage in paid work, freelance activities or business activities, including self-employed individuals and remote workers serving foreign clients. Under the new regime, employers must demonstrate that no suitable local candidate is available before applying for authorization.

4.24. A number of the mode 4-related measures were trade-facilitating. For example, Viet Nam issued, on 13 August 2025, a decree easing labour market tests and introducing new qualifying criteria for work permits and related exemptions. Armenia established on 20 January 2026 a new work visa system allowing single and multiple-entry stays of up to 120 days and removed the labour market test, although an annual State-level quota on foreign workers was introduced, effective on 1 November 2026. China introduced a new K visa for young foreign scientific and technological talent, providing greater flexibility in the number of entries and duration of stay, as well as a streamlined application process. Brazil expanded the range of activities that foreign nationals may perform under visitor status to include technical and technology-transfer activities through Decree No. 12.657, published on 8 October 2025. Such activities may generally be performed for stays of up to 90 days, with the possibility of an additional 90-day extension, although the permitted length of stay, eligibility for extension and duration of any extension vary by nationality.

4.25. Hong Kong, China expanded, on 1 November 2025, its Short-Term Visitors Scheme, allowing non-local talent to undertake specified short-term activities in additional designated sectors without an employment visa or entry permit. Guatemala created an entry pathway for self-employed professionals and extended the validity of business visitor visas, with single-entry and multiple-entry visas valid for up to 12 months and five years, respectively, compared with up to 90 days previously, effective from 8 October 2025. The United Kingdom shortened the prior employment requirement for the Global Business Mobility Secondment Worker visa from 12 to six months, effective from 8 April 2026.

Trade concerns raised in the Council for Trade in Services (CTS)

4.26. At the CTS meetings held on 12 December 2025, 20 February, and 4 June 2026, concerns were reiterated regarding: (i) cybersecurity measures in China (raised by Japan and the United States); (ii) cybersecurity measures in Viet Nam (raised by Japan and the United States); (iii) measures by the United States regarding trade in services (raised by China); (iv) measures by India regarding trade in services (raised by China); and (v) at the June meeting, measures by the European Union regarding trade in services (raised by China).

Air services agreements

4.27. Table 4.1 presents information on air services agreements (ASAs)[3] concluded or amended between July 2025 and June 2026. These include new ASAs and revisions of existing ones. As far as can be assessed from available sources, these ASAs provide for improved access conditions compared with those previously in place. A significant share of the agreements listed were concluded

[3] The term "Air Transport Agreements" is used here to refer to Air Services Agreements, Memoranda of Understanding, Exchanges of Notes, and other such relevant instruments.

during the seventeenth ICAO Air Services Negotiation (ICAN2025) event, held in the Dominican Republic from 10 to 14 November 2025.

Table 4.1 Air transport agreements concluded or amended between July 2025 and June 2026

Parties		Date of signature	Source
Somalia	Tanzania	01.07.2025	https://web.mfa.gov.so/somalia-and-tanzania-renew-aviation-pact-approve-direct-flight-route/
Serbia	Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	04.07.2025	https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2352014
Tajikistan	United Arab Emirates	16.07.2025	https://gazinform.com/news/tajikistan-and-uae-sign-intergovernmental-agreement-on-air-transport-cooperation-9fa2ca
India	Kuwait, State of	16.07.2025	https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/latest-updates/india-and-kuwait-sign-air-treaty-to-boost-flight-capacity-to-18000-seats-weekly/articleshow/122574902.cms?from=mdr
Nigeria	Egypt	21.07.2025	https://newsaero.info/accordaerienvisa/nigeria-and-egypt-strengthen-aviation-ties-with-new-basa-agreement?true=8873#:~:text=Nigeria%20and%20Egypt%20Strengthen%20Aviation%20Ties%20with%20New%20BASA%20Agreement,-Accords%20a%C3%A9riens%20/%20Visas&text=On%20July%2021%2C%202025%2C%20Nigeria,Badr%20Abdelatty.
Uzbekistan	Indonesia	01.08.2025	https://uz.kursiv.media/en/2025-08-07/uzbekistan-and-indonesia-sign-deal-to-expand-air-travel/?utm_campaign=endless_feed
Nigeria	Brazil	25.08.2025	https://punchng.com/nigeria-brazil-sign-deal-on-direct-flights-others/
Qatar	Algeria	02.09.2025	https://themedialine.org/headlines/qatar-and-algeria-sign-air-transport-agreement-to-expand-flight-operations/
Rwanda	Senegal	08.09.2025	https://www.msn.com/en-xl/africa/top-stories/rwanda-senegal-sign-bilateral-air-services-agreement/ar-AA1M8yuR
Bahrain, kingdom of	Japan	19.09.2025	https://www.mtt.gov.bh/news/bahrain-and-japan-sign-consultation-document-air-transport-services-and-direct-flights
Guyana	Oman	23.09.2025	https://demerarawaves.com/2025/09/22/guyana-oman-sign-air-services-agreement/
Oman	Syria	23.09.2025	https://demerarawaves.com/2025/09/22/guyana-oman-sign-air-services-agreement/
Oman	Côte d'Ivoire	23.09.2025	https://omannews.gov.om/topics/en/80/show/125494
Morocco	Rwanda	25.09.2025	https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-industry/2809-49062-morocco-rwanda-sign-air-services-agreement-as-saatm-integration-advances
Guyana	Rwanda	26.09.2025	https://www.stabroeknews.com/2025/09/27/news/guyana/guyana-signs-open-skies-air-services-agreement-with-rwanda/
Oman	Cabo Verde	12/11/2025	https://omannews.gov.om/topics/en/80/show/125494
Nigeria	Brazil	13/11/2025	https://www.travelandtourworld.com/news/article/nigeria-secures-basa-with-brazil-and-amended-air-service-agreement-with-uae-at-ican-2025-strengthening-routes-for-air-peace-and-emirates/
Nigeria	United Arab Emirates	13/11/2025	https://www.travelandtourworld.com/news/article/nigeria-secures-basa-with-brazil-and-amended-air-service-agreement-with-uae-at-ican-2025-strengthening-routes-for-air-peace-and-emirates/
Dominican Republic	Greece	13/11/2025	https://dominicantoday.com/dominican-senate-approves-air-services-agreement-with-greece/
Guyana	Panama	14/11/2025	https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/posts/guyana-signs-six-new-air-services-agreements-with-several-countries
Guyana	St. Marteen	14/11/2025	https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/posts/guyana-signs-six-new-air-services-agreements-with-several-countries

Parties		Date of signature	Source
Guyana	Uganda	14/11/2025	https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/posts/guyana-signs-six-new-air-services-agreements-with-several-countries
Guyana	Ecuador	14/11/2025	https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/posts/guyana-signs-six-new-air-services-agreements-with-several-countries
Guyana	Liberia	14/11/2025	https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/posts/guyana-signs-six-new-air-services-agreements-with-several-countries
Guyana	Kenya	14/11/2025	https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/posts/guyana-signs-six-new-air-services-agreements-with-several-countries
Qatar	Uganda	11/2025	https://www.caa.gov.qa/en/news/qatar-and-multiple-countries-sign-air-services-agreements-during-ican-2025
Qatar	Cabo Verde	11/2025	https://www.caa.gov.qa/en/news/qatar-and-multiple-countries-sign-air-services-agreements-during-ican-2025
Qatar	Haiti	11/2025	https://www.caa.gov.qa/en/news/qatar-and-multiple-countries-sign-air-services-agreements-during-ican-2025
Qatar	Honduras	11/2025	https://www.caa.gov.qa/en/news/qatar-and-multiple-countries-sign-air-services-agreements-during-ican-2025
Dominican Republic	Sweden	12/11/2025	https://jac.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Minuta-Acordada-y-Rubrica-de-ASA-Suecia-2025.pdf
Dominican Republic	Norway	12/11/2025	https://jac.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Minuta-Acordada-y-Rubrica-de-ASA-Suecia-2025.pdf
Dominican Republic	Denmark	12/11/2025	https://jac.gob.do/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Minuta-Acordada-y-Rubrica-de-ASA-Suecia-2025.pdf
Zimbabwe	Ethiopia	11/2025	https://iharare.com/zimbabwe-expands-global-air-connectivity-with-eight-new-aviation-deals/
Zimbabwe	The Gambia	11/2025	https://iharare.com/zimbabwe-expands-global-air-connectivity-with-eight-new-aviation-deals/
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	Cabo Verde	11/2025	https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2444400
Saudi Arabia	Paraguay	11/2025	https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2444400
Saudi Arabia, kingdom of	Costa Rica	11/2025	https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2444400
United Arab Emirates	South Africa	21/11/2025	https://www.travelandtourworld.com/news/article/uae-and-south-africa-sign-historic-new-air-services-agreement-aimed-at-expanding-bilateral-relations-and-improving-connectivity-for-business-and-tourism/
Kenya	Malaysia	24/11/2025	https://nation.africa/kenya/news/malaysian-pm-kenya-on-track-to-join-first-world-countries-5276098
Hungary	Türkiye	Dec, 2025	https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkiye-hungary-flights-to-almost-triple-under-new-aviation-deal/3767687
Canada	Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	01/12/2025	https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-canada/news/2025/12/expanded-air-transport-agreements-with-saudi-arabia-and-the-united-arab-emirates-to-allow-more-passenger-and-cargo-flights.html
Canada	United Arab Emirates	01/12/2025	https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-canada/news/2025/12/expanded-air-transport-agreements-with-saudi-arabia-and-the-united-arab-emirates-to-allow-more-passenger-and-cargo-flights.html
Canada	Albania	12/12/2025	https://ambasadat.gov.al/canada/en/newsroom/nenshkrimi-i-marreveshjes-se-bashkepunimit-shqiperi-kanada-ne-fushen-e-transportit-ajror/
Hungary	Türkiye	12/2025	https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkiye-hungary-flights-to-almost-triple-under-new-aviation-deal/3767687
Peru	Australia	05/01/2026	https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/airports-networks/peru-australia-sign-open-skies-agreement
United States	Samoa	02/03/2026	https://www.state.gov/u-s-samoa-air-transport-agreement-of-march-2-2026/
The Philippines	Malaysia	05/03/2026	https://www.caap.gov.ph/philippines-and-malaysia-strengthen-aviation-partnership-%E2%9C%88%EF%B8%8F/
United States	Israel	12/03/2026	https://www.state.gov/policy-issues/air-transport-agreements

Parties		Date of signature	Source
European Union	Switzerland	13/03/2026	https://www.europa.eda.admin.ch/en/content-package-switzerland-eu
Australia	El Salvador	17/03/2026	https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/infrastructure-transport-vehicles/aviation/international-aviation/air-services-agreements-arrangements
Australia	Maldives	19/03/2026	https://www.infrastructure.gov.au/infrastructure-transport-vehicles/aviation/international-aviation/air-services-agreements-arrangements
Germany	Syria	29/03/2026	https://sana.sy/en/economic/2307260/
Morocco	Nigeria	15/04/2026	https://africa24tv.com/morocco-air-transport-agreement-signed-with-nigeria/
Australia	Qatar	18/05/2026	https://minister.infrastructure.gov.au/c-king/media-release/australia-signs-four-new-aviation-agreements
Australia	United Arab Emirates	18/05/2026	https://minister.infrastructure.gov.au/c-king/media-release/australia-signs-four-new-aviation-agreements
Hong Kong, China	Uzbekistan	05/06/2026	https://www.hongkongairport.com/en/media-centre/press-release/2026/pr_1871
Hong Kong, China	Kazakhstan	05/06/2026	https://www.hongkongairport.com/en/media-centre/press-release/2026/pr_1871
Belgium	Kenya	08/06/2026	https://www.ecofinagency.com/news/1006-56348-kenya-belgium-sign-air-services-and-diplomatic-spouses-employment-memoranda
Jordan	Syria	14/06/2026	https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/Syria-and-Jordan-signed-the-1976-Air-Transport-Update-Agreement./
Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of	Ireland	15/06/2026	https://www.spa.gov.sa/en/N2613031
European Union	Kazakhstan	23/06/2026	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/european-union-signs-aviation-agreement-kazakhstan_en
United States	Cambodia	30/06/2026	https://www.state.gov/u-s-cambodia-air-transport-agreement-of-june-30-2026

Source: WTO Secretariat.

5 POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Acceptance of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement

5.1. During the reporting period, Kazakhstan deposited its instrument of acceptance of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement.[1] Eighty-five per cent of WTO Members have accepted the Protocol, with only twenty-four WTO Members yet to do so.

IP-related International, Regional and Bilateral Agreements

5.2. During the reporting period, developments in the international intellectual property (IP) architecture included Brazil's accession to the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, which became effective on 20 January 2026.[2] The Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services entered into force for Qatar on 10 February 2026,[3] and the Vienna Agreement Establishing an International Classification of the Figurative Elements of Marks entered into force for the Islamic Republic of Iran's on the same date.[4] The Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks entered into force for Grenada on 15 March 2026.[5] The Indonesian Culture Collection was recognized as an international depositary authority under the Budapest Treaty, effective 24 February 2026.[6] The Eurasian Patent Organization became a party to the Patent Law Treaty on 17 March 2026.[7]

5.3. The Free Trade Agreement between MERCOSUR and Singapore entered into force bilaterally between Singapore and Paraguay on 1 February 2026, between Singapore and Uruguay on 1 March 2026, and between Singapore and Brazil on 1 August 2026. Ratification procedures in Argentina approved the Agreement on 26 August 2026. Chapter 15 addresses IP rights and is accompanied by annexes on geographical indications and technology transfer.[8]

Developments in Domestic IP Regimes

5.4. Members and Observers continued to recognise the importance of integrating IP property into their broader economic development agendas. During the reporting period, Nigeria approved its National Intellectual Property Policy and Strategy (NIPPS) in November 2025,[9] and the Dominican Republic's National Intellectual Property Strategy Towards 2030 was launched in June 2026.[10] Japan adopted its annual Intellectual Property Strategic Program 2026 in June 2026.[11] Reportedly, Mozambique approved its Intellectual Property Policy and Strategy 2026–2035 on 30 June 2026.[12]

5.5. Table 5.1 below presents trade-related measures concerning IP rights communicated by Members to the WTO Secretariat during the reporting period.

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[1] Viewed at: WTO | Intellectual Property (TRIPS) and Public Health: Members Accepting Amendment.

[2] The accession enables recognition, for patent-procedure purposes, of deposits of microorganisms with an international depositary authority. Viewed at: TREATY/BUDAPEST/375: [BUDAPEST Treaty] Accession by the Federative Republic of Brazil.

[3] Viewed at: TREATY/NICE/147: [NICE Treaty] Accession by the State of Qatar.

[4] Viewed at: TREATY/VIENNA/45: [VIENNA Treaty] Accession by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

[5] Viewed at: TREATY/MADRIDP-GP/241: [MADRIDP-GP Treaty] Accession by Grenada (Protocol).

[6] Viewed at: TREATY/BUDAPEST/378: [BUDAPEST Treaty] Communication by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Relating to the Acquisition of the Status of International Depositary Authority (IDA) by the Indonesian Culture Collection (InaCC).

[7] Viewed at: https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/notifications/details/treaty_plt_47.

[8] Viewed at: Uruguay activates Mercosur–Singapore FTA on a bilateral basis, opening preferential access to Southeast Asia — MercoPress and Singapore and Brazil deepen economic ties as MERCOSUR-Singapore Free Trade Agreement enters into force | Ministry of Trade and Industry.

[9] Viewed at: Nigeria's Federal Executive Council Approves National Intellectual Property Policy and Strategy.

[10] Viewed at: Dominican Republic Launches National Intellectual Property Strategy to Drive Innovation and Economic Growth Towards 2030.

[11] Viewed at: Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters | Prime Minister in Action | Prime Minister's Office of Japan.

[12] Viewed at: Mozambique Approves IP Strategy to Study AI Patentability and Digital Rights • 360 Mozambique.

Table 5.1 Legislative and Administrative Developments

Member	Measure	Date of entry into force
Cabo Verde	Legislative Decree No. 2/2025 of 2 December 2025 contains the new Industrial Property Code	2 June 2026
Colombia	Decree No. 370 Whereby Article 32 of Law No. 1915 of 2018 is implemented in relation to pre-established compensation for infringement of copyright and related rights. The measure establishes the mechanism for pre-established compensation.	7 April 2026
China	Law Against Unfair Competition of the People's Republic of China	15 October 2025
China	Amended Patent Examination Guidelines	1 January 2026
China	Provisions on the Protection of Trade Secrets	1 June 2026
European Union	Regulation (EU) 2025/2645 on compulsory licensing for crisis management, amending Regulation (EC) No. 816/2006	19 January 2026
Ukraine	Order of the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine No. 337 "On Amendments to the Order of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine No. 11319 of 16 August 2023" of 27 August 2025. The Order introduces amendments to the Procedure for State Registration of Copyright and Agreements Related to Property Rights to a Work	13 November 2025
Ukraine	Order of the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture No. 1052 amends the Rules for drafting, filing and examination of applications for registration of geographical indications in order to align the procedures with the Law of Ukraine "On Administrative Procedure" and taking into account the specific provisions established by the Law of Ukraine "On the Legal Protection of Geographical Indications" and the Law of Ukraine "On Grapes, Wine and Viticulture Products".	23 December 2025
Ukraine	Order of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine dated 7 November 2025 No. 1148 "On Approval of the Regulation on the Commission for the Accreditation of Collective Management Organizations and the Procedure for the Examination of Applications for the Accreditation of Collective Management Organizations".	23 December 2025
Ukraine	Order of the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine of 03 February 2026 No. 1748 "On Approval of the Procedure for Maintaining the State Register of Geographical Indications of Ukraine".	22 April 2025
Ukraine	Order of the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine of 3 March 2026 No. 3645 "On Approval of the Rules for Drafting, Filing and Examination of an Application for the Registration of a Semiconductor Product Topography"	8 May 2026
Viet Nam	Law No. 131/2025/QH15, amending and supplementing provisions of the Law on Intellectual Property	1 April 2026
Viet Nam	Decree No. 134/2026/ND-CP, amending Decree No. 17/2023/ND-CP on copyright and related rights	9 April 2026

Note: The Table contains communications by Members and Observers to the WTO Trade Monitoring Exercise.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

TRIPS Council

5.6. The TRIPS Council met formally on 10-11 November 2025 and on 23-24 April 2026. At its November meeting, Members' addressed technology transfer, pandemic preparedness, empowering women in IP and digital infrastructure; the Council also commenced the review of national implementing legislation of Samoa. At the April meeting, Members considered the implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, and the use of IP offices in support of innovation.

5.7. The Council's work on technology transfer included the annual workshop on the implementation of Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. Technical-assistance activities continued to support Members and observers in understanding and implementing the TRIPS Agreement, including through a virtual training programme requested by Bangladesh in March 2026.

6 TRANSPARENCY OF TRADE POLICIES

Notifications and surveillance in WTO Councils and Committees[1]

6.1. This Section provides a factual overview of the compliance and timeliness of Members' notifications to the WTO in key areas. Notifications are the primary instrument for ensuring transparency in the multilateral trading system. They are submitted by each Member and reviewed by the relevant bodies of the WTO. The importance attached by WTO Members to this issue explains the very elaborate system of notifications and cross-notifications put in place under the terms of most agreements. Transparency in trade and in trade policy making is fundamental for allowing trade policy makers and businesses make informed decisions, and markets operate more efficiently. This Section focuses on one-time and regular notification obligations, for which compliance and timeliness can be more systematically assessed. Ad hoc notifications, which are triggered by specific events or measures, are not comprehensively covered, as the absence of a notification cannot be systematically ascertained.

6.2. The overview of the compliance and timeliness of Members' notifications to the WTO illustrates that, with a few exceptions, compliance with notification requirements of the various WTO Agreements continues to be very uneven. Despite efforts by some delegations to bring their notifications further up to date, the general sense from Members is that progress on this front remains too slow. The lack of compliance with notification obligations across WTO bodies is problematic because it undermines individual agreements and, more generally, the operation of the multilateral trading system. There are several reasons for low compliance with notification requirements, and an important one relates to capacity constraints of many WTO Members, despite the efforts to help by the WTO Secretariat and individual Committees.

Agriculture

6.3. The CoA continued its review of the implementation of commitments under the AoA primarily on the basis of notifications submitted by Members. There are currently ten distinct notification requirements applicable in the domain of agriculture covering the following five areas: (i) Market access (Tables MA:1 to MA:5), (ii) Domestic support (Tables DS:1 to DS:2), (iii) Export Competition (Table EC:1), (iv) Export prohibitions or restrictions (Table ER:1), and (v) Follow-up to the Marrakesh NFIDC Decision (Table NF:1). The applicability of each notification requirement to a Member largely depends on the specific commitments it has undertaken under the Agreement on Agriculture, and in many cases, only a limited number of notification requirements apply to a particular Member. At the same time, certain notification requirements, particularly in the area of agricultural subsidization (i.e. Tables DS:1 and EC:1), apply to all WTO Members. Beginning with the implementation year 2025, the notification requirements and formats related to export subsidy commitments contained in WTO document G/AG/2, namely Table ES:1, Table ES:2 and Table ES:3 notifications ("ES notifications") have been replaced by a single export competition notification, Table EC:1, pursuant to the Committee's Decision contained in WTO document G/AG/2/Add.2 of 16 December 2024.

6.4. At each meeting, the Committee reviews Members' compliance with their notification requirements under the AoA based on a background document prepared by the Secretariat. The latest revision[2] considered by the CoA at its May 2026 meeting showed that for the period 1995-2024, there were a total of 2,268 outstanding regular notifications, which represented around 23% of expected notifications.[3] Members are actively working to meet their notification requirements.[4] Among the four annual notification requirements, Domestic Support (DS:1) notifications had the highest number of outstanding notifications with 1,149 notifications pending (Chart 6.1).


[1] Notifications in the SPS and TBT Committees are dealt with in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 of this Report.

[2] WTO document G/AG/GEN/86/Rev.59, 12 May 2026.

[3] *Ad hoc* notification obligations applicable only upon maintenance of a specific measure (e.g. Table ER:1 required upon the application of export restrictions) as well as the annual notifications where it was not possible to determine *a priori* whether the concerned notification requirement would be applicable (e.g. Table NF:1 applicable to donor Members only) are excluded.

[4] Notification activity has increased since 2019, with average annual notifications rising from approximately 183 (1995-2018) to around 375 (2019-2025). Additionally, the Committee's new simplified process for export subsidy notifications led to a reduction of nearly 200 outstanding notifications between 2023 and 2024.

Chart 6.1 Outstanding notifications per type of notification requirement, 1995-2024



* This number represents the count of reported years and does not necessarily match the number of notifications submitted since some notifications covered more than one year.

Note: The chart covers notification requirements up to 2024, the latest year for which all notification deadlines had expired. Members follow different commitment "years" and for some the 2025 notification deadlines may extend until 30 November 2026. Limiting the analysis to 2024 ensures consistency and avoids counting notifications as outstanding before the applicable deadlines have passed.

Source: WTO document G/AG/GEN/86/Rev.59, 12 May 2026.

Anti-dumping

6.5. Pursuant to Article 16.4 of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 (the Anti-Dumping Agreement), all Members are required to submit to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, on a semi-annual basis, reports of any anti-dumping actions taken within the preceding six months, using an agreed standard form. Members that have not taken anti-dumping actions during a given six-month period are required to submit a simple nil notification. Members that have not established an authority competent to conduct anti-dumping investigations have the option to make a one-time notification indicating that fact, which remains valid unless and until they establish an investigating authority, in lieu of submitting nil notifications every six months.

6.6. For the period 1 January to 30 June 2025, sixty-six Members[5] submitted semi-annual reports, either reporting anti-dumping actions, or indicating that no actions had been taken. Forty-nine Members submitted one-time notifications covering the same period. The remaining 24 Members did not submit semi-annual reports in respect of anti-dumping actions taken during that period. For the period 1 July to 31 December 2025, sixty-seven Members submitted semi-annual reports, either reporting anti-dumping actions, or indicating that no actions had been taken. Forty-eight Members submitted one-time notifications covering the same period. The remaining 24 Members did not submit semi-annual reports in respect on anti-dumping actions taken during that period. The number of Members submitting anti-dumping semi-annual reports and the number of Members failing to notify remained broadly similar in 2025 compared to 2024, indicating a stable pace of notifications. Fluctuations in one-time notifications (OTNs) do not indicate either an improvement or a deterioration, as Members move in and out of this category when they establish investigating authorities. Moreover, some non-notifying Members may subsequently submit notifications retrospectively, meaning these figures can change over time.

[5] The European Union is counted as one.

6.7. For the period 1 January 30 June 2026, fifty-six members submitted semi-annual reports, either of anti-dumping actions taken, or of no actions taken. Forty-eight Members have submitted one-time notifications covering the same period. The remaining 35 Members failed to submit semi-annual reports in respect of anti-dumping actions taken during that period.

Balance-of-Payments Restrictions

6.8. Notification obligations in relation to restrictions to safeguard a country's balance of payments stem from Articles XII and XVIII of the GATT 1994 and the Understanding on Balance-of-Payments (BOP) Provisions (described in Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 Notification procedures for BOPs restrictions

Legal source	Notification requirement	Type
GATT Article XII:4(a) GATT Article XVIII:12(a)	Any Member applying new restrictions or raising the general level of restrictions by a substantial intensification of the measures applied under this Article shall immediately after instituting or intensifying such restrictions (or, in circumstances in which prior consultation is practicable, before doing so) consult with Members as to the nature of its BOP difficulties, alternative corrective measures which may be available, and the possible effect of the restrictions on the economies of other Members	*Ad hoc,* followed by annual consultations *Ad hoc,* followed by biennial consultations
Understanding on BOP Provisions, para. 9	A Member shall notify to the General Council the introduction of, or any changes in, the application of restrictive import measures taken for BOP purposes, as well as any modifications in time-schedules for the removal of such measures as announced under paragraph 1. Significant changes shall be notified to the General Council prior to, or not later than, 30 days after their announcement	*Ad hoc,* followed by a yearly consolidated notification

Source: WTO Secretariat.

6.9. On 24 February 2026, the US introduced the imposition of a 10% surcharge on most imports invoking fundamental international payments problems. The measure was notified to the WTO on 24 March 2026. The first consultations on this measure were held in the Committee on Balance of Payments Restrictions on 22 June 2026. The import surcharge expired on 24 July 2026. Its termination was subsequently notified to the BOP Committee on 3 August 2026, and the consultations were concluded.

Safeguards notifications

6.10. Unlike the Anti-Dumping Agreement or the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, the Agreement on Safeguards does not oblige Members to submit semi-annual reports. The Agreement on Safeguards requires Members to immediately notify individual safeguard actions, such as the initiation of an investigation or the imposition of a measure. The number of notifications regarding initiations and impositions are explained in Section 3.2 of this Report. In addition, pursuant to Article 12.6 of the Agreement on Safeguards, all Members are required to notify to the Committee on Safeguards their laws, regulations and administrative procedures relating to safeguard measures. As of 6 July 2026, 79 Members had notified their legislations, while 46 Members had notified that they had no such legislation. 14 Members had not filed any notification.

Subsidies and countervailing measures

6.11. The trends in the status of notifications of subsidies to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures under Article 25.1 the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures during the period 1995-2025 are shown in Table 6.2. Subsidy notifications are required every two years, and the deadline for Members to submit their 2025 new and full subsidy notifications was 30 June 2025.

6.12. A significant decline is observed in the percentage of Members notifying subsidies, decreasing from 51% in 1995 to 37% by 2025. The percentage of Members making a "nil" notification has also

decreased, moving from 26% in 1995 to 5% in 2025. When combining the data for those that notified subsidies and those that made a "nil" notification, the overall rate of notifications has seen a notable decline. In 1995, 77% of Members provided some form of notification, and this decreased to 42% by 2025. Over the same period, the share of Members providing no notifications more than doubled, rising from 23% in 1995 to 58% in 2025. This sharp deterioration in notification rates suggests that subsidy notification requirements are increasingly not being met by Members. The trend also appears difficult to reconcile with analytical findings by the OECD and the Global Trade Alert (GTA), which continue to identify extensive use of subsidies, pointing to significant transparency gaps in subsidy notifications.

Table 6.2 Status of subsidy notifications (due on 30 June of the year shown)

	Per cent share of total														
	1995	1998	2001	2003	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2017	2019	2021	2023	2025
Members that notified subsidies	51	40	45	45	48	49	49	48	50	49	48	47	41	45	37
Members that made a "nil" notification	26	17	15	14	13	12	18	22	19	19	16	11	10	8	5
Subtotal notifying Members	77	56	60	60	62	61	67	70	70	68	63	58	51	52	42
Members that did not make any notification	23	44	40	40	38	39	33	30	30	32	37	42	49	48	58

Note: As of 14 July 2026.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

6.13. Pursuant to Article 25.11 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, all Members are required to submit to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, on a semi-annual basis, reports of any countervailing actions taken within the preceding six months, using an agreed standard form. Members that have not taken countervailing actions during a given six-month period are required to submit a simple nil notification. Members that have not established an authority competent to conduct countervailing duty investigations have the option to make a one-time notification indicating that fact, which remains valid unless and until they establish an investigating authority, in lieu of submitting nil notifications every six months.

6.14. Fifty-nine Members[6] submitted semi-annual reports, either of countervailing actions taken, or of no actions having been taken, during the six-month period July - December 2025. Forty-seven Members have submitted one-time nil notifications covering the same period. The remaining 33 Members failed to submit semi-annual reports in respect of countervailing actions during the period July-December 2025. Few, if any, of these non-notifiers are likely to have taken countervailing actions as they have never notified the establishment of an investigating authority.

State Trading Enterprises

6.15. The Working Party on State Trading Enterprises reviews notifications of state trading enterprises, reporting to the CTG. Since 2004, these notifications have been due every two years. Table 6.3 presents the number of notifications received in each of the years in which a new and full notification was due. The significant decline in notification activity by 2026 suggests a growing transparency gap, which contrasts with the continued existence of STEs and relevance in WTO discussions.

[6] The European Union is counted as one.

Table 6.3 Status of new and full STE notifications (due on 30 June of the year shown)

Year	1995	1998	2001	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022	2024	2026
Number of Members that have notified	66	65	72	64	64	67	67	63	66	72	60	55	56	50	18

Note: As of 30 June 2026.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

Customs valuation

6.16. Notifications in the area of customs valuation stem not only from the Agreement on Customs Valuation itself, but also from several Decisions that have been adopted by the Committee on Customs Valuation. There are four main notification requirements.

6.17. Article 22 of the Agreement on Customs Valuation and a Decision of the Committee contained in WTO document G/VAL/5, 13 October 1995, require the submission of the complete texts of national legislation (laws, regulations, etc.) that deal with customs valuation, as well as any changes to such laws and regulations. Members must also provide answers to a "Checklist of Issues" provided for in the Annex to WTO document G/VAL/5. As of 30 June 2026, the number of Members that have notified their customs valuation legislation stands at 120, including Guyana's notification issued on 31 October 2025, whereas the number of Members that have provided their answers to the Checklist of Issues stands at 96, including two additional notifications by Barbados and Côte d'Ivoire, issued on 9 June 2026 and 17 December 2025, respectively.

6.18. In addition, Members are required to notify the Committee of the date of application of the Decision on the treatment of interest charges in the customs value of imported goods[7], and Members that apply paragraph 2 of the Decision on the valuation of carrier media bearing software for data processing equipment must notify the Committee of their practice.[8] As of end June 2026, 77 Members have submitted notifications relating to the Decision on the treatment of interest charges, including 4 Members during the period of review, and a total of 72 Members have submitted notifications with regard to the Decision on the valuation of carrier media, including 3 Members during the reporting period.

Integrated Database (IDB)

6.19. Market access transparency is anchored on reliable and updated information. The IDB is the repository of Members' officially approved data on tariffs and imports, and other market access information, including applied internal taxes and other duties and charges.


6.20. Chart 6.2 shows the completeness of tariff and import notifications to the IDB directly submitted by Members or collected by the Secretariat. As of 1 July 2026, the overall completeness of IDB notifications stood at 84% for tariffs and 77% for import statistics. The coverage of the 2026 tariff information, which was due on 30 March 2026, was at 35%. The coverage of the 2024 import statistics was 42%.

6.21. The coverage of IDB notifications varies among Members. As shown in Table 6.4, 41 Members (29%) have complete tariff information, and 42 Members (31%) have complete import statistics in the IDB. The table also shows high percentages of Members with at least 6 years of outstanding notifications - 36% for tariffs and 38% for imports.

6.22. The IDB data are disseminated through different WTO online portals including for example in the "WTO Tariff & Trade Data" portal (https://ttd.wto.org) and are used to calculate the statistics published in the World Tariff Profiles (WTP), a yearly compendium of comprehensive market access indicators.

[7] GATT document VAL/6/Rev.1, 1 October 1984.
[8] GATT document VAL/8, 10 October 1984.

Chart 6.2 Completeness of IDB tariff and import notifications, 2017-2026



* Notifications of imports for 2025 and 2026 were not due at the time of reporting.

Note: Tariff and import notifications for 2024 for Comoros and Timor-Leste are not included in the analysis. The deadline for 2026 tariff notifications was 30 March 2026 and for 2024 import notifications, 31 October 2025. The completeness of notifications is calculated on the basis of the number of Members' schedules (i.e. EU member States are included in the European Union's schedule, and Liechtenstein in Switzerland's). Information provided by the European Union for the period since 1 January 2021 covers its current 27 member States. For the period until 31 December 2020, tariff information provided by the European Union also covers the United Kingdom.

Source: WTO Secretariat, as of 1 July 2026.

Table 6.4 Completeness[a] of notifications among Members

Number of years with outstanding data	Tariffs (up to 2026)		Imports (up to 2024)	
	No. of Members	%	No. of Members	%
None (complete data)	41	29	43	31
1-2 years	29	21	26	19
3-5 years	19	14	16	12
6 or more years	50	36	52	38
Total number of Members' schedules	139	100	137	100

a The completeness of notifications is calculated on the basis of the number of Members' schedules (i.e. EU member States are included in the European Union's schedule, and Liechtenstein in Switzerland's). Information provided by the European Union on the period since 1 January 2021 covers its current 27 member States. For the period until 31 December 2020, tariff information provided by the European Union also covers the United Kingdom.

Source: WTO Secretariat, as of 1 July 2026.

Preshipment inspection

6.23. Article 5 of the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (PSI) provides that Members shall submit to the Secretariat the following information when the Agreement enters into force: copies of the laws and regulations by which the Member put the Agreement into force; copies of any other laws and regulations relating to PSI; changes in such laws and regulations immediately after their publication; and information that the Member has no laws or regulations relating to PSI. According to the notification status as of 30 June 2026, 133 Members have submitted notifications, of which 84 Members have notified that they do not have PSI-related laws or regulations.

Preferential trade arrangements

6.24. Under the Transparency Mechanism for Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs) which was established in December 2010[9], newly notified PTAs are to be considered in dedicated sessions of the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD), on the basis of factual presentations prepared by the Secretariat. Since the establishment of the Transparency Mechanism, 13 PTAs have been notified to the WTO. Five of these have been considered by the CTD in dedicated sessions. Several draft factual presentations are currently under preparation before being circulated to all Members, while for several other PTAs, the Secretariat is awaiting information from notifying Members to prepare the factual presentations. Regular updates are provided at each meeting of the CTD's dedicated session regarding the PTAs to be considered.

6.25. The Transparency Mechanism for PTAs also stipulates that an electronic database on individual PTAs is to be maintained by the Secretariat. The Database on PTAs[10] currently contains information on 37 PTAs. Table 6.5 provides an overview of the PTAs included in the database, which is updated primarily on the basis of information provided by the Members implementing PTAs.

Table 6.5 PTAs of WTO Members

WTO Member	Number of PTAs	Name or description of PTA
Armenia	1	Generalized System of Preferences
Australia	2	Generalized System of Preferences
		South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement[a]
Canada	2	Generalized System of Preferences
		Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff
Chile	1	Duty-free treatment for LDCs
China	1	Duty-free treatment for LDCs
European Union	4	Generalized System of Preferences
		Trade preferences for countries of the Western Balkans
		Trade preferences for Pakistan[b]
		Trade preferences for the Republic of Moldova[c]
Iceland	1	Generalized System of Preferences
India	1	Duty-Free Tariff Preference Scheme for LDCs
Japan	1	Generalized System of Preferences
Kazakhstan	1	Generalized System of Preferences
Republic of Korea	1	Preferential Tariff for LDCs
Kyrgyz Republic	2	Duty-free treatment for LDCs[d]
		Generalized System of Preferences
Montenegro	1	Duty-free treatment for LDCs
Morocco	1	Duty-free treatment for African LDCs
New Zealand	2	Generalized System of Preferences
		South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement[a]
Norway	1	Generalized System of Preferences
Russian Federation	2	Generalized System of Preferences (01/01/2010-10/10/2016)[d]
		Generalized System of Preferences (as of 10/10/2016)
Switzerland	1	Generalized System of Preferences
Chinese Taipei	1	Duty-free treatment for LDCs
Tajikistan	1	Duty-free treatment for LDCs
Thailand	1	Duty-free treatment for LDCs[e]
Türkiye	1	Generalized System of Preferences
United Kingdom	2	Generalized System of Preferences (01/01/2021-18/06/2023)[f]
		Developing Countries Trading Scheme (as of 19/06/2023)
United States	6	African Growth and Opportunity Act[g]
		Andean Trade Preference Act[h]
		Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
		Former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
		Generalized System of Preferences[i]
		Trade preferences for Nepal[k]

a Australia and New Zealand both provide preferences under this PTA.
b The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31 December 2013.
c The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31 December 2015.
d The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 10 October 2016. The GSP that replaced it also provides specific preferences for LDCs.

[9] WTO document WT/L/806, 16 December 2010.
[10] WTO, PTA database. Viewed at: http://ptadb.wto.org.

e The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31 December 2020.
f The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 18 June 2023.
g Entry into force: 18 May 2000. Extended until 31 December 2026.
h The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31 July 2013.
i The renewal of the GSP program requires a legislative act by the United States Congress.
k The preferences granted under this PTA expired on 31 December 2025.

Source: WTO PTA Database.

Quantitative restrictions (QRs)

6.26. The notification of QRs to the Market Access Committee is an obligation established by the 2012 Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions (WTO document G/L/59/Rev.1). The Decision requires Members, every two years, to notify all QRs they have in force, as well as any changes in the interim. As of 18 September 2026, a total of 63 Members (counting the EU-27 as one) had submitted QR notifications and 76 Members had never submitted a notification since the requirement was established.[11] More information on QRs can be found in the QR database. The number of notifications for each biennial period is provided in Table 6.6.

Table 6.6 Notification procedures for QRs

No.	Notification requirement	Total number of notifications received as at 18 September 2026, by biennial period
1	QRs in force (regular notification)[a]	2012-14: 24 Members 2014-16: 33 Members 2016-18: 33 Members 2018-20: 51 Members 2020-22: 47 Members 2022-24: 43 Members 2024-26: 35 Members 2026-28: 1 Member
2	Changes to the QRs maintained (*ad hoc*), or introduction of new QRs	2012-14: 2 Members notified changes to existing QRs 2014-16: 3 Members notified changes to existing QRs 2016-18: 1 Member notified changes to existing QRs 2018-20: 20 Members notified changes to existing QRs, most of which related to measures introduced as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic 2020-22: 21 Members notified changes to existing QRs, most of which related to measures introduced as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic 2022-24: 11 Members notified changes to existing QRs 2024-26: 11 Members notified changes to existing QRs 2026-28: 1 Member notified changes to existing QRs
3	QRs maintained by other Members (reverse notification)	No Member submitted this type of notification
4	Non-tariff measures maintained by other Members (reverse notification)	No Member submitted this type of notification

a Some of these notifications contain information only on COVID-19 measures. See annex table in WTO document G/MA/QR/16, forthcoming.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

Rules of origin

6.27. There are three types of rules of origin that Members have agreed to notify to the WTO Secretariat:

[11] WTO document G/MA/QR/16, forthcoming.

i. Preferential rules of origin applied in the context of regional trade agreements: all WTO Members must notify to the WTO that they have entered into regional trade agreements. The details regarding these agreements are notified to the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), including information about the applicable rules of origin. The CRO has decided that a notification to the CRTA is sufficient and does not require a separate notification to the CRO.

ii. Preferential rules of origin applied in the context of non-reciprocal trade preferences for least-developed country Members: for preference-granting WTO Members, such origin requirements must be separately notified to the CRO (G/RO/LDC/N series). The information notified must use a template agreed by the Committee.[12] Some Members have regularly updated their notifications, and only three Members have not submitted the relevant information to the CRO. Document G/RO/W/163 contains regular updates on the status of these notifications.

iii. Non-preferential rules of origin applied in the context of trade policy purposes as defined by Article 1 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin and notified under Article 5: As of June 2026, 59 Members have informed the CRO that they apply non-preferential rules of origin, while 60 other Members have informed the CRO that they do not. Twenty Members have not yet submitted the necessary information. Annex 1 to the Committee's Annual Report to the Council for Trade in Goods contains the detailed list of Members under each category. Members are encouraged to update their notifications using the voluntary template contained in WTO document G/RO/103.

6.28. In addition to the voluntary template for notifying non-preferential rules of origin (G/RO/103), Members at the CRO meeting held on 11-12 May 2026 agreed to a proposal by Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom for the reorganization of symbols related to notifications of preferential and non-preferential rules of origin to facilitate and streamline document retrieval, while also providing greater visibility to notifications.[13]

Services

6.29. In 2025, a total of 24 new notifications were made under various GATS provisions, followed by 11 further notifications during the first half of 2026.

6.30. Out of the new notifications submitted, 15 were made under GATS Article III:3 in 2025, with a further six recorded in the first half of 2026. This Article requires Members to notify to the Council for Trade in Services, at least annually, of any regulatory changes that significantly affect trade in services covered by its specific commitments. Annual notifications under this Article reached a peak in 2019, followed by a general decline in subsequent years.


6.31. Seven agreements concerning economic integration in services were notified under GATS Article V:7 in 2025, with three more notified in the first half of 2026. These agreements were referred to the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements for consideration. Annual notifications under this article have stabilised since 2023 at moderate levels, below those recorded a decade ago.

6.32. Two notifications were made under GATS Article VII:4 in 2025, and a further two in the first half of 2026. This Article requires Members to notify to the Council for Trade in Services any new or existing mutual recognition agreements or arrangements. While notifications under this Article have increased between 2018 and 2022, this trend has not continued in recent years.

6.33. As shown in Chart 6.3 a slowdown in notifications has been observed over the past years, particularly for Article III.3 which is the general transparency obligation under the GATS

[12] WTO document G/RO/84, 6 March 2017.
[13] WTO documents G/RO/W/245, 24 April 2026, and G/RO/M/86, 19 June 2026, pp.8-9.

Chart 6.3 Notifications pursuant to GATS Articles III:3, V:7 and VII:4, 1995-2026



Note: 2026 data cover the period up to 30 June 2026. Changes to previously submitted notifications are not counted. Figures on Article V:7 include agreements of the EC/EU with its future member States and EU-enlargement agreements.

Source: WTO Secretariat.

Transparency of TRIPS


6.34. Article 63.2 requires Members to notify the TRIPS Council of the laws and regulations made effective by them that pertain to the subject matter of the Agreement. Historically, notifications peaked in 1996, when developed Members notified existing laws or amendments implementing the TRIPS Agreement. From 2000 onwards, notifications have primarily been submitted by developing Members and recently acceded Members.[14]

6.35. The Secretariat's 2026 *Annual Report on Notifications and Other Information Flows* showed that the number of notifications submitted under Article 63.2 in 2025 was well below the annual average of the preceding 20 years.[15] During the reporting period, a number of Article 63.2 notifications, including those from India and Japan, were submitted in the context of preparations for the Members' respective Trade Policy Reviews.

6.36. During the reporting period, 15 WTO Members submitted a total of 98 notifications to the TRIPS Council, under Article 63.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. Chart 6.4 shows the laws and regulations notified from 1995 to 15 October 2025.

[14] Viewed at: e-trips.wto.org.
[15] Viewed at: IP/C/W/732.


Chart 6.4 Notified laws and regulations under TRIPS Article 63.2 from 1995 to 15 June 2026



Source: WTO Secretariat, e-TRIPS.

6.37. The cumulative total of laws and regulations notified until 15 June 2026 was 6,381 legal texts. Significant gaps in the coverage of more recent laws and legislative amendments remain, as several Members have not updated their initial notifications for over a decade. Chart 6.5 below, shows the notifications by subject matter from 1995 to 15 June 2026.

Chart 6.5 Notified laws and regulations under TRIPS Article 63.2 by Subject Matter, from 1995 to 15 June 2026



Source: WTO Secretariat, e-TRIPS.